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SUMMARY 
- ~, ..... _,._. 
i 
The theory presented in this dissertation is intended as 
~ contribution to a central problem faced by contemporary 
psychologists, namely the problem of the role of value in the 
study of human action. 
This problem can be phrased in the following fashion: 
most contemporary writers in the philosophy of science agree 
that some a priori framework is essential for the study of 
naturally-occurring phenomena (Feyerabend, 1965; Katsoff, 1953; 
Turner, 1967). Such a framework serves the dual function of 
indicating, in a paradigmatic fashion (Kuhn, 1962, 1970), the 
direction research should take and -provides an underlying 
epistemology and methodology enabling relevant findings to be 
interpreted. 
Now, at any time in scientific and quasi-scientific 
disciplines, there exists conflicting ideas about how the 
subject-matter should best be approached. These ideas need not 
but pften are organized in the form of schools, orientations, 
or even paradigms (Watson, 1967) and in psychology this is no 
less the case (Hitt, 1967; Katahn and Koplin, 1968). 
Psychology has, broadly speaking, two main traditional 
"ways of viewing" human action; the phenomenalistic (or Lockean) 
\ 
and the phenomenological (or Leibnizian) more commonly known 
as objective and subjective schools of thought (Allport, 1955; 
ii/' ••• 
I 
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Brody and Oppenheim, 1966; Diesing, 1966). These two traditions 
place, emphasis on different aspects of the human, the former 
preferring to glean its information from publicly observable 
behaviour whilst the latter is more interested in experiential 
data. 
As a consequence of these differing emphases different assumptions 
l are made by psychologists about the basic nature of the human 
person. In turn, these assumed bases have important consequences 
for such areas as mental health, psychological research, and 
psychotherapy. ,The position is made more complex by members of 
both traditions claiming epistemological certainty for their own 
assumptions (Day, 1969; Rogers, 1956; Skinner, 1955; Straus, 1964). 
Now, in the existential or empirical psychological situation 
which could be either a laboratory or psychotherapeutic setting the 
psychologist, if he is aware o~ the different traditions, is faced 
with what is in essence a value problem. He has to choose between 
two traditions in order to know how he is to conceptualize the 
situation. 
This choice involves a number of features : the psychologist 
has for example, if·he is a psychotherapist, to select some value or 
goal for therapeutic outcome and some technique for attaining the 
chosen goal. These value choices imply, additionally, a theory 
of mental health and - in the final analysis - an epistemology, 
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a theory of reality. 
It becomes essential therefore that the psychologist in 
the pragmatic situation have some way of understanding the nature 
of his value dilemma (Lowe, 1959). This thesis attempts to 
provide such an understanding. 
In the introduction, the problem is defined in greater 
detaiL Here the various uses of the term "value" are examined and 
the conclusion is drawn that the term has, in the past, been 
defined in accordance with the general theoretical framework used 
by the particular investigator. Thus, for example, naturalistically-. 
orientated thinkers have conceived of value as relating to fulfillment 
of natural drives or the maintenance of homeostatic states 
(Allport, 1963; Lowe,1959; Tisdale, 1961) : human action is 
explained in terms of the individual striving to attain these 
values. In contrast more humanistically-orientated thinkers 
conceive of value as referring to man's striving to creating his 
own Being or fulfilling his own inherent potentiality. 
These considerations enable the following point to be 
made. In talking of "values" or in conceptualizing human action 
in terms of value-goals, certain assumptions are made which are 
themselves value choices (McClure and Tyler, 1967b). There is 
clearly here an infinite regression in which the person stud~ing 
values ha;:.: to account for his own conceptualizing (and, therefore, 
his own valuation) in his understanding of his investigations. 
c--
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Following Bridgman (1959) and Lyons (1963), both of whom 
drew attention to this issue, this value problem serves to 
. 
direct the investigation: we seek, in short, an appreciation 
of how different value orientations cope with this value 
\ problem and how they account for the observer as a valuator in 
the study of human action. 
To this end a specific context, the psychotherapeutic 
situation, is chosen. There are a number of reasons for this 
choice. Firstly, it is important that both traditional "ways of 
viewing" the person are investigated and by selecting the 
psychotherapeutic setting both naturalistic and existential-
humanistic orientations can be considered, whereas if an experimental 
context were selected, the latter would not necessarily apply. 
Secondly, both these orientations make crucial recommendations 
for mental health. The psychotherapeutic context allows these 
·recommendations to be contrasted in terms of their approach to the 
value problem. 
In Section B these two orientations are examined in detail. 
Naturalistic orientations discussed are the radical behaviourist 
position (Day, 1969) and the more moderate naturalistic positions 
represented by Lazarus' technical eclecticism (La~arus, 1967) 
and cognitive therapy (Beck, 1970a). The conclusion drawn 
mncerning naturalistic value orientations, is that where the 
problem is admitted (notably .in the moderate orientation) 
v/ ••• 
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it is treated as an extraneous variable to be explicated. The 
arguments of such theorists as Kessel (1969) and McClure and 
Tyler (1967a,.1967b) are examined and their "explication solution" 
is found lacking in a number of respects. 
Pr:i.m.e amongst these is the point that any explication of' 
value choices removes the value problem. Explication :implies 
that some state is possible in which the therapist would have 
total knowledge of all variables operating in the situation (Wann 
and Walker, 1961): such a state would render the need for the 
therapist to make value choices obsolete and would open the way for 
an authoritative epistemology in which conflicting orientations 
and paradigms would disappear. 
Existential - humanistic orientations treated are Existential 
Analysis, Logotherapy and Humanistic Psychology. It is argued 
that while existential philosophers show an appreciation of 
the value problem not found elsewhere, the systematization found 
in the three "schools" of psychological thought creates a definite 
value essenceo 
This essence (authentic action) is examined in terms of the 
1.B.lue problem and the conclusion is drawn that authenticity is a 
value put forward by a consensus of existential-~humanistic psychologists 
as an ideal way of living. This is contradictory to .claims frequently 
made by exponents of these orientations that each individual has to 
vi/ a •• 
-vi-
create his own value. Clearly, it is argued, if this is so, 
it would be impossible to arrive at some consensual authentic 
value choice. 
In the final section these criticisms are drawn together 
md are cited as examples of authoritative solutions to the 
value problem: in each case, individual therapists are urged to 
adapt the dictates of ,,the respective orientations. 
In contrast, the present theory retains close adherence to the 
value problem maintaining that the only tenable solution is one 
which takes as focus the value problem and retains this focus 
within a non-authoritative and provisional framework. The theory 
is in essence a development of Sartre's treatment of the value 
problem (Sartre, 1943, 1948a). 
Sartre argued that the human person could not be totally 
identified by any theory about him since a theory cannot be 
the reality which it seeks to describe: the human person is always 
free to move beyond the limits imposed upon him by such theoretical 
descriptions. 
Whilst Sartre has been criticized for attempting to construct 
a theory of an authentic consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; 
Naville, 1948), the indeterminacy contained in his writings is 
retained here and used as a base for conceptualizing the therapist's 
awareness of the value problem. It is argued that .the therapist 
' I 
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structures the existential situation in terms of his own personal 
and eclectic understanding of various value orientations and 
can choose to act either authoritatively or provisionalay. 
If he acts authoritatively, he chooses~ value orientation / 
and ignores the value problem. To act provisionally however 
requires that he keep the value problem as a focus of his attention 
(Polanyi, 1968). " 
This provisionality is achieved and intended by the therapist 
being aware of conflicting value orientations and allows him to 
choose any technique which he feels is suitable in the circumstances 
without prior rejection of any technique for authoritative reasons 
(Lambl_ey, 1970b, 197la). 
By retaining the value problem, the therapist avoids 
identifying the patient or the patient's '.illness". He has, in 
contrast, to accept that his own role as an evaluator pre~cludes 
such a total identification and this allows him to see that there 
are a number of different ways in which the patient and his 
problem. can be viewed. 
This theory makes two main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, 
it provides a conceptual framework which enables the therapist to 
understand the valu'e dilemma that he finds himself emerged in. He 
is enabled to see the different values offered by different psychological 
orientations as differences of opinion regarding human functioning and 
this without connni ting himself to any particular va·lue orientation, 
merely to the value problemo 
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Additionally, the theory is a plea for tolerance of 
· provisionality and complexity (Bugental, 1962a; Jourard, 1967; 
Lambley, 197lb)o Most, if not all, approaches to the value 
problem fail to accept that other orientations have as valid 
claims to be orientations (not, of course, to the truth) and 
this is, in the main, due to authoritative belief in systems 
of thought. 
The present theory, by avotding parochial attachment to 
particular systems of thought, allows all orientations into 
consideration and regards such acceptance as a priori to an 
appreciation of the value problem. 
The second contribution made by this thesis lies in the 
movement it makes away from the traditional boundaries set up 
between "applied" psychology and "pure" psychology. It attempts, 
in the manner of Fine (1969), to incorporate the opposing areas 
into one theory and does this by focussing on the value problem -
an issue common to both. This allows the various orientations 
to be contrasted without the restrictions of either pure pragmatic 
or pure theoretical exigencies often found in such attempts at 
reconciliation. 
SECTION A INTRODUCTION 
I 
I 
I 
• 
I 
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This thesis is concerned with a particular problem -
the role of value in psychotherapyo It is argued that this 
problem is perhaps the most crucial one facing psychologists 
in their dealings with people since it brings into focus the 
competing "schools" or "paradigms" which exist in contemporary 
psychologyo Each t}J_eory that has gained favour amongst 
particular groups of psychologists presents in some way a 
value orientation; it advocates in some way the use of its 
particular way of looking at the human in favour of otherso 
o j The problem facing any psychologist at any given time and 
I 
! in any situation is, essentially, one of choosing one value 
· in preference to another in order to understand his subject-
. mattero 
Psychotherapy represents a particular situation in which 
• this problem can be viewedo It allows, basically, two value 
orientations to be compared - that of experimental -
naturalistic psychology and that of existential - humanistic 
psychologyo Further, it is an area in which results of value 
choices take on a relatively more urgent nature than that found 
in laboratory science. In a sense psychotherapy is an existential 
situation; it requires action here and now on the part of the 
therapist and his existential evaluation of his actions. 
From this it can be seen that psychology is in need. of a 
\theory of such an existential situation which attempts to 
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account for and accommodate the role of the valuer (the 
psychotherapist) into a general account of the process of 
psychotherapy. Equally, contemporary psychology demands that 
approaches to such delicate problem areas be open-minded 
in their consideration of alternative formulations since 
anything that can aid in the understanding of the human situation 
must receive attention,.,(Bugental, 1967; Fisher, 1967; 
Kelman, 1967; Lachenmeyer, 1970; Pereboom, 1971). It is 
hoped that this thesis will attain these requirements. 
In this introduction the concept "value" will be examined 
in terms of the way particular orientations have conceived 
of it and the nature of the value problem will be clearly 
defined. 
L 
In the second section the approaches of two major value 
orientations (naturalistic and existential~ humanistic) will 
be examined in terms of their ability to cope with the value 
problem. In the last section a theory will be p~eserited which 
will be a critical synthesis of the two value orientations. 
The model used will be derived, in part, from the writings of 
existential thinkers such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Polanyi 
and from the published work of the candidate. 
3/ ... 
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VALUES IN GENERAL 
.The history of man has been replete with attempts to 
find or discover that which i~ of value to mankind. In 
recent times this interest has resulted in a wide variety 
of endeavours, most of them concerned, as Handy and Kurtz 
(1963) note, with investigating behavior "··· evidencing 
preferences among altefnative choices available to individuals 
and groups, and the criteria, or further set of preferences, 
that influence the selecting of one choice rather than another 
(p.131)". 
Elaborating on this initial specificati~n, Handy and Kurtz 
point out that the study of values means different things to 
different people and can vary from the explicit empirical 
approach of Morris (1949) or Perry (1926, 1954) to the more 
' 
humanistic work of Maslow, who asks; 
What is the good life? What is the good man? 
How can people be taught to desire and prefer 
' , 
the good life? How ought children to be brought 
up to be sound adults? etc. That is, we think 
that a scientific ethic may be possible, and we 
think we know how to go about constructing it. 
(Maslow, 1959b,p.120). 
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Modern man, no less than old, seeks a better life for 
himself. The models that he uses to attain this end may be 
worded as the above, or may be put more formally "to provide 
formal criteria for rational decision choice and evaluation 
(Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes, 1955, p.140) 11 • Others, such 
as Back (1961), prefer to use non-rational or irrational theories, 
arguing that formaLratibnal models (such as the above) take little 
~ or no cognisance of psychodynamic factors which are inherent in 
the dynamic structure of the individual rather than the situation. 
Initially the term "value" was taken to refer to the worth 
of an entity from an economic point of view (Frankena, 1951; 
Shartle, Brumback and Rizzo, 1964). Gradually, however, use of 
the term spread to a wide range of phenomena such as considerations 
relating to the "good", the "right", the "aesthetic" and so on 
(Burt, 1963; Handy, 1969). 
In general two major uses of the term can be identified 
in current philosophical discussion; firstly the term can be 
said to refer to those things which are not "bad". In a specific 
sense the term - in this usage - implies particular "goods" or 
things desired, but in a general sense it can be used to delineate 
~ all that is on the ''good side of bad 11 • As Franken~ writes, 
"In its widest use ''1'value 1'· is the generic noun for all kinds of 
critical or pro and con predicates, as opposed to descriptive ones, 
and is contrasted with existence or fact (1r.s, p. 229)" • 
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A special case of this may be the value expressed when one 
states what is right (Hare, 1952). 
The second use of the term is encountered when we talk of 
someone's values. This is commonly taken to ref~r to that which 
a person values, as Roubiczek notes; 
A value expresses the significance -
great or small,.,.- which man ascribes to 
matters to a particular activity or 
experience or to his life in general 
and thus provides him with guidance 
for his behavior. 
(1969, p. 219). 
The first issue that concerns anyone dealing with the 
theory of value is to distinguish between the expression 
of a value and the evaluation of such an expression. In a 
profound sense this is the important difference between the 
· various sorts of value theories, since, ori the one hand the 
· .. 
former expresses the normative view of what the case should 
be 1 whilst the latter attempts merely to describe at a meta-
normative level the various value judgments about an entity. 
As Burt puts it; 
We think of them (humans) as living creatures 
like ourselves, each with his own implicit or 
explicit aims; and in order to discover their 
aims, we must first discover what things they 
6/ ... 
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value, and wbat are the priorities in their 
schemes of value. And wherever the case 
is one that called for remedial treatment, 
we too must have our scheme of values t~) 
direct our efforts. 
(1963, p.62. My emphasis) 
,rt 
Now, normative t~eories of value attempt by an appropriate 
~.I;'~ 
method, to specify the why of human behaviour. One gets, for 
example, theories,which take some monistic concept such as 
desire or pleasure and human behaviour is then explained in 
terms of the seeking for the stated value. Such a monism need 
not,! of course be a sirnplistic hedonism but may involve some 
state of drive-reducti.on as a state of satisfaction - as 
opposed to a pure "pleasure" value (Blanshard, 1961, Frankena, 
Meta-normative approacp.es to the study of value on the 
other hand, attempt,to take statements of value and ascertain 
the truth status of such statements. One prominent example 
of such an approach can be found in the emotive theory of 
value often associated with the logical positivism movement 
(Ayer, 1936). This approach distinguishes between predicates 
which express an opinion that can be validated in reality 
1 I ... 
1 English and English (1958) define monism as the belief 
that "ultimate reality is of only one kind or quality 
(p. 328)". 
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and those which cannot; the latter are regarded as value 
judgments and are termed expressions of emotion or feeling. 
Such a position relies on the ability of the human investigator 
to correctly identify emotive statements and non-emotive state-
ments an assumption that has received considerable criticism 
(Burt, 1963; Joad, 1950 ). 
This ··criticism has been directed in the main, to 
,,, .. t 
questioning the assumed "value free" notion of science that 
the emotive theory implies. Burt (1963) for example raises 
the relevant issue by asking what the status of the generai 
statement of the theory is. Is it, he asks, an emotive or a 
factual statement ? Since the statement itself cannot be 
validated, by their own criterion, it must, therefore, be an 
emotive or value expression. In short, the meta-normative 
nature of such a theory is questioned. 
Another example of the meta-normative approach is that of 
Perry. He contends that; 
No one would be disposed to deny that there is 
a common something in truth, goodness, legality, 
wealth, beauty and piety that distinguishes th~m from 
gravitation and chemical l;ffinity. It is the express 
/ business of theory of value to discover what this 
) something is; to define the genus, and discard the differential of the species. 
(1926, Pp. 4-5). 
8/ ... 
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Again, the idea is to abstract from expressions of value, 
the core, or common feature. 
It becomes apparent from this brief introduction to 
the general usage of the term "value" that there is a close 
interrelationship between expressions of value and any 
evaluation of these expressions, such that in order to 
investigate values, some framework must be constructed which 
., ._,/;' 
itself, as Burt (1963) points out, contains value theory. 
-a Consequently any attempt to define the term "value" is 
....... 
made more difficult by the requirement of a statement of the 
value of the investigator prior to definition. This 
difficulty has been noted by most authors concerned with 
definitional problems. Patterson (1959) for example synthesizes 
the ideas of Kluckhohn (1952) and Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb 
(1937) to produce the following definition; 
••• Values are what might be termed hypothetical 
constructs. They are not objective - they are 
not objects, or goals, nor are they needs, wants 
or desires. But they are tied to both of these. 
On the one hand they are directed toward objects or ' 
goals, in that they constitute criteria or standards 
for the choice of such objects or goals. On the 
other hand, they are expressions of wants, interests, 
desires and needs; that is they are preferences. 
(p. 55) 
9/ ... 
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It is clear from this attempt at definition that the 
term is difficult to identify. Notice his use, for example 
of analogy, relating value to goals, desires etc. Additionally, 
values cannot be seen and have to be inferred from observable 
changes in some standard criterion, behaviour being that most 
often used in the behavioural sciences (McLaughlin, 1965). 
In philosophy,,, this problem of the role of value in 
·.;'i' 
the study of value, has been labelled the "infinite value 
regress11 (Bridgman, 1955). In essence the problem is 
derived from the difficulty experienced in creating 
epistemological systems whereby the knowledge contained in the 
system is complete and consistent. For a human observer to 
know that it is consistent he must check predictions made 
by the system against some non-system criterion. To ensure 
the consistency of this evaluation a second evaluator and evaluat-
ing criterion is required and so on 1• 
Bridgman formulates the issue ·by talking of the major 
insight involved in knowing at the human level; 
Attention to activities and the first person 
emphasise the insight that we never get away 
from ourselves •••• The problem of how to deal 
with (this) insight ••• is perhaps the most 
10 •••. 
1 Godel (1962) expressed this problem in his theory of 
mathematics (See Nagel and Newman, 1958 and GDnther, 1968). 
.. 
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important problem before us ••• Not only is 
each one of us as an individual not able 
to get away from himself, but the human race 
as a whole can never get away from itself 
Yet it seems to me to have been a major 
concern of most conventional philosophy and 
religion to side~tep the consequences of 
this insight, or not to admit it in the 
first pl'ace. 
(1959, Pp. 5-6) 
Other writers, in particular Lyons (1963) and Maslow 
(1966a) have suggested that this infinite regress is particularly 
relevant in psychology.where both the subject matter and the 
investigator are the same. 
These points direct attention to the interrelation that 
exists between defining values as hypothetical ?standards of 
the desirable ••• and relevant to actual behaviour as a 
function of personal commitment and situational factors" 
to quote McLaughlin (1965, p.266) and specifying the 
particular method used to identify these values. 
Clearly, the way value is defined will bear a close 
relationship to the method used to uncover the value and 
to the general theory of knowledge of the investigator: 
it would, for instance, be of little use to define value in 
such a fashion that it could not be known. 
11/ ••• 
-11-
In any discipline there are specified met:.1odologies 
which can be used by members to investigate r,eality. Thomas 
Kuhn uses the term "paradigm" to refer to the interrelation 
between methodology and epistemology and this is an appropriate 
term to use here when talking about theories of value and 
corresponding methodologies. 
This term has, .. come into general use in both the natural 
and social sciences since the publication of Kuhn's The 
structure of scientific revolutions (1962) and as a result, 
the term is now widely applied, and usage ranges from 
Katahn and Koplin's use of it to contrast the views of 
"behaviouristically orientated psychologists and those who 
preferc()gnitive interpretations (1968, p.147)" to its use in 
contrastine orientations as far apart as behaviourism and 
phenomenology. Kuhn used the term to describe the activity 
of "normal science" which, he argued, operates within a 
commonly-agreed upon set of rules which act as guides 
for the conduct and continuation of research. Watson (1967) 
describes the mechanisms of paradigm activity; 
As scientists go about the tasks of normal 
science, eventually an anomaly, i.e. a 
research finding, which does not fit the 
prevailing paradigm, is obtained ••• (however) 
failures in science to find the results 
12/ ••• 
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predicted in most instances are the result of 
lack of skill of the scientist. They do not 
call into question the rules of the game, i.e. 
the paradigm, that the scientist is following •••• 
Only repeated failure by increasing numbers of 
scientists results in questioning the paradigm which, 
in turn, results in a ::,1 crisis'\ •• 
(p.436) 
During periods of "normal" scientific activity, the 
• 
paradigm assumes a high degree of stability and demands, 
consequently, dogmatic acquiescence (Agassi, 1963; Kuhn, 1970; 
Watson, 1967). It fulfills the needs of its members' 
allegiance by providing "a set of rules and examples which 
serve to tell the practitioner how to identify a legitimate 
~problem ••• what counts as an explanation, which constructs 
are viewed as elementaries ••• (Jenkins, 1968, p.55)" and so on. 
Kuhn notes; 
There must be a basis, though it need be neither 
rational nor ultimately correct, for faith in the 
particular (paradigmatic) candidate chosen. Some-
thing must make at least a few scientists feel that 
the new proposal is on the right track, and sometimes 
it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic 
considerations that can do that. 
(1962, p.157) 
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Kuhn claims - as do others such as Polanyi (1962a)- that there 
is not of necessity an independent, or logical "reality" 
. t 1 to which successive paradigms approxllila e • 
Whilst the term ''paradigm" is derived from analyses 
of scientific activity, it serves as a useful analogy here. 
i,It becomes clear, therefore, that the study of values is 
i' 
, dependent on the dict'ates of particular paradigms and that 
'.ithe position that one adopts will vary according to the 
paradigm chosen. Any attempt to define value as the term 
applies in particular disciplines requires some lmowledge of 
relevant paradigms. 
VALUES AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Both Kuhn and Watson (1967) contend tbat the term 
"paradigm" can only be applied to relatively sophisticated 
\:, sciences and that p~ycholog~- ~s-~~. ~t~d~ at __ P:r:_es~~~. ~C::.k.~!~e 
\ initial cohesiveness required for the development of paradigms. 
----·- -<·~--· --· ---~· 
' However the term has been used in psychology (Katahn and 
Koplin, 1968; Jenkins, 1968; Lambley, 1970b) and its meaning 
1 Richard Hall (1970) criticizes Kuhn for such a view and argues 
that certain systems have rational advantages over others. 
Hall argues that the Copernican system, for example, contains 
less arbitrary features and is essentially simpler than the 
Ptolemaic system and that these are rational, not emotive 
reasons, for the preference of the former. 
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to psychologists can be said to be fairly well established. 
These points notwithstanding, there have been numerous 
attempts (for example, Boring, 1957 and Brunswik, 1955) on 
the part of psychologists to identify broad-scale frameworks 
from which current paradigms (for example cognitive and S-R 
1 
approaches ) have developed. As was noted in the final 
_,11 
paragraph of the last section, this is an important pre-
requisite to the definition of any value problem and in this 
section the general conceptual background will first be 
reviewed followed by a review of specific approaches to the 
study of values in psychology. 
Conceptual Frameworks 
To begin with, while there are many divergent 
philosophical trends that have played important roles in the 
development of modern psychology, two basic epistemologies 
can be identified and will be dealt with here. These 
epistemologies can be identified at many different levels 
and in the first place can be seen in the arguments of 
phenomenalists like Russell (1917) or Wittgenstein (1922) 
and those of phenomenologists such as Brentano (1955) or 
Husserl (1931). 
Phenomenalists contend, briefly, that "reality" exists 
external to the individual and can only be known by looking 
15/ 
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0 at reality; that is, all knowledge is made contingent upon 
the empirical perceptual experience. As Turner (1967) notes 
"for phenomenalism, all ontological statements are reducible 
I 
to statements whose meanings are assignable only in terms 
of empirical constituents. ( p. 53)". 
Early phenomenalistic philosophers posited a logical 
a priori which became lmown to the human observer through 
the construction of a "picture" of reality based on atomistic 
principles. Reality could, according to this principle, be 
broken into constituent parts which were directly observable 
by the observer. By working logically backwards from these 
"phenomenal facts" he could uncover the logical structure 
that was the common element of his "picturing" and the 
expression of this structure in empirical reality. 
One of the more important pragmatic implications of 
the phenomenalist's position was its treatment of the problem 
of how a person was to communicate the empirical observation 
that served as a foundation for his epistemology. Russell (1956) 
points to the need for qualification of the phenomenalist's 
position; 
It is tempting to think that a particular .••• 
constitutes a fact. For example suppose 'a' designates 
the thing to which I am pointing. Is this thing 
(to which I am pointing) not a fact? Not as such. 
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It becomes a fact only with the assignment, or 
prediction of a characteristic or of a relation 
to another particular. 
(p.91) 
More sophisticated variations of phenomenalism as is 
exemplified by the logical positivist movement concentrated 
,,/!' 
on the problem of developing basic "ideal" languages for 
communication of empirical particulars. Schlick (1936) and 
his associates maintained, for example, that sentences about 
"facts" were meaningless unless they bore a direct relationship 
to "facts". On the other hand, people like Carnap (1937), 
Neurath (1959) and Hempel (1959) proposed that the relevance or 
meaning of an empirical statement was dependent on the syntactical 
relation that this new statement had to other statements within 
the general body of existing knowledge. 
All of which suggests, as Russell (1953) has pointed 
out, that phenomenalists are aware of the need for some 
conceptual classification system which can be said to exist 
a priori to the observation of particular empirical sense data. 
u 
. 
I mention all this here because it is often assumed by many 
psychologists and philosophers (for example May, 1958) that 
phenomenalism implies the separation of the experiences from that 
which is experienced. As can be seen from the above this is not 
the case at all. 
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The second epistemology mentioned above, that of 
phenomenology has, as its main theme, the direct involve-
• ment of the subject in his gaining knowledge of reality. 
Thus Husserl for example, draws attention to an essential 
reality which he argues, lies at the back of phenomenalistic 
perceptions. The important aspect in this epistemology is 
its emphasis on the removal of unnecessary aspects from the 
total phenomenological world. One "brackets" all pre-existing 
expectations, constructs, theories or attitudes, and pays 
attention purely to essential phenomena perceived. 
Knowledge therefore, for the phenomenologist is knowledge 
obtained through a kind of individual subjectivity and the 
problem of communication of such knowledge is dealt with by 
describing the process of attending to the pure essences 
(the phenomenological reduction). Both these epistemolog:i,.es 
are related to the traditions identified by Allport (1955, l957) 
in Western philosophy - the Lockean and the Leibnizian. 
The former according to Allport, stresses the reactive 
nature of man; 
John Locke, we all recall, assumed the mind 
of the individual to be a tabula rasa at 
birth. And the intellect itself was a 
passive thing acquiring content and 
structure only thr~ugh the impact of 
sensation and the criss-cross of associations ••. 
(1955, p.7) 
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Allport sees the Lockean tradition as still part and 
parcel of the Anglo-American view of psychology, and indeed 
exists in all theories which emphasize the rather passive 
role played by the human in understanding reality. In common 
with the phenomenalist position, emphasis is placed on the 
mass of extended reality as opposed to the individual and 
his knowledge of it. 
The Leibnizian tradition which Allport identifies with the 
phenomenological and existential movements of European psychology, 
'places greater emphasis 
vl awareness of knowledge. 
onthe individual, as creating his 
In short, whilst both traditions 
take note of the complexities of epistemological interaction 
between the knower and what is known the Lockean tradition 
assumes a relatively neutral, independent body of knowledge to 
the more personal treatment of the Leibnizian tradition. 
More recently, these two traditions have returned as the 
issue over "objectivism" versus "subjectivism" in the social 
sciences. Diesing (1966) elaborates; 
••• On the one side, the objectivists have 
argued that the scientific method requires 
publicly observable, replicable facts, 
and these are available only in the area of 
overt behaviour. Subjective phenomena such 
as intending, conceiving, and repressing 
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can be studied only indirectly through 
their connections with overt behaviour, if 
at all ••• On the other side, the subjectivists 
have argued that the essential, unique charact-
eristics of human behaviour is its subjective 
meaningfulness, and any science w:q.i_c_h_igno.:i:_es 
- -----.--
m~_ing--4tld-purpo·se-is -net. a_sQcJal science. 
Human action is governed by subjective 
factors - images, not stimuli, by reasons, 
not causes. Consequently an adequate science 
of man must understand action from the stand-
point of the actor, as a process of defining 
the situation, evaluating alternatives 
in terms of goals, standards, and pre-
dictions and choosing to act. 
(p. 124) 
Other writers, for example Koch (1970) and Feifel (1964) 
have added to this argument by contrasting the often conflicting 
demands made of a science trying to establish itself and the 
demands of a human situation in need of radical help and immediate 
attention. Koch writes; 
Among the brute facts that must be faced 
are these: Ever since its. stipulation 
into existence as an independent science, 
psychology has been far more concerned with 
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being a science ..• Its history has been 
i largely a matter of emulating the methods, 
forms, symbols of the established sciences, 
especially physics. In so doing there has 
been an inevitable tendency to retreat from 
broad and intensely significant ranges of 
its subject matter, and to form rationales 
for so doing which could invite further ' 
retreat. 
(1970, Pp. 116-117) 
That this issue is a vital one is revealed by the number 
of publications that continue to appear in which one side 
or the other is taken. In the past decade this issue has been 
discussed in terms of whether or not psychology should be an 
objectivist discipline in which case some form of behaviourism 
has been advocated or a subjectivist disciplirle _r_~p.resented 
....... -· __ _:._._ - - .. - . ·-~ ·-f ~ by phenomenologic~l psychology (Blanshard, 1965, 1967; Brody 
and Oppenheim, 1966, 1967; Burt, 1964; Eysenck, 1967; Henle 
and Baltimore, 1967; Knopfelmacher, 1965; Mischel, 1963, 1966; 
O'Brien, 1966; Robbins, 1968; Skinner, 1967; Wann, 1964; 
Zaner, 1967). 
The "clash" between these opposing traditions is seen 
best in the debate that arose over the attack made against the 
phenomenological point of view by Brody and Oppenheim (1966). 
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They contend that "the fundamental data of psychology are 
the publicly observable behaviours of organisms (p.295)" 
and that the phenomenologist, with his emphasis on a pure 
]
experientially-based methodology does not contribute in any 
way to scientific knowledge of man. They argued that "any 
advantages inherent in non-conceptualized experiences are 
obtained at the price,'of their irrelevance ~~for science 
(p. 302)". 
In a later paper, the same authors point out thatj 
1. Psychologists are phenomenologists, irrespective 
of the many differences in viewpoint among them, if 
they take as the fundamental data (J'phenomena'~I) 
for their investigations experiences themselves. 
2. Psychologists are behaviourists, irrespective 
of the many differences in viewpoint among them, 
if they take as the fundamental data for their 
investigations not experiences themselves, but 
the publicly observable behaviour of organisms, 
including verbal communications about experiences 
of any kind (whether they are sensory or not) 
in the form of first and third-person 
reports. 
3. Behaviourists can obtain intersubjective 
agreement with respect to their data, since 
their data consist of publicly observable 
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behaviours. 
4. Phenomenologists cannot obtain inter-
subjective agreement with respect to their 
data, since their data are experiences to 
which, by definition, only an experiencer 
himself can have 'privileged access.' 
(1967, p.330) 
Implicit in the above is the independence of pieces of. 
behaviour, which are treated as facts and thus, as Zaner (1967) 
points out, the ultimate criterion in the study of man. 
The opposite point of view contends that mental phenomena 
such as experiences of emotion, etc., are irreducible to behavioural 
levels of explanation (Burt, 1964; Knopfelmacher, 1965) and 
have to be known by some form of subjective experience whereby 
the knower CJ partly from self-knowledge and partly through 
"-- ./ 
empathy the feelings of the other. In this approach the 
experiencing consciousness of the person (as opposed to purely 
I 
behavioural considerations) is used as a valid intervening or 
hypothetical fiction (Winthrop, 1963) to help in understanding 
the nature of the experience perceived. 
Support for the latter argument has come from Lyons (1963, 
1966), Giorgi (1965, 1966, 1967, 1968), Koestenbaum (1961, 
1962, 1966), Schrader (1969), Schlitz (1967a),Wintbrop (1961, 1965) 
and Zaner (1961). The best summary of this general trend is 
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by Koestenbaum (1966). He conceptualizes the main problem as 
follows; 
The question of confirmation ••• exists at two 
levels: at the level of the particular or 
the individual and at the level of the universal. 
At the universal level it is simply a matter of 
confirming the truth of the generalization. At 
the individual level, however, it is a question 
of recognizing the abstraction. And this is the 
question of precision: what criteria tells us 
that the quality in question is really present in 
the experience ••• ? Behaviouristic criteria are 
inadequate, since the new empiricism or phenomenology 
deals principally with introspective data, ••• the 
closest we can get to precision is intuitive 
certainty or adequacy. 
(Pp. 417-418) 
Clearly the two opposing points of view represent 
clashe~ of levels of confirmation. The objectivist confirms 
that his knowledge of the individual is correct by predicting his 
behaviour while the subjectivist confirms his knowledge by under-
standing the feelings of the other. 
These two points of view differ, the~, in the content 
of the criteria but both, as Robbins, (1968) points out, 
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involve the use of some consensual framework - some agreement 
amongst fellow workers as to the meaning of results obtained 
(Abramovitz and Abramovitz, 1970; Lunnette, 1966; Hotopf, 1958, 
1959). 
In a recent paper Hitt (1969) contrasted these two poles 
J and suggested that they be seen as two "models of man". Hitt 
I draws attention to th~ relevance of the positions taken by either 
view for human affairs; 
The acceptance of.either the behaviouristic 
model or a phenomenological model has 
important implications in the everyday 
world. The choice of one versus the 
other co~ld ·greatly influence human 
activities (either behaviour or awareness) 
in such areas as education, psychology, theology, 
behavioural science, law, politics, marketing, 
advertising and even parenthood. Thus, this 
ongoing debate is not just an academic exercise. 
(p. 657) 
It is possible now to consider actual research performed 
in either or both of these traditions and to see how the 
particular theory of value developed is a function of the 
methods used. 
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Research on Values 
The definitive review in this area is Tisdale 1 s (1961). 
His task was to identify various clusters which had predominated 
in thirty years of psychological research into values. This 
was certainly an extremely arduous task made more so when one 
considers that Albert & Kluckhon's bibliographic survey of 
related literature (1960) contained over fifteen hundred 
references to the study of values. 
Tisdale identifies five "clusters". 
1. The first associated with the work of Maslow (1959a, 1959b), 
Goldstein (1959), Murphy (1953, 1964) and Fromm (1947) "defines 
values as needs or need satisfactions (Tisdale, p.1244)". 
Maslow (1954, 1955, 1962) for example argues for a "Needs 
hierarchy" by which he means a continuum running between so-
called "basic needs" which, once satisfied, are superseded 
by less-biologically rooted and more psychologically-rooted 
needs such as ma.n's highest values including ma.n's need to 
"self-actualization". Closely related are the writings of 
Freeman (1936), Mace (1953), Thompson (1952) and White 
(1944, 1951). 
Criticism of this approach is directed at the lack of 
empirical evidence (Tisdale; McLaughlin, 1965) and the problem 
of knowing which particular need is operating in specific 
situations (Margenau, 1959; Weisskopf, 1959). Weisskopf suggests 
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that these "needs" a.re value-judgments themselves and are not 
suitable for the scientific study of values. 
2. Tisdale describes the second cluster as follows; 
Group Two, while granting the biological basis 
of values, prefers to stress their motivational 
nature as pr~dispositions operating prior to 
_,.11 
behaviour. 
(p. 1245) 
Tisdale refers to the work of Allport (1961) Allport, 
Vernon and Lindzey (1951) and Spranger (1928). Additionally 
the \Work of Bruner and his associates (Bruner arid Klein, 1960, 
Bruner et al, 1966) is relevant. In essence this cluster posits 
a close interaction between environmental, cognitive (or 
psychological) and biological determinants of behaviour. The 
respective theorists varying in emphasizing the role of cognitive 
aspects in directing behaviour (Allport, 1963; Locke, 1969). 
In general, however, emphasis centres about the intricacies 
of situational-bound contexts in which behaviour is seen as a 
tunction of external situational exigencies together with 
motivational (or valuative) pre-existents which pre-dispose 
the conscious "awareness" of the person toward a particular 
action orientation. In short the perceiver is "keyed" by 
these determinants to receive particular information patterns 
rather than others. Thus, for example, Bruner et al (1966) 
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argue that parhcular values obtaining in specified 
\ cultures can di.date the super-ordinate classification 
\system used to :i.dentify objects in "reality". .An orange or 
an apple f.~r :i.nstance may not be classified automatically 
as "fru:it" but may be classified according to specific 
cultural value criteria. 
3. The third approac;:U to the problem of value contends that 
"values arise only when problem situations demand behavioural 
I 
choices (Tisdale, p •. 1245)". This cluster places more emphasis 
than the second on behavioural and empirical correlates of 
value choice (Barton, 1962; Dukes, 1955) • .An excellent 
example of this approach is the study by Charles Morris (1956) 
who, influenced by the views of people like Dewey (1922), Mead (1938) 
and.Lewis (1947) claimed that a study of values from a scientific 
perspective was the only way to develop a genuine "humanism" in 
which optimal conditions for all could be obtained. 
Morris's main task was to exhaust the possibilities of 
human values, that is he sought the extent of all possible modes 
of liv:i,ng. He finally decided on thirteen which, he claimed, 
were independent to cultural determination. In his study he 
concentrated on the conceived notion of value in that his 
questionnaire administered to subjects in different cultures, 
asked subjects to assess how they conceive of the "good life".1 
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Morris does however discuss operative and object-related values 
but sees conceived value as more relevant to actual behaviour 
(Morris, 1942, 1948). Other examples of this emphasis on 
expressed behavioural preferences as defining the term value 
can be found in Grace and Grace (1952), Woodruff (1942, 1944) 
and Woodruff and di Vesta (1948). 
4. The fourth cluster ·'deals with definitions of value which 
hold:~\ that these are "h1tellectually held concepts or beliefs 
.. _, ... ) 
(Tisdale, p. 1245)". Relevant theorists here are Hartman (1959), 
Kluckhohn (1952), Scott (1959) and Smith (1954, 1960, 1963). 
McLaughlin writes; 
••• values are standards that may generate 
motivation, and the first task of analysis 
is to identify these value standards. The 
person's commitment to these standards is 
important also, since the extent to which 
values affect behaviour may be a function 
of commitment. 
(1965, Pp. 264-265) 
This approach bears some similarity to that of the second 
cluster in that they are both concerned with cognitive aspects 
in the definition of values. 
5. The final cluster is a development from Gestalt approaches 
to ps;ychology and emphasizes, as Kohler (1938) did, the objective 
and subjective interrelationship which dictates the appearance 
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of particular situational Gestalts. These Gestalts are said to 
have a value properly independent to the variation of subjective 
taste. Asch (1952), Lewin (1944) and Winthrop (1961) have 
extended this conceptualization to incorporate the social 
context of knowledge. McLaughlin points out that for this 
cluster; 
The objectivity of values derives from their 
ethical nature and is defined in terms of the 
intrinsic appropriateness or harmfulness of 
behaviour as it affects other people in the 
shared field. 
(1965, p.263). 
In sum, these clusters represent attempts at defining the 
scope and nature of the problem of values according to the 
particular guiding epistemology. Clearly distinction can be 
made between the behavioural approach to the value issue and 
the cognitive approach, the latter extending into the humanistic 
realms of cluster one. What can be said at this stage is'that the 
concept, value, plays an extremely important role in the 
understanding of human action and that both traditions 
obtaining in Western psychology have contributed to the 
development of approaches to the problem. 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
So far a number of definitions of values have been offered 
but it is not necessary, for the purposes of this thesis, to 
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have one specific definition of the term. What is important is 
that there is a problem peculiar to the study of values and it 
is to this problem that we now turn. 
Burt ( 1963), .. as has already been pointed out, introduced 
lthe problem as being one which occurs when a psychologist has to 11treat 11 a person - or has to change in some way existing 
lvalues. He must be s~~e, in his knowledge of his own values 
that his own values are superior in some way to the other's. 
We have also seen, above, ~~~~ va~ues_ can ?nly !:J_e _ :Lm:estigateg. 
from within some orientation (oi paradigm) which itself contains ..____ _____ ..._-_" -
an element of choice of value (for example in choosing a definition, 
a certain orientation is also assumed). This is succinctly stated 
by Lowe (1959) 
The dilermna of the practicing psychologist is 
compounded by the existence of a multiplicity 
of .competing sets of values, for one value 
orientation tends to exclude all others, 
each makes a demand for loyalty, setting at the 
same time its own criteria or goal. 
(p.687) 
Lowe prefers to use the term "value orientation" to "paradigm" 
- a practice that will be maintained here - although much of what 
is contained in the definition of paradigm applies to the term 
\ "value orientation." 
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That this "dilemma" is true of the realm of general psychology 
as well as that of the study of values is maintained by Hitt (1967) 
as well as by Bannister (1970) and Koch (1964, 1969). Hitt for 
instance lists cybernetics, behaviourism and existentialism as 
examples of different ways of studying the human. and remarks that 
psychology needs some "higher authority" in order to synthesize these 
conflicting value orientations. He suggests that "reason" is 
~
the only possibility arguing that this "journey of logic and 
intuition, grounded in facts, but inspired by imagination" can 
"lead to scientific discourse among all psychologists -
from existentialists to behaviourists, or from phenomenologists 
to mathematical model builders (p. 271)." 
Let me now formulate in general terms the problem to be 
treated here. Firstly, Hitt notwithstanding, one of the main 
failings of approaches to the study of values has been the lack 
of attention paid to the role of the investigator in completing 
his investigation •. Hitt's use of the concept "reason" is just 
such an example, for how is it that he knows what this "reason" 
is (clearly it is a value of his) whilst this knowledge has 
eluded for so long the appr~aches that he distinguishes? 
Equally, one point made against the more cognitive approaches 
to the definition of value was the la.ck of scientific rigour 
(Tisdale, 1961; McLaughlin, 1965) yet does being scientific 
''imply that one's observer is neutral with regard to his subject matter? 
Clearly not. He has, for example, to choose in the first place 
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the scientific 1 rather than a non-scientific orientation which is 
itself ~xpressing preference for one methodology ( and all 
that it values) over another. 2 
Apart from the above examples I have in an earlier 
publication (Lambley, 1970b) defined the problem rather 
differently. 
_,/!' ' 
••• the history of empirical science and its 
attempts to create criteria that give certain 
knowledge, is interspersed with problems of the 
relationship between reality and the description 
thereof. Some theorists attempted to formulate 
a logical atomism in which atomic propositions 
referred to facts. Such a proposition had to 
consist of a particular ( an event) and a universal 
(a class of events), so that a fact could be related 
to the general class it belonged to ••• (We) can 
see, I think, the clash of various paradigms as 
being clashes of analysis and of language: 
the empirical psychologist today is pointing to 
a particular event and describing it by using his 
own paradigm language. Essentiall;y- the plµ'adigm 
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provides the universal. Consequently, 
when we say the paradigm refers to some 
'thing' we accept that 'thing' is problematic, 
just as we accept that several people may 
have different lmowledge of the same 'thing''. 
For theoretical psychologists, however, the 
problem becomes -One of analysing. these separate 
paradigms and trying to see what they have in 
common. 
If we look at Piaget's work (1959) we are given 
to understand that there are common logical 
structures in thinking. This is in fact a 
commonly accepted base to much research into 
thought and cognition, but how does it help 
us here? An article by Mary Henle (1962) 
provides a useful analogy: she points out 
that it is often held that because Ss do not 
?-PPear to arrive at correct logical answers 
given syllogisms, thinking is not necessarily 
logical. She contends that the person does 
in fact think logically, it is just that he 
perceives the axioms differently, according 
to his background needs, and so on. In 
other words, given the same 'facts' then 
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the same end-states can be reached 
logically. 
Now what of our paradigms? Are they 
not in fact generalized instances of 
the above, in which the logical structure 
of numerous paradigms is the same, they 
just perceive different aspects of 'reality?' 
Let us look closely at this. Firstly we see 
tbat the existence of reality is not ip. doubt: 
indeed, so it seems, all tbat we bave to do is 
to agr.ee on a delimitation of the total 
aspects of reality and then we would see 
that all thinking ( be it by individuals or 
paradigms) is logical. Yet, is this not the 
,, 
very root of the trouble? Just wbat is reality? 
The logical atomists and empiricists could not 
agree on it, and it seems neither ca.ri the 
paradigms of psychology. In effect, what 
r:---_ -----
psychological paradigms do is to pick only 
~-------··--- -----
those aspects of reality which_:th~Y: consider 
. ~ ---- -..... -· --·- - - - ~·-· -----
,-
important (Buchwald, 1961; Gorowitz, 1962). 
ThiS-:rs-H~nle 1 s problem. Even if everybody does 
think logically, epistemologically, difficulties 
$UCh as the above do arise; 'what is reality'' 
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0 
is not really a logical issue at all, but is 
one involving conflicting views about 1'reali ty1• 
(Pp. 577-578) 
The problem as expressed above has also been dealt with 
by Beth and Piaget (1966), Bolles (1967) and KUng (1967). It is 
dealt with at some length above because of the rather special 
place logic has in th~ minds of many scientists. Clearly, the, 
issue cannot be resolved by positing some value existing independent 
to those individuals, investigating the problem. Or, rather, 
one can, but at the expense of stating how different paradigms or 
value orientations come to disagree about what this constant is. 
Most approaches to the problem make some appeal to either 
1 
an independent self-obvious criterion or to some consensual 
criterion. By doing this the problem is seemingly resolved 
since, logically, if all people within a particular value 
orientation accept the basic approach of that orientation 
as de rigueur and unquestionable, then only someone outside that 
consensus (or a rebel) can disagree with the prevailing attitude. 
~~ o t. In.what follows two value orientations will be examined in 
terms of their "solution" to the problem of value, that is how 
they build the observer into their systems, and how they .allow 
for the evaluation of the values of the valuer. This thesis 
will provide a new theory working on from the examination of 
1 For example, Burt's "intuition". 
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the two orientations. 
/ 
/ Before this however it is necessary to define certain 
limits of the study and to specify the exact nature of the 
t~eory to be developed. 
In the first place, I intend considering a somewhat 
specialized part of the value problem - that of the problem of the 
'·) role of value in psychotherapy. There are a number of reasons 
for choosing this specific area and these can be enumerated 
as follows: 
1. Clearly in order to investigate value orientations and their 
approach to the value problem, some area must be delineated in 
order that a comparison be made. As I have pointed out, this 
selection of an area involves a value choice in itself - shall 
we, for instance, demand empirical or experimental predictions 
so that a linear comparison can be made? Obviously this would 
be unfair to the cluster associated with Maslow 1 s work and to 
the existential - humanistic psychologists in general. 
The choice of area is made more complex by the status 
that has accrued over time to empirical experimental psychology. 
"Pure"P~ychologists tend to regard themselves as the direct 
descendents of "true science" (Sanford, 1965). Their position 
and power being gleaned from the remarkable success of the 
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natural sciences in which accurate control and prediction 
in laboratory situa,tions were the foundations of technological 
advancement. Psychology of the "pure" variety, by being 
able to use the experimental method and its concomitant 
stress on aspects or abstractions of the total person, 
attempts to measure man, and not merely to describe him. 
The fortune of such a:· psychology rests on being able to 
predict and control man's direction not only in the laboratory 
but in life-at-large. To the extent that the former is 
accomplished adequately, reputations remain intact, but the 
l application of laboratory findings to the human situation remains problematic. 
0 This point is emphasized by Mehlman (1963 ) who suggests 
that the controlling nature of tbe experimental situation tends 
to be a limiting as well as advantageous condition in the study 
of human action. Mehlman points out that the s1'.:_eer _co_!!!pJexi:ty 
1 
fou;nd __ in tb,~ _human- condition __ cannot adequately_ b~ r_e-crea:t_e_d_~n 
laboratory conditions using humans, let alone when such research 
..-
is performed on animals. 
Additionally, when one considers that the empirical 
psychologist has to select relevant variables for study and 
that he frequently spends his life dealing with experimental 
situations - as indeed is advocated by Skinner (1963) - then there 
would appear to be little point in using his experience of human 
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action as a criteria when compared to the experience, for 
example, of the clihician. It seems fair to say with 
Sanford (1965), Koch (1969), Pereboom (1971) and Wallach (1971) 
that empirical research is done often for the sake of research 
alone, little attention being given to the penultimate value 
that the work has for the study of man. In effect what researchers 
seem to be saying - albeit, in most cases, implicitly - is that 
"one day, when all our little bits of research are put 
together, a conclusive way of living which has been proven 
scientifically, will emerge". 
Nobody can reject outright the value of such a viewpoint 
which is merely, I think, asking for a patient, "all-will-come" 
attitude; yet at the same time - what if one does not subscribe 
to such a belief? Surely one has the right to ask at any 
moment (not just in the future ) "what does the work I have been 
doing mean for humanity? Perhaps this sounds overly 
philosophical but it need not be. If Skinner, for example, can 
C develop his ideas ahead, as it were, of his research (Skinner, 
1948, 1956) then so, it follows, should other empiricists and 
humanists. 
Putting this more firmly it seems that theories about how 
mankind should conduct its affairs should be put to more than 
just laboratory test; they mould also be applied in a value 
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setting such as psychotherapy. More important for this thesis: 
surely by requiring the testing of theories of value solely 
in terms of .a laboratory model inflicts a limiting condition on 
certain value orientations such that their theories about the 
human, not easily tested experimentally, are rejected 
(Ausubel, 1956, 1961). 
This does not imply that we reject the values of empirical 
experimental psychology, but that we seek a field which most 
prevailing value orientations can apply to. Only by choosing 
the psychotherapeutic area does each of the clusters have 
an opportunity to be compared. 
2. Earlier I quoted Maslow (1959b) as saying that psychologists 
sought general rules for living happily. Now, the second reason 
for choosing psychotherapy is closely related to Maslow 1 s 
expression of the general intent of psychology and this is that 
the problem of value in psychology is - at Maslow's level - the 
problem of good or bad mental health. 
[
. It seems rea.sonable to suggest that a viewpoint developed 
't by any method will, in so far as it is a viewpoint dealing 
with human problem~make some contribution to the creation of 
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a dictate for living. And, so it has been argued by people 
such as Popper (1965) and Polanyi (1958), that even 
when a theory is used dealing with non-human problems, 
such as an engineering theory, there are important side-effects 
for mental health. This latter point can be seen clearly by 
studying for example inter-relations between automation, 
technological development, computerization, and variables such 
as alienation, suicide and other "side affects" (Merton, 1957; 
Seeman, 1959). 
Confirming this position are the numerous articles and 
books that have appeared in recent years that have drawn attention 
to the need to reconsider both conceptualizations of mental 
health and the role of value in psychotherapy. Marie Jahoda (1958) 
for example wrote; 
In a sense, the attempts to give meaning 
to the idea of mental health are efforts 
to grapple with the nature of man as he 
ought to or could be. 
(p.l) 
Further in her book she points out that integration 
between research and concepts of mental health is sadly 
underdeveloped. Other writers, such as Adams (1964), Bordin (1966), 
Brewster Smith (1954, 1961) and Szasz (1958, 1960, 1961) have 
argued for a re-appraisal of established dogma related to the 
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concept of mental health. Szasz and Adams, for example write about 
the need to see mental health in terms of "problems in living" 
whereby the therapist is an agent and "induces (the patient) 
to give up his habitual mode of communication and to substitute 
for it a new language •• (Szasz, 1961, p.301). In effect, 
this new "language" is a theory about the human, paying particular 
EJ,ttention to a directi0n that the individual must take in order 
to attain fluency in. the new "language". Szasz adds; 
In his dilemma, man is confronted by the 
imperative need to relinquish old games 
and to learn to play new ones. Failing this, 
he is forced to play new games by old rules, 
the old ones being the only ones he knows how 
to play. This fundamental game-conflict 
leads to various problems in living. It 
is these that the modern psychotherapist is 
usually called to treat. 
(1961, p.308) 
Clearly, from this, the psychotherapist must have 
"-. ~':J ! knowledge of the correct "game". As Papanek says "The 
· problem of the 'real' innate nature of man must be faced 
_:.,. 
by every thinking person and especially by every psycho-
therapist (1958, p.160)". Thus the therapist relies to a 
certain extent on the ability of some framework to provide 
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him with such an understanding (McCall, 1964). Here again we 
find the therapeutic situation a focal point for varying 
views of "the real nature" of man. 
3. Again, the third reason is closely tied to the above 
two. There would appear in Anglo-American psychology to be a 
fairly wide gap existing between the "pure" researcher and the 
"applied" clinician in that the former tends to concern 
himself with a different type of proof of his theories about 
human actions than t~e latter. 
Attention has been drawn to this unfortunate "gap" by 
Cronbach (1957) who wrote; 
Psychology continues to this day to be 
limited by the dedication of its investigators 
to one or the other method of inquiry rather 
than to scientific psychology as a whole. 
(p.671) 
The two method~ experimental and correlational psychology, 
are distinguished by the fact that "correlational psychologists 
like people~" The gist of Cronbach 1 s argument was that the 
two should co-operate and evolve "··· a common theory, a 
common method and common recommendations for social ·better-
ment (p.683)". 
The importance of this position was reiterated by Reuben 
Fine who, in a series of papers (Fine, 1959, 1961, 1969), began 
such a reconciliation. 
43/ •.• 
-43-
Fine attempted to set up a framework within which· 
various methodologies could be interrelated. He suggests the 
following division of labour; 
,./"'Three types of psychological responses may 
be distinguished: stimulus-bound, organism-
bound and affect-laden, o~ganism bound and 
not affect-laden~,, If the response is stimulus-
bound, experiment is the appropriate method. 
If the response is organism-bound and not 
affect-laden, statistical inference is 
appropriate. If the response is organism-
bound and affect-laden, the case-history is 
appropriate. 
(1969, p.530) 
Instead of rejecting methodologies such as introspection, 
Fine sees the concept as organism-bound and affect-laden and 
in his view introspective case-studies provide scientific 
insight into a valuable aspect of human functioning which 
can supplement and add to experimental investigation. 
In accepting this need for rapprochement as a problem area, 
--·· 
and taking note of the other reasons for choosing psychotherapy, 
it is apparent that psychotherapy provides the only level, 
at this time, which most of the respective value orientations 
can all apply too Equally, rapprochement requires some synthesis 
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between theory and its applications and mental health 
represents such a synthesis. 
~· So far, the nature of the problem in general has been 
~ discussed; it remains to specify the precise nature of the 
problem. This can best be done by considering first the way 
previous researchers have conceived of the problem of value 
in psychotherapy. 
Generally, writers in this area have provided a particular 
defini t::j_on of '>value" and then gone on to discuss various 
ramifications of these definitions. Patterson (1959) for 
example, discussed yalues in general and concerned himself 
with criteria of mental health, therapeutic methods, selection 
of clients and the influence of the therapist's values on the 
client. Ehrlich and Wiener (1961) on the other hand 
concentrated on empirical problems in the measurement of 
values. 
Kessel and McBrearty (1967) provide the most recent survey 
and.after presenting a number of opinions on the matter conclude 
that; 
••• psychotherapy may at least in part consist of 
a didactic situation in which the patient learns 
~ 
..:\ and adopts the values of the therapist; the therapist 
as a controller of behaviour is responsible for 
concern with the issues of values, and mental 
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health and psychopathology are, at least in 
part, value problems. 
( 1967' p. 683) 
Amongst the examples cited in this review is the study 
·of Rosenthal (1955) in which twelve patients and their 
respective therapists were asked to complete the Moral 
Values Q sample as a measure of tbe values held by each person. 
·1 
1 Rosenthal found that patients who were successfully treated 
tended to shift their values in the direction of the therapist's. 
Another example was the more recent work by Pentoney(l966) 
who found that "there was a general tendency for the values 
of clients to resemble the values of client-centered therapists 
as they proceeded in psychotherapy (Kessel & McBrearty, p. 677)". 
The instrument used in this latter example was a Q-sort based 
on Kluckhohn & Strodbeck 1 s (1951) classification of value 
orientations •. 
Other studies have questioned whether or not values do 
in fact get transmitted and are adopted by the patient. 
Rosenthal, for example in the study cited above, failed to 
establish transmission when he used the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey 
questionnaire. Further, as Farson (1961) has pointed out, 
the transmission of values may depend very much on the 
\ ability of the therapist. Farson argues that competent 
therapists will not make it their business to get the patient 
to adopt their values but will encourage the patient to 
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develop his own. If Farson is correct in this then "values" 
as defined operationally in terms of specific scalar measures, 
may or may not get connnunicated. 
Clearly what we have here is confusion over the meaning 
of the term "value" and disagreement as how to measure values. 
Ehrlich and Weiner (1961) made an attempt to come to grips with 
this problem. They demanded that studies of value connnence with 
a categorical analysis of the particular conception of value 
allowing a connnon classification of values to be developed. 
Given such a classification, then both therapist and patient 
can complete a questionnaire or Q-sort and indicate what they 
value. 
Such a programme has been attempted by Allport, Vernon 
and Lindzey (1951), Carter (1956), Catton (1954, 1956), Grace 
and Grace (1952), Hawkes (1952), Hughes and Thompson (1954), 
Morris (1956) and Woodruff and Di vesta (1948). In each case 
some attempt was made to quantify selected value dimensions. 
Resultant problems experienced by such investigations and 
listed by Ehrlich and Weiner involve the poor controls available 
in studying the therapeutic situation and the effect of 
investigation on the parties concerned. As we have seen above, the 
main problem was the evaluation of change, that is of 
communication of values. 
Ehrlich and Weiner suggest that this can only be done 
by inference from a minimum of three levels; 
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••• greater frequency of patient's bringing 
in problems independently ranked by the 
therapist as important • • • changes in 
patient's evaluation of the importance 
of certain problems (and) ••• the analysis 
of changes in patient's observed or self-
reported behavior as they may reflect 
'new' values'. 
(p. 369) 
Whilst this is a useful consideration there are two 
important omissions not only in Ehrlich and Weiner's analysis, 
but in most if not all treatments discussed above. Firstly, the 
initial analysis of the meaning of the term "value" is not 
carried far enough. If it were, then the value problem - as 
discussed earlier - would receive prominent treatment. Further 
evidence that this problem receives scant attention is seen in 
the almost universally-accepted bias that obtains in the above 
studies which assumes there is only one way to investigate 
the values of the participants in therapy - using empirical and 
experimental criteria. 
Secondly, there is no attempt to interrelate at the 
conceptual level the existential therapeutic situation with 
the person analysing it in terms of the value problem. At 
the most mention is made of the problem of the role of the 
observer; research then progresses as before. 
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Specifically then, this thesis attempts to present a 
theoretical perspective in which these considerations are 
given prominent attention. In short, the theory to be 
~ developed is one which allows the therapist to conceive of 
.!] the therapeutic situation in terms of the problem of value. 
" 
Further, the importance of the observer-therapist remains at the 
forefront of the theo:s;;r and does not at any stage disappear. 
MODE OF INQUIRY 
,) In the earlier parts of this section, attention was drawn 
to definitional problems involved in any study of values and 
this was found to be no less the case at the psychotherapeutic 
level. Clearly, whether or not values are present in therapy, 
let alone get transmitted, is a question that is answered in 
different ways by different investigators defining "value" in 
different ways. 
\ 
To approach the problem in terms of a preconceived 
methodology, as we have seen, presents difficulties. In the 
present case the value problem has first been discussed so 
that our focus will be a problem rather than a methodology. 
In doing this however, certain assumptions have had to be 
made - for example, the existence of the various "schools" 
in current psychology, the relevance of what has been written 
to this segment of the study of man etc. In order to proceed 
beyond this point certain simplifications have to be made as 
regards the selection of specific value orientations to be 
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considered. 
However, the situation is made somewhat easier by 
the considerations raised earlier regarding firstly the 
two "traditions" obtaini..v1g in Western Psychology and secondly 
the "clusters" identified by Tisdale wh.ich fall relatively 
easily into two main orientations, that common to what I shall 
call the naturalistic orientation and that common to the 
existential--humanistic orientation. The difference between each 
is taken to be a matter of degree and revolves around the 
use of inferred (not necessarily observable) conceptualizations 
of values as opposed to behaviouristic, observable and physical 
conceptualizations of values. 
This decision to use two value orientations is, however, 
not a function entirely of what has gone before, but is also 
based on treatments of the problem as it applies in psycho-
f;. \ therapy. Lowe (1959) for example distinguished four sets of 
value orientations, naturalism, culturalism, humanism and theism~ 
He defines naturalism as the doctrine whereby " •• all notions that 
are not susceptible to empirical validation (p. 687) " are 
rejected and the application of science to all facets of human 
fl 
action is the only conceivable methodology. Lowe adds; 
Since reality is limited to what is defined 
operationally, naturalism limits psychology 
to the study of behaviour, the mind being 
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reduced to the physiological and physical, 
which can be measured. The result is 
behaviourism and a limited scientific 
vocabulary that prevents the erection of 
any hierarchy of values that will transcend 
the physical. 
(Pp. 687-688). 
Lowe includes in this orientation, the classical 
psychoanalytical school claiming that it postulates a 
pbysicalistic homeostasis. He is supported in this contention 
by Allport (1963). 
Lowe believes that "culturalism" takes as its focal point 
the social world. These theorists "see man's problems as 
arising more from his social needs than from his physical 
wants (Pp. 688-689)". This orientation identifies values 
as "loyalty to the culture". Lowe quotes from the A.P.A. 1 s 
"Ethical Standards of Psychologists" as supporting this view; 
The psychologist's ultimate allegiance 
is to society and his professional behavior 
should demonstrate an awareness of his 
social responsibilities. 
(1953, Para. 1. 12 - 1) 
With regard to humanism, Lowe writes; 
••• humanism is belief in the self-sufficiency 
of man to control his own destiny and to 
realise his inherent potentialities through 
rational thought processes. Man's final 
moral obligation is to strive continually 
to realise all the unique potentialities 
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which are inherent in human nature, the 
ultimate value being man. 
(p.690) 
Lowe includes the work of people like Rogers 
(1957a, 1957b, 1958) and Fromm (1955) under this orientation, 
terming their writings examples of "American activism". 
Finally, "theism.i'i. Briefly, this orientation is concerned 
with the "loyalty of man to a God". This position stresses 
the importance of the individual finding his God and thus 
achieving the supreme value. 
Two other writers, London and Rossi, have added to the 
above. Perry London's contribution rests on the distinction 
that he draws between 11 insight 0 and "action" psychotherapeutic 
orientations; 
In general, the activities of psychot~1erapists 
are efforts to implement either of only tw0 gross 
kinds of therapeutic operations I think the 
difference (between the two) can be most clearly 
understood as an orientation towards the problem 
of symptoms. 
(1964, Pp. 34-35) 
This distinction, he argues, is the main area of dispute 
since "If the therapist is orientated toward Insight methods" 
he writes, "he will probably try to assail the ailment that 
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lies beneath the symptom" whilst, the Action therapist tends 
to "behave as if the symptom were itself ailment enough, 
and try to remove it (p. 36)" Clearly the distinction drawn 
by London is similar to that posited here. 
Rossi (1967) adds to this by distinguishing between 
"game" and"growth" orientations in psychotherapy. He writes; 
••• psychotherapists are struggling to define, 
develop, and integrate two very different 
dimensions in their work with human beings. 
In the game dimension one is generally 
concerned with the individual's relation 
to the outside world and his ways of 
coping with it. One typically analyzes 
repetitive patterns of behaviour which are 
apparently maladaptive, one analyzes the 
bad games and seeks to substitute good ones 
in their place. In the growth dimension, 
on the other hand, one is more concerned 
with the individual's experience of his 
inner world and his relation to it ••• 
the focus of the work is more definitely 
on the development or growth of something 
new in the personality. 
(p.139) 
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Rossi argues that the game orientation emerged from 
a model that viewed man as " a kind of mechanism, with a 
model derived from areas like biology, mechanisms, or, 
more recently, computer and information technology (p.140)". 
He cites, in this respect Dollard and Miller (1950), Wolpe, 
Salter and Reyna (1964), Eysenck (1960), Ullman and Krasner (1965) 
and the computer-derived systems of Miller, Galanter and Pribram 
(1960) and Breger and McGaugh (1965). He also refers to 
behaviouristically orientated writers such as Sullivan (1953), 
Kelly (1955), Berne (1961, 1964), Wolberg (1964), Glasser (1965) 
\ 
and Szasz (1961) wh.o all, he argues, advocate therapies that 
"concentrate on learning better ways of coping with reality and 
thus, in the final analysis, be understood as therapies that 
people better games they can play (p.141)". 
The "growth" dimension is.not as concerned with the learning 
of socially-adaptive games as the above but rather concentrates on 
the individual. The patient is encouraged to create his own 
personality and assume responsibility for his own growth. Rossi 
says that " the subject is always in a process of development 
wherein he designs or synthesizes his experience of the world 
(p.144)". 
Finally, other psychologists have also made mention of 
the basic dichotomy that seems to exist in psychotherapeutic 
thinking. In particular Jessor (1956) writes; 
Discussions of psychotherapy in nearly all 
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recent tests refer to two general directions 
or goals of treatment. The first of these 
is .~trapersonal and usually refer to the 
reduction or elimination of conflict on in:.~er 
tension ••• the second major goal of treat-
ment (is what has been) called the agreement 
of behaviour with,., cultural expectations; what 
others have referred to as social conformity. 
(Pp. 264-265) 
Others such as Rotter (1963) and Weisskopf Joelson 
(1953, 1968a, 1968b) have made similar comments. 
•" 
Any exposition of the problem must take into account ~~-th··-~ 
these orientations a.~d a convenient break up is that between ~ 
the naturalistic and existential -humanistic, despite Lowe 1 s 
four orientations. It seems appropriate to subsume Lowe's 
"culturism" under the naturalistic orientation and to place 
the theistic under the existential - humanistic (Royce, 1962; 
~rickland, 1966). 
-........_ 
Tlie-naturalistic orientation will be examined first 
followed by the existential -humanistic. In each case, the 
general tenets of the orientation will be discussed and then we 
shall endeavour to ascertain the orientations position with regard 
to the value problem in psychotherapy. In discussing the naturalistic 
orientation, three variations will be treated - radical, eclectic 
and cOgni tive approaches - whilst in the existential- humanistic 
orientation existentialanalysis, logotherapy and the humanistic 
approach will be discussed. 
\ 
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It is important to distinguish (as Lowe, 1959, fails to do) 
between three approaches which, whilst being clearly naturalistic 
in their general value orientation, nevertheless have different 
implications for the psychotherapeutic situationo On the one 
hand, there is a form of naturalism which I shall term radical 
and on the other a position which I shall call for convenience, 
moderate. There a.re a,·number of important differences between 
these which have to be specified. 
Before proceeding however it is necessary to explain the 
apparent neglect of the psychoanalytic orientation in the 
break-up of value orientations into two broad groups. The 
position of psychoanalysis is somewhat difficult to classify 
involving as it does components of both tha naturalistic and 
existential - humanistic orientations. Lowe, for example 
argues that; 
! 
Both Behaviorism and classical psychoanalysis 
in turn imply a pbysical hedonism by 'placing 
emphasis on pbysical laws which reduce the 
life of the mind to the needs of the body. 
(1959, p.668) 
Equally however, much of more recent psychoanalytic theory 
emphasizes the importance of ego-functioning in much the 
same way as humanistic psychologists emphasize growth of 
self concept (Bellak, 1970; Brown, 1964; London, 1964, 
Macleod, 1963). 
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Allport (1963) makes a useful suggestion by distinguishing 
between closed and open system theories in the study of 
personality; he argued that psychoanalysis, along with 
similar reductive theorie~ was concerned mainly with the 
biological homeostatic balance assumed to underlie human 
functioning. More existential and humanistic theories tend, 
on the other hand, to believe in an essential growth factor 
underlying behaviour. 
In this thesis then following Allport and Lowe, we 
will consider psychoanalytic theory to be fundamentally 
naturalistic in nature whilst at the same tL~e recognizing 
the contribution it has made to virtually all orientations 
treated (Binswanger, 1957). What is important in the distinction 
made here between the two orientations is that the type of 
approach to the value problem be examined. Clearly, if one 
wanted to cover every possible approach to the value problem, 
numerous other distinctions would have to be made. The 
distinction employed here seeks to incorporate value orientations 
which are representative of the two epistemological traditions 
discussed in Section A. This has necessitated including 
Continental as well as Anglo-American psychologies, something 
that is not always done in other treatments. / 
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R.AnICAL NATURALISTIC VALUE ORIENTATION 
Traditionally, naturalism in psychology began with the 
work of J.B. Watson (1913) who advocated an environmentalistic 
determinism which still holds an influential place in modern 
psychology. Watson's writings, together with developments in 
laboratory science, the use of animals in experimentation and 
the growth of appropria'te philosophy of science (logical positivism), 
helped to ground behaviourism in the methods of traditional 
science. Consequently, terms often associated with natural 
science become familiar to psychologists (for example, 
operationism, empiricism, the public nature of knowledge etc). 
I Radical naturalistic approaches in psychology are a 
direct outgrowth of this tradition and I shall make reference 
to the works of Skinner (1957, 1963, 1964, 1966a, 1966b, 1969) 
Eysenck (1952, 1964b) and Day (1969) as representative of this 
\ approach to the study of man. 
Although there have been debates in the literature over 
the particular delineations of the various "action" schools, 
(Breger and McGaugh, 1965; Yates, 1970a, 1970b) here I shall use 
the views of what Breger (1968) calls the Eysenck-Wolpe axis and 
what Yates terms the Lindsley-Skinner (American) school. What 
I am after is an expression of the value that is applied in 
therapy by the radical school of thought. And in this respect 
the ideas of Eysenck and Skinner overlap. 
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Main Tenets 
This position is that closest to the phenomenalistic 
tradition and involves the conceptualization of the study 
of man as a public, behavioural task. Man is examined in 
terms of a functional model and the units of analysis are 
determined by the operationality (Skinner, 1945) of constructs 
used (Boring, 1945; Boring et al, 1945). Involved in such a 
programme is the reduction of human "data" to the level of 
observable measures (Maltzman, 1966; Millen.son, 1968; Jessor, 1963). 
Thus argues the radical, to talk of a "mind" or any other 
inferred entity is to give reality to a term which cannot be 
observed. However, the radical does not just deny such 
inferred entities (Marx, 1951, 1963); 
Even the most mentalistic language is understandable 
and valuable in this sense. The meaningfulness 
of psychological and mental terms provides no 
insuperable problem, provided the verbal 
practices of both speaker and hearer have 
been shaped by overlapping verbal communities. 
The meaning of such terms can be clarified by 
an attempt to assess the observable (not 
necessarily publicly observable) events 
that act as discriminative stimuli in 
control of emission of the term. 
(Day, 1969, p.320) 
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The radical behaviourist wishes to guard against assumed, 
-~ 
or animistic commonsense formulations which have no factual 
basis. Day writes; 
He (the radical) does not believe that the 
functional relations he describes :constitute 
an identification of anything which might be 
called 'true law~ of nature' , in the sense that the 
systematic collection of such functional relations 
can ultimately be expected to fit togeth~r into 
a completed picture of an account of human 
interaction with the environment. Rather, he is· 
t content for the most part simply to describe what-
ever natural consistency he can actually see, 
and to hope that the report he makes of his 
observations will in turn generate uitimately 
more productive behaviour in the control of 
human affairs. He adopts this course of action 
out of an interest in.increased efficiency and 
a· conviction that only the analysis of behaviour 
will lead some day to a more trustworthy set 
of guideline$ for the acquisition of know~edge. 
I 
. 
( p. 319) 
In his desire to describe these "natural consistencies" the 
radical ha:s to rely on some ·criteria which will tell him when 
he has successfully described these consistencies. Day (1969) 
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suggests that this focal point is the search for the variables 
in the environment which control behaviour; 
(the behaviorist) is most confident in his 
statement of a functional relationship 
if it plays some part in guiding hiin 
eventually to the successful manipulation, 
i.e. control, of specific behavior. 
(Day, 1969, p.318) 
We see from this a clear role being given to the mani-
pulator, but what status does this manipulator have in terms 
of radical behaviour theory? ·The radical behaviourist has 
a ready answer to this; as Day puts it; 
A second basic dimension of radical behaviorism 
is its insistence that scientists are themselves 
no more than behaving organismso Science is 
at heart either the behavior of scientists or the 
artifacts of such activity, and scientific 
behavior is in turn presumably controlled by 
much the same kind of variables as those 
which govern any other aspect of complex 
human behavior ••• The radical behaviorist 
faces the fact that the ultimate achievement 
of his scientific activities is for the mo.st 
part either further verbal behavior on his part 
or a new set of acquired behaviors which hopefully· 
enable him to control nature more effectively. 
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Day is trying to avoid establishing a science of behaviour 
in which knowledge is re-ified independent to the knower 
(Mandler and Kessen, 1959). Yet his arguments seem contradictory 
in that on the one hand he says that what a scientist sees is 
the result of a particular reinforcing contingency acting on 
him. Yet at the same time "natural consistencies" do occur 
and can be controll'ed. The contradiction occurs when we are 
asked to accept the community '2> relativism of the former 
statement together with the re-ification contained in the 
latter (Gibson,·· 1960). 
Other tenets can be found in the work of Eysenck and his 
associates. These writers have tried to developf explanatory 
systems in terms solely of empirical criteria. 
Writing as early as 1952, Eysenck attempted to apply 
empiricism to psychotherapeutic and related areas. He denounced 
the crtteria for therapeutic change set up by conventional 
psychotherapies and insisted on the use of empirically valid 
criteria as the only acceptable explanation of human action. 
Despite attacks on his position, notably by Rosensweig (1954), 
Hoppock (1953, 1954), Raush (1954) and Strupp (1963) Eysenck, 
1954, 1955, 1960, 19f:4a, 1964b). In common with Day above 
he has repeatedly stressed that this method is the only valid 
L 
-63-
· one, deriving its privilege from learning theory 
approaches to the study of behaviour. 
Eysenck's general position can be characterized as 
follows: he views the disturbed personality as the result of 
two interrelated determining conditions. The first.can be 
regarded as a biological pre-condition which stresses individual 
.... 
difference in genetical inheritance, "conditionability and 
autonomic lability (Eysenck and Rachman, 1965, p.12)". 
The second c,ondition, a more environmentally determined one 
interacting closely wtth the first, involves poor learning 
developing in the individual through the lack of correct 
conditioning occurring. Describing this interacting, 
Eysenck and Raclunan write; 
In the first instance, we have a single 
traumatic event, or else a series of 
sub-traumatic events producing un-
conditioned but strong autonomic reactions ••• 
At the second stage we find that in a large 
number of cases conditioning takes place, in 
the sense that a previously neutral stimulus, 
through association, becomes connected with the 
unconditioned stimuli which give rise to the 
traumatic, emotional reaction ••• (However) 
conditioned responses which are not reinforced 
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begin to extinguish, and we would expect, 
therefore, that conditioned autonomic 
responses ••• would extinguish as the 
individual concerned encounters many 
examples of a conditioned stimulus which 
are not followed by reinforceme~t ••• 
The evidence i.!3 indeed very strong that 
such remission takes place ••• The fact 
that not all cases show spontaneous 
remission·; however, must make us suspect 
that there is, in many cases, a third stage. 
(Eysenck and Racbm.an, 1965, Pp. 4-5) 
The third stage involves the action of the person in 
evading conditions under which "spontaneous remission" would. 
occur. Here there is a failure in the conditioning process resulting 
in the development of socially undesirable habits. 
Eysenck and Racbm.a.n distinguish a sub-group of this latter; 
••• there may have taken place a type of 
positive, appetitive conditioning which 
is contrary to the rules and laws of the 
country in question. Thus homosexual, 
fetishistic, or other perverse erotic 
behavior patterns may have become 
fixated through a process of conditioning 
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in which these undesirable behavior patterns 
were in fact reinforced tbrough orgasm or 
in some other way, so that the problem 
for the therapist is now one of breaking 
down the positive conditioning and of 
establishing instead a negative conditioned 
response to these stimuli ••• Punisbrnent 
(i.e. from society) therefore, coming much 
later than the rewarding consequences of the 
guilty act., is not likely to lead to extinction 
of behavior in the long run. 
(Pp. 8-9) 
It is clear from the above that a strong element of social 
conformity enters into this particular value orientation. In 
fact, emphasis seems placed almost entirely on the adequacy 
of a per$on 1 s observable behaviour where observable means 
socially observable. Where implied events are considered they 
are seen as intermediaries and only used where appropriate to the 
control of overt behavior (Champion, 1967; ·Lichtenstein, 1971). 
Psychotherapeutic value implications 
In sum, this radical orientation involves the acceptance 
by its exponents of one overriding perspective: behaviour 
is the sole criterion and involves, at the psychotherapeutic 
level, the therapist fitting"easily into his role as an expert in 
the repetitive and empirically verifiable pattern of psychopathology. 
He has been taught to do this and has authority and theory to guide 
him. (Rossi, 1967, p.149)". Or, as London puts it, "the Action 
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therapist is interested entirely in his ability to manipulate 
behaviours to eliminate symptoms, and is somewhat complacent 
about their origin (1964, p.78)". 
In general, objections to this programme have concentrated 
on the facile acceptance of social action as the value expressed 
in therapy. (Breger and McGaugh, 1965; Jourard, 1959, 1961; 
Rogers, 1955, 1956 and Weitzman, 1967). Grossberg (1964) 
for example, wrote; 
If there is agreement that all psychological 
treatment involves a lawful interpersonal 
influence process, then objections must be 
made to the kind of manipulation or 
influence involved in behavior therapy, 
rather than to manipulation per se. 
(1964, p.84) 
Now clearly, this is a criterion that involves the value 
problem. How is it, one has to ask, that the behaviour controller 
alone can decide which behaviours are acceptable and which not? 
Ulrich (1967) makes this claim in reply; 
There has been some feeling that the actual 
application of the scientific control of 
behaviour, especially as pertains to human 
values, should be withheld until goals and 
restrictions have been made more explicit. 
67/ ••• 
-67-
But why should scientists refrain from 
actively working to effect cultural ethics 9 .... 
If we refuse to apply our knowledge of behaviour, we 
are not simply taking a neutral position. 
Rather, we are endorsing other forms of control 
which gain in potency as we withhold the 
competition offered by our methods ••• 
Perhaps research will someday yield 
reliable criteria that can be used to 
help decide which individuals will 
control which behaviours ••• Debate 
concerning the morality of behaviour 
control should be replaced with experi-
mentation, both basic and applied, designed 
to better determine immediately the 
behaviours necessary for approximating 
a reinforcing existence for all. 
(Pp. 232-233) 
For Ulrich and others (Kanfer, 1965; Parsons and Fox, 1958) 
"experimentation" is the answer to the value problem. The 
fact that the controlling therapist is a person involved in living 
is considered irrelevant; all problems of living cannot be 
solved by discussion but must be solved by a naturalistic 
programme (Bandura, 1961, 1968; Ullman and Krasner, 1965; Ulrich 
et al , 1966). 
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There are however several writers who have gone into 
this problem in more depth. Skinner (1956) for example shows 
that he is very aware of the dangers involved in advocating 
the naturalistic control of human behaviour. He Writes; 
Control must be analyzed and considered 
in its proper proportions. No one, I 
am sure, wishes .. to develop new master-
slave relationships or bend the will 
of the people to despotic rulers in new 
ways. These are patterns of control 
appropriate to a world without science. 
They may well be the first to go when the 
experimental analysis of behaviour comes 
into its own in the design of cultural 
practices. 
( p. 278) 
With regard to the role of value, he suggests the following; 
Any list of values is a list of 
reinforcers - conditioned or other-
wise. We are so constituted that 
under certain circumstances food, water, 
sexual contact, and so on will make any 
behaviour which produces them more likely 
to occur again ••• People behave in ways 
which, as we say, conform to ethical, 
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governmental, or religious patterns because 
they are reinforced for doing so. The 
resulting behaviour may have far-reaching 
consequences for the survival of the 
pattern to which it conforms. And 
whether we like it or not, survival is the 
ultimate criteria. This is where, it seems to 
me, science can help - not in choosing a goal, 
but in enabling us to predict the survival 
value of cultural practices. Man has too 
long tried to get the kind of world he wants 
by glor:j.:fying some brand of immediate rein-
forcement. As science points up more and 
more of the remoter consequences, he may 
begin to work to strengthen behaviour, not 
in slavish devotion to a chosen value, but 
with respect to the ultimate survival of 
mankind. Do not ask me why I want mankind 
to survive. I can tell you wby only in the 
sense in which the physiologist can tell 
you why I want to breathe. Once the relation 
between a given step and the survival of my 
group has been pointed out, I will take that 
step. 
(Pp. 289-290) 
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and thus finally; 
Fear of control, generalized beyond any 
moment, has led to a misinterpretation of 
valid practices and the blind rejection of 
intell-igent planning for a better way of 
life ••• in conquering this fear we shall 
become more matl:lre and better organized 
and shall, thus, more fully actualize 
ourselves as human beings. 
(p. 292) 
I have quoted at length here in order to reveal the subtle 
attempt to evade the main issue. Where one expects a significant 
treatment of the value problem, one gets mere reference to the 
ultimate survival value of particular actions. There is no 
acceptance of difference in opinion amongst academic equals, 
such that one would expect: survival is best achieved through 
the agencies of behaviour theory as espoused, in this case, · 
by Skinner. That other orientations may see different choices 
is out of the question, they are, in short, simply wrong. 
In this respect Krasner (1962) writes; 
We would suggest two major steps to be 
takeri ••• The first is to develop teclm.iques 
of approaching the basic problem of social 
and ethical issues involved in behaviour control 
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A second ••• is communication between the 
general public and the research investigations. 
The psychologist (must be) ••• constantly alert 
to what is taking place in society and ••• 
(be) active in investigating and controlling 
the social uses of behaviour control. 
(1962, p.203) 
and Eysenck (1969) in criticising therapists who dare to 
deviate from this experimental norm, writes; 
This eclectic, middle-of-the-road, common-sense 
approach has a considerable appeal to the 
practising therapist ••• It sounds fine 
to say that each method should be used 
when appropriate, or for suitable 
subjects, but in fact this is, at the 
moment, a statement of no empirical 
content. 
(p.l) 
In sum then, this variation of the naturalisti.c ·Jalue 
orientation either ignores the depth of the value problem 
(Eysenck and Rachman, 1956; Frank , 1961; Greenspoon, 1961,19S2; 
Greenspoon and Brownstein, 1967; Kanfer, 1961; Krasner, 1961; 
Salzinger, 1959) or, where it is treated in depth (London, 1969) 
recourse is made to the application of the value orientation to 
correct its own errors • London writes; 
••• Man is thus ethically committed to a 
technical contest with himself whose future 
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limit is not evident: he must keep making 
new things to correct the indecencies 
which are sometimes by-products of the new 
things he has made • 
. (Pp. 215-216) 
This grasping search for penultimate certainty -seems 
doomed to remain just a search and it assumes obsessive pro-
portions in its attempts to keep out all alternative formulations. 
So much so that it neglects the important ethical and value 
issues with which it is supposed to deal so efficiently 
~ Criticism of this value orientation has generally been of 
J 
the type that invokes the "full" nature of man as an alternative. 
Thus humanists like Maslow (1962), May (1961), Caruso (1964) and 
others such as Koch (1969a, 19S9b) and Lyons (1965) complain of 
the narrowness of the radical point of view which restricts the 
study of man - especially in a psychotherapeutic context - to 
observable behaviours. 
However, whilst these points of criticism are well taken there 
is still a more important one and that is that this particular 
orientation denies the value problem. It reduces the problem 
of value to the level'at which it is seen as an unfortunate 
and temporarily uncontrolled variable, not of any importance 
and easily accommodated by increasing the application of the 
orientation's methodology (Holt, 1952; Immergluck, 1964; 
· Skinner, 1969). 
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The resultant position expressed is that the psychotherapeutic 
' 
{ goal is behaviour which is in conformity with socially -
acceptable behaviour (Skinner, 1966a, 1966b). 
MODIFIED NATURALISTIC VALUE ORIENTATIONS 
Consideration of'., the naturalistic position in modern 
psychology reveals the need to identify a movement away from 
the tenets expressed above towards a framework in which, whilst 
remaining naturalistic in orientation, makes a deal more use of 
non-observable entities (Meissner, 1966). 
By way of background it is appropriate to discuss two 
major philosophical ideas which bave found adherents among 
psychologists and wbich bave helped in formulating the mo~ified 
naturalistic approach. 
Perhaps the most significant of these "revolutionary" ideas 
bas been the arglllllent for a relational epistemology. Gtinther 
(1968) for example, suggests tbat "reality" today cannot be seen 
as a Platonic-like mass awaiting discovery; rather,. he argues, 
modern. conceptions of reality involve obvious disagreement about 
the ultima.te nature of reality. He points out that the e;x:istence 
of competing schools of thought is more of a reality than faith 
in the evolution of some tdal epistemology independent to human 
conception of it. 
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These ideas have been developed in depth by many 
philosophers of s-cience in particular Feyerabend (1961; 1962, 
1965, 1970), Hanson (1958), Katsoff (1947, 1949, 1953), Lewis 
(1923, 1929) and Polanyi (1958). Lewis (1929) for example 
contends that the development of empirical knowledge requires 
an a priori schema of defining concepts which direct attention 
to particular empirical,,"reality". 
Similarly, Turner (1967) cites a number of different types 
of a priori~. which can influence directions taken in research 
and in thinking. Amongst others, she distinguishes the 
"epistemological" a priori that Lewis talks of above, as 
·well as Kant's "intentional" .a priori whereby the world 
·view, or exp~r~ence of the world is created by an :i,ntuitive 
awareness; that is one's being here in the world. Other types 
discussed by Turner are "linguistic" .a prioris_ which stress the 
limitations placed by linguistic classification on inquiry and 
copceptualization (Wharf, 1956) and psychological a prioris 
which limit man 1 s ability to transcend his physiological 
capabilities (Hayek, 1952, 1964; Bertalanffy, 1955). 
The general principle involved in all this is best 
expressed by Katsoff's statement that "Every scientific observation 
involve a set of categories.?- priori (1947, p.688)". 
Feyerabend (1965) takes this further by arguing for the 
development of a pluralistic philosophy of science in which 
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meaning is given to facts by the presence of alt~rnative 
explanatory systems. Value is thus put on realizing that there 
are no ultimate criteria for the evaluation of theories, 
since advocating the independence of facts involves the 
1 denial of the need for an a priori. 
Closely rel~ted to the above is the second idea. This 
concerns the desire on,. the part of many philosophers of 
science to "make explicit that which is implicitly contained 
in scientific practice (Kessel, 1969, p.999)". In essence this 
idea involves the scientist being aware of the sort of a priori 
influences discussed above. Thus philosophers of science have 
turned to an examination of the effects of their own actions 
on their subject matter and found, in many cases, that gaps 
existed between what scientists said they did and what, in 
actuality, was done. 
The point here is that if one argues that various 
influences such as culture, language and measurement (Heisenberg, 
1958; Northrop, 1958) have unwanted effects on investigation 
then the role of the personal effects of the investigator must 
certainly count as one such effect. Discussions about the role 
of the personal in science have abounded. Ghiselin (1952), 
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Margoshes and Litt (1965), Medawar (1967), and Popper (1965) 
have helped to emphasize the important role played by personal 
values and creativity at all levels of investigation. 
Main tenets 
W·i th this background we can now look at the effect of 
these two philosophical ,,ideas on psychology. 
Whilst psychologists have from time to time, written 
about these philosophical changes (see for example, Kantor, 1959; 
Lachenmeyer, '1970; Louch, 1962; McCall, 1964) developments 
within psychology itself, have helped to give psychological 
relevance to the ideas expressed above. In particular, many 
changes have taken place in behaviouristic psychology, as 
researchers have discovered that numerous difficulties 
presented themselves in the application of behaviouristic 
principles. 
Koch (1959, 1964) has outlined this trend and his 
analysis shows clearly that psychologists have slowly been 
r taking note of the human and personal nature of scientific 
I research. Guthrie for example wrote; I 
The phenomena in which the psychologist 
is interested are not specified in terms 
of mass, length and time• They involve 
categories not reducible to positions on 
a scale. In fact, they normally involve patterns, 
situation and movement that require recognition by 
a human observer •. 
v· (1959, p.164) 
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Guthrie stresses the need to appreciate the fact that stimuli 
.have "meaning for the responding organism (p. 165) ",. a plea 
also made by Bevan (1968), Bruner et al (1966), Gibson (1959, 
1960) and Miller (1959) who all contributed to the use qf 
intervening, non-observable formulations interceding between 
st:;i.mulus and response. Koch (1959) remarks; 
To those who have seen the methodological 
problems of psychology primarily in terms 
deriving from the study of learning theory, 
it will be illuminating to discover that the 
present 'convergence' is largely unilateral. 
It is the S-R theorists who have moved and 
the man-preoccupied systematists who have 
(relatively) stood still. 
(Pp. 762-763) 
This shift in emphasis from an almost mechanical model to 
a more flexible model of man's behaving can be found at particular 
levels apart from the general convergence cited above. Perhaps 
the most significant of these has been the increased interest 
taken in experiential aspects of human functioningo Richardson 
(1965) for example, argued as follows: 
A scientific fact is a function of the 
reputability of the methods employed, 
including the reputability or the 
observer himself. Ultimately the 
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reputability of the method is a 
function of the frequency with which 
it has been found to produce consistent 
results. When put in this form it becomes 
obvious that psychologists have been using 
subjective report ever since experimental 
psychology began. 
(p. 226) 
Richard~on believes that experiential analysis can be 
just as readily used as behavioural analysis since both demand 
consensual agreement as to the defining categories involved 
(See also Wallach, 1971 and Wolman, 1960). There is no reason, 
he argues, for behaviour to be considered a more rundamental 
level of reality than experience, a point made by the "subjective 
behaviourists" Miller, Gallanter and Pribram (1960) and 
Pribram (1962, 1968). 
( What Richardson is saying is that the subjective experience 
( Qf the individual can be studied as readily as pure behaviour 
( and has the advantage that the subject plays an important role, 
not as an ohject to be examined in isolation but as part and 
\parcel of the research act (Natsoulas, 1970; Pereboom, 1971). 
Closely related to this example is research into what has 
come to be called the social psychology of the experiment. 
Here the work of the following may be cited; Argyris (1968), 
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Campbell (1959), Criswell (1958), Ekman and Friesen (1960), 
Friedman (1967), Kelman (1966), Lester (1969), McGuigan (1963), 
Orne (1962), Reitman (1959), Riecken (1958), Rosenthal (1963a, 
1963b, 1966) and Sarason (1965). These authors have been 
concerned with the social psychological effects of the 
experimenter on subject's cognitions and verforma.nces, during 
experimentation. Friedman (1967) in describing Rosenthal's 
work wrote; 
He has shown in experimentation on rats, 
planaria, ••• and humans ••• that the 
experimenter's expectancy can be a significant 
partial determinant of the results he obtains. 
In the paradigmatic study of experimenter bias, 
rats are randomly assigned to cages labelled 
'maze-bright' and 'maze-dull' respectively. 
Analysis of the results of maze-learning 
experiments run by naive experimenters 
shows that those·rats labelled 'maze-
bright' have done significantly better 
than those labelled 'maze-dull'. 
(p.3 ) 
In effect workers in this area feel that experimenters 
(i 
/ approach research problems with particular "cognitive 
\ ecpectancies" and in subtle ways influence their subjects 
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( 
to respond according to these expectancies. In a sense this 
idea is relevant to the discussion above on a priori 
classifications since from the experimenter-bias literature it 
appears that these "cognitive expectancies" can be seen as 
\ . classification "sets" involving both the formal, stated 
\ aim of the experimenter together with his personal influence 
on the experiment. 
There have been two main answers or solutions to these 
findings, each designed to reduce in some way the error factor 
involved in such a bias. Rosenthal himself advocates reducing 
the expectancy of the observer and making him as aware as 
possible of the bias factor (Rosenthal, 1967a, 1967b). Others, 
for example Breger (1968) and Chomsky (1959, 1964, 1968) argue 
that some kind of cognitive inferred construct must be used to 
ex-plain and account for the error involved in trying to reduce 
the totality of human functioning to a finite limit. 
On the other hand others, such as Ammons and Ammons (1970), 
Buck (1963), Harrington (1967) and Ingraham and Harrington (1967) 
have suggested that this "bias" occurs only at certain levels where 
total control of the situation has not yet been possible - due, 
they argue to poor training of researchers and lack of sufficiently 
sensitive operational controls. Implied in this position is 
that these controls will be provided in time (Burns, 1960; 
Champion, 1967; Johnson, 1963; Reid, 1960). 
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( In sum then, the modified naturalistic approach is less 
· inclined towards the overall ethos of control found in the 
radical position. The modified naturalist is prepared to 
admit that he has an influence on research and that behaviour 
alone is not sufficient for an appreciation of human functioning. 
Indeed the use of non-observable constructs seems to be a 
\ 
p+e-requisite for the understanding of experimenter-effect 
findings in that influences operate that the experimenter is 
not aware of. We should note here that the approved method of 
approaching this problem is to increase the awareness of the 
experimenter (Kraft, 1971). 
What has to be done now is to examine the therapeutic value 
orientations that have been influenced by this modification and 
to appreciate the efforts made by these orientations to come 
to grips with the value problem. 
Psychotherapeutic value implications 
One of the points raised in criticism of the radical 
position by Breger and McGaugh (1965, 1966) concerned the 
looseness of the term "experimental". Valid procedure was taken 
to refer to a broad "learning theory" which, so argued Breger 
and McGaugh, hid many arguments and unresolved conflicts amongst 
learning theorists (see for example'Estes et al, 1954). 
Yates (1970a, 1970b), who reviews the origins and development 
of behaviour therapy introduces a broader view of experimentation 
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which attempts to encompass the therapeutic as well as the 
laboratory situation. Yates defines the experimental method 
as applying to each·individual such that the individual provides 
the raw data on which the experimental method is applied. 
This is in contrast to the approach of radicals such as 
Eysenck where idiographic manifestations are minimized in 
order that the individual better fit the experimental method 
derived from laboratory learning-experiments. 
This revised definition of the term "experimental" 
is closely related to the above-named developments in that 
it is in accordance with the movement towards attaching 
importance to the social nature of effects (effects which 
occur incidentally, at a level not included in the traditional 
definition of experimental conditions) and to inferred, 
non-observable concepts. Expanded definitions of the 
term "experimental" as reflected in the most recent reviews 
(Lachenmeyer, 1970; Pereboom, 1971 and Wallach, 1971) 
are, in effect, attempts to bring these "extraneous" value 
effects to the attention of psychologists instead of denying 
them. 1 83/ ••• 
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This revised approach has received considerable attention 
from therapeutically-orientated psychologists and here we 
shall discuss the work of Arnold Lazarus and other "eclectic" 
psychologists together with cognitive therapy approaches as 
representative of this interest. 
Technical eclecticism. The work of Lazarus, himself a 
guiding light in the development of behaviour therapy (Wolpe 
and Lazarus, 1966), provides an excellent example of the shift 
in emphasis of the modified naturalistic orientation. 
Lazarus admits that in his early work he employed 
"subjective techniques such as insight, support, guidance, etc., 
wh~n they seemed warranted (Carole Abramovitz, 1970, p.256)" 
and that these techniques were overlooked becau.se his attention 
was directed to S-R interpretations. Only later was he able 
to appreciate the influence of his own effects on the situation. 
Connnenting on his new awareness, Lazarus asks "Can a 
practising psychotherapist afford to ignore any effective 
technique, regardless of its theoretical origins? (1967, p.415)". 
In reply he adds "the consequence of adhering to a particular 
~0 school of thought is to exclude from one 1 s armamentarium a 
r-"~ \'\, 
1 '\ significant range of effective procedures". 
(
/ The ,important point, 
t4erapy has to be cured. 
for Lazarus, is that the patient in 
Consequently, the treatment is 
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structured around the particular patient's level of functioning. 
As Lazarus puts it; 
••• those who practice psychotherapy ••• 
should be trained to (a) rapidly identify 
the patient's basic problems, (b) determine 
the seemingly best way for that individual 
of dispelling these problems, and (c) 
skilfully apply the necessary procedures 
or make the appropriate outside referral(s)" 
(1971, chapter three 1 ) 
Similar ideas can be found expressed by Marks and Gelder, 
·therapists of similar persuasion to Lazarus. Gelder for example 
writes; 
An initial psychiatric assessment of 
phobic patients is essential, because 
it differentiates the patients with 
more isolated phobias, who will do well 
with behaviour therapy, from those with 
free floating anxiety, underlying depression 
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and so on, who will not. The psychiatric 
assessment must be combined with a 
psychodynamic assessment to determine 
the place of the symptom in the patient's 
mental economy. 
whilst Marks states; .. 
(1968, p. 315) 
( 
The same piece of behaviour may have 
different significance in different 
situations. It may be unassociated 
with other clinical phenomena or it may 
be part of some complex psychopathology. 
In the former situation behaviour therapy, 
and in the latter psychodynamic therapy, 
is appropriate. If we overextrapolate by 
taking everything to the extreme we may 
lose the value of any new technique by 
applying it to all patients, for some 
of whom it is completely inappropriate • 
(1968, p.315) 
Thus far we can see a real appreciation of the value 
problem in that the authors seem to be aware of the fact that 
no one orientation can provide all the answers and that they, 
as therapists, do have a considerable role to play both in the 
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outcome of therapy and in the very conceptualization of therapy. 
However, there are certain limitations imposed on this 
"freedom" particularly by Lazarus. He writes; 
While the basic point ••• is a plea for 
psychotherapists to try several effective 
techniques ••• it is nevertheless assumed 
that any selected manoeuvre will at least 
have the benefit of empirical support. 
( 1967' p.416) 
And this is. important. He is concerned with therapeutic 
success and yet still intends remaining within the empirical 
J framework (Lazarus 1968a, 1968u) • 
Technicians, be they physicians, surgeons, 
or psychotherapists, should operate rigorously, 
making as mu.ch use as possible of applied 
scientific principles, but without forgetting 
that their function is to alleviate suffering 
rather than to advance knowledge or satisfy 
their own curiosities. 
(1968b, p.48 ) 
,,. 
This in short is the limit accepted: by Lazarus and his 
associates. He is prepared to use techniques that work, 
but only empirically verifiable tectiniques: much in the 
same manner as Skinner (1955) describes the collection of 
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empirical facts, so Lazarus advocates the collection of 
empirical techniques. 
Once we have become aware of these limits then we can 
see that critics of this position, for example Eysenck (1969) 
and Maultsby (1968a, 1968b) take a radical approach to matters 
scientific and fail to appreciate the wide range of both 
philosophical and psychological support for this modified 
view of therapeutic action. 
The important thing to bear in mind is that whilst an 
empirical framework is retained, the status of tbe observer 
or therapist receives increased importance. His effect on 
the interaction is reg,istered in the fact that the therapist 
has to decide which of several techniques are most suitable 
for the particular individual's problem. 
What emerges from these considerations is a value 
orientation, still empirical in nature, but in which particular 
·;;,,.~ individuals, each with a unique configuration of identifiable 
"illness patterns" present for treatment. Treatment consists 
of fitting the therapist 1 s interpreting of the individual 1 s 
symptomatic pattern within an existing.pattern of therapeutic 
techniques. One presumes that as empirical techniques grow, 
so, slowly but surely, will all, or most, aspects of mental 
ill-health be covered such that at some desirable stage 
in the future, techniques will exist literally for the treatment 
of all disorders. 88/ •• 0 
-88-
Some of my own objections to this programme are 
contained in a critical assessment published this year 
(Lambley, 197la). There I drew attention to the obvious 
empirical a priori residue found in Lazarus' approach, and 
argued that this axiom has not been given enough attention since; 
If we take as the main concern of the 
psychotherapist the recovery of his 
patient then, as Lazarus has pointed 
out, how the therapist achieves this is 
relatively unimportant - he can be as 
eclectic as he likes. Now this leads to 
two major points. First, should there be 
any limit set on the types of techniques 
used? Epistemologically, if we grant that 
no technique or data can be said to exist 
a priori and if we grant that existing tech!liques 
' and theories are relative in that they are 
perspectives, ways of looking at reality, 
then we must also grant that other techniques 
such as the numerous existentialist ones 
(Pervin, 19~0) and the Zen therapies 
(Maupin, 1962) have as valid a claim to 
be techniques as desensitization, 
relaxation therapy, and so on. The 
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point being that insisting on only empirically 
acceptable techniques is asserting one point 
of view as being superior to others. There is 
no logical reason why this should be so since 
the only criterion (therapeutically) of interest 
is that the patient be treated successfully 
(London, 1964) •· 
(Pp. 93-94) 
The second point· that I raised in the paper concerned 
as it does here - the value position put forward, that is, 
what direction does therapy take? Therapists like Lazarus seem 
to operate with a goal, albeit an implied one, of a socially 
' 1 
and emotionally well-adjusted personality. Equally, 
responsibility for the direction taken in therapy rests on 
the judgment of the therapist; 
••• the behavior therapist rapidly gains insight 
into his patient and uses his insight to change 
1 Hunt (1968) for example writes that 
• • • behaviour therapy assumes tba t an organism only 
retains behavior that is somehow satisfying, favors 
only that behavior which maximises satisfaction, and 
works persistently and cleverly toward that end no 
matter what we do. 
(p. 260) 
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the patient's behaviour. The patient, in turn, 
may not gain much insight about himself but 
fundamental changes in his behaviour will 
persist and spread. 
(Lazarus, in Porter, 1968, p.325) 1 
Certainly we can accept that the therapist imparts 
a value in the situation, but it is apparent that his vision 
is only as good as the techniques that he is prepared to us~. 
Following the above argument, this is an act which would 
curtail values unacceptable to the eclectic therapist but which 
m~ have value for the improvement of the patient (Lambley, 197ln). 
Cognitive therapy. If, for discussion purposes, we accept 
that the modified naturalistic approach involves a shift away 
from behavioural data towards the use of inferred constructs, 
then cognitive therapy is the most far removed from the radical 
approach. Cognitive therapy involves, usually, the therapist 
working with an inferred concept and often advocates some sort 
of growth or re-orientation of this concept as a criterion of 
successful therapeutic action. 
Clearly almost any approach that is not explicitly 
. behavioural can be considered a cognitive one but we are here 
concerned more with naturalistic theories of therapy. 
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To facilitate discussion recent work by Breger (1968), 
Breger and McGaugh (1965, 1966) by Beck (1963, 1967, 1970a, 1970b) 
and by Ellis (1957, 1958, 1962) will be cited to give some idea 
of naturalistic cognitive therapy and its value orientation. 
To begin with, Beck (1970) defines cognitive therapy as 
follows: 
••• any technique whose major mode of action 
is the modification of faulty patterns of 
thinking can be regarded as cognitive therapy. 
· This defination embraces all therapeutic 
operations that indirectly affect the 
cognitive patterns, as well as those ~hat 
directly affect them ••• An individual's 
distorted view of himself and his world, 
for example, may be connected through insight 
into the historical antecedents of his, 
misinterpretations (as in dynamic psychotherapy), 
through greater congruence between the 
concept of self and the ideal (as in 
~ Rogerian therapy) and through increasingly 
sharp recognition of the unreality of 
fears (as in systematic desensitization). 
(1970, P• 187) 
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More specifically; 
••• cognitive therapy may be defined more 
narrowly as a set of operations focussed on 
a patient's cognitions (verbal or pictorial), 
and on the premises, assumptions, and 
attitudes underlying these cognitions. 
(1970, p. 187) 
Beck, in contrast to Breger, cites the work of Ellis 
(1956, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1970) as representative of cognitive 
therapy. Beck and Ellis distinguish between primitive and 
mature cognitive structures (a distinction which corresponds 
closely to Freud's primary and secondary processes) whereby; 
Many of the primitive concepts are idiosyncratic 
and unrealistic ••• Peculiar or irrational 
cognitions emanating from the primitive system 
are generally tested, authenticated, and rejected 
by higher centers. 
(Beck, 1970b, p. 194) 
When, for some reason overall cognition organization is dis-
orientated, then these "primitive" cognitions exert considerable 
directive functioning over the behaviour of the system as a 
whole. "In such circumstances, the conceptual systems grind 
out a powerful stream of depressing, frightening, or paranoid 
thoughts (Beck, p.194)". As Ellis puts it; 
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A large part of what we call emotion, is 
nothing more or less than a certain kind -
a biased, prejudiced, or strongly evaluative 
kind-of-thinking. What we usually label as 
thinking is a relatively calm and dispassionate 
appraisal (or organized perception) of a given 
situation. 
(1958, p.36) 
The cognitive therapist's task is then one of the 
--cognitive therapist returning the patient to a more "rational'' 
or "logical" mode of thinking within the particular area in which 
deficiency has occurred. Beck lists four major examples of 
cognitive inconsistencies; 
Arbitrary inference refers to the process 
of drawing a conclusion when evidence is 
lacking or is actually contrary to the 
conclusion ••• Overgeneralization refers 
to the process of making an unjustified general-
ization on the basis of a single incident ••• 
Magnification refers to the propensity to 
exaggerate the meaning or significance of 
a particular event ••• cognitive deficiency 
refers to the disregard for an important 
aspect of a life situation. 
(1970b, 190-191) 
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Closely related to these patterns of inconsistency is the 
general value orientation of these authors. Ellis, for example, 
devotes his therapy to helping his patients " to be less :i.llogical, 
less neurotic (1958, p.38) 11 • He adds; 
\ 
I 
o•o the therapist serves as a frank counter-
propagandist who directly contradicts and 
denies the self-defeating propaganda and 
superstitions which the client has originally 
learned and which he is now self-
propagandistically perpetuating ••• 
cognitive therapy is co~sciously 
performed with one main goal in mind: 
namely that of getting the client to 
\\ internalize a rational philosopby of living. 
(Pp. 44-45) 
The other example of the cognitive approach to therapy is 
that of Breger and McGaugh and their associates, (Breger, 1968). 
Here, cognitive is defined slightly differently in terms of 
information storage and retrieval; 
Learning is viewed as the process by 
which information about the environment 
is acquired, stored, and categorized. 
This cognitive view, is of course, quite 
contrary to the view that learning consists 
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of the acquisition of· specific responses; 
responses according to our view, are 
mediated by the nature of the stored 
information, which may consist of 
facts or of strategies or programmes 
analogous to the grammar that is acquired 
in the learning of a language. 
(Breger and McGaugh, 1965, p.355) 
Breger and McGaugh conceptualize neurosis as follows: 
••• what is learned in a neurosis is a set 
of central strategies (or a programme) 
which guide the individual's adaptation 
to his environment. Neuroses are not 
symptoms (responses) but are strategies 
of a particular kind which lead to certain 
observables (tics, compulsive acts, etc.) 
and certain other less observable, phenomena 
(fears, feelings of depression, etc.) 
(p. 355) 
They make the following suggestions regarding psycho-
therapeutic programmes, 
First, a careful study should be done to 
delineate the neurotic language; both its 
vocabulary and its grammar, of the individual. 
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Then a situation might be constructed ••• in 
which the individual's existing neurotic 
language is not understood and in which the 
individual must develop a new 'language•·, a 
new set of central strategies, in order to be 
understood. 
(p.· 356) 
The important point to be borne in mind in both these examples 
of the cognitive view is the central, mediatory role played by 
cognitive or conscious constructs (Roberts, 1967; Spielberger, 1965). 
There have been a number of criticisms levelled at the 
cognitive approach to therapy. These have stemmed in the main 
. from the lack of clarity regarding the referent of the term 
"cognitive" (Racbma,n and Eysenck, 1966; Ullman, 1970; Wiest, 1967). 
Other writers have welcomed the use, however, of such mediatory 
co~cepts (Bandura, 1969; Bergin, 1970; Davidson, 1968). 
There ~as, however, been little appreciation of the approach 
adopted by cognitivists towards the value problem ~d this seems 
to be simply a result of the cognitivist's non-concern with 
the problem. We get, for example, concern with inferred 
entities but cognitivists in general seem to have forgotten 
why there arose a demand for these constructs. Clearly, as 
has been shown, the effect of the observer-therapist on the 
empirical situation was a major reason for the advancement of 
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these constructs, yet it could appear that only Lazarus and 
1 his associates have shown any awareness of this problem. 
By way of example consider the direction or goal to be 
taken in therapy. We have to accept statements by cognitivists 
(Ellis, 1962, 1970 for instance) to the effect that mental 
health is "rational" or "logical" or "successful adaptation". 
Yet how is this "logical" new language derived and why is .it 
different to the equally "logical" (one presumes) language 
of radical behaviourists? 
What is lacking is an awareness of the role of the 
"rational" therapist in the process of therapy and, more 
fundamentally, awareness of the value problem. Without this 
awareness, the status of cognitive therapy remains comparable 
to the radicals denial of the existence of the problem: the 
cognitivist in other words maintains that his orientation, his 
view of human functioning, is the correct one. 
CONCLUDING EVALUATION 
We are in a position now to make certain statements about 
naturalistic value orientations without being accused of 
neglecting important new developments in these orientations. 
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It will, be remembered that our task is to elicit the 
general approach of each orientation to the value problem 
outlined earlier and in this respect we can draw the following 
conclusion: in so far as the radical position is concerned, the 
value problem is of little or no concern In so far as the 
modified orientation is concerned the problem is important 
but it is a problem to be overcome by the appllication of 
scientific principles: in short by explicating values as 
~ as possible. 
In therapeutic terms we can see that Lazarus envisages a 
net of empirically-validated techniques for each and every 
disorder and we can see that the cognitivists rely on the 
development of a cognitive-rational non-neurotic language. 
Now, the one over-riding contention that emerges from 
this conclusion is that where values enter into therapy, they 
are to be explicated. This fact is implied I think by most 
of the authors of the modified - naturalistic orientation and 
certainly it appears that they would probably agree to it if 
asked (Kraft, 1971). Unf0rtunately we have to turn to more 
theoretically-orientated ,,_·.ithors for a more detailed treatment 
of this problem, but this - in terms of this thesis' expressed 
/ de~_:!;Q interrelate theory and practice - is no real problem, 
What is important is that this penultimate approach to the value 
problem be examined. 
' J 
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That this is the most relevant single orientation can be 
seen clearly in the work of Ellis and Hitt (1967) where 
emphasis is put on the growth of reason. Equally, as London 
(1964) points out, where inferred entities are posited some 
kind of growth in consciousness is advocated as a sign of mental 
health. Growth in consciousness may be of a qualitative kind 
but more importantly it can mean a growth in knowledge of 
variables that enter into therapy. In this sense explication 
is clearly analogous to growth in consciousness: by knowing 
all the values (variables).that operate in therapeutic activity, 
full, complete knowledge is possible. 
This emphasis on explication receives its most sophisticated 
treatment from Kessel (1969) and McClure and Tyler (1967a, 1967b). 
Kessel makes it clear not only in his article but in personal 
correspondence (July 1970) that whilst he accepts into scientific 
discourse, personal value~ these present no real problem 
provided they are explicated: thus invoking the image of a 
growth in awareness which can be seen to tend towards a finite 
epistemology in which all values are, logically, identified. 
Naturally enough under these conditions the value problem 
disappears. 
This point can be made clearer by considering the two 
articles of McClure and Tyler. The authors argue that the 
process of scientific exposition demands a number of decisions, 
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most of these directed to obtaining accuracy. Some of 
these decisions include decisions over good pli;mning (control), 
sampling, precision, and what constitutes acceptable data: 
It is, the author's wish to argue, a necessary 
characteristic of all policy decisions that 
they ultimately employ some criterion of 
value as an essential factor in the decision 
A policy decision alw~s involves 
considerations of purpose, goal, or aim: 
the purposes of the decision maker him-
self or of his organization, his discipline, his 
nation, and so on. 
(1967a, p.73) 
From this and from the work of Irwin (1958 , 1961) they 
conclude that every statement of fact is made on the basis of 
and as a result of a statement of value and vice versa. They 
point out that one way of showing wby this is so is because 
"it is not possible to give a complete account of man's valuings 
without considering him as discriminating states of affairs 
(1967a, p.78)". The valuer must, in short, be able "to 
recognize, distinguish, or discriminate (something) in his 
surroundings (1967b, p.218)". 
More specifically, the authors argue as follows: 
An individual's preferences, at any given 
period, will depend partially, though 
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importantly, upon a host of 'factual', 
as opposed to valuational matters. The 
way the world is viewed by his culture 
and his own history in sizing up the 
'facts' will guide his discriminations 
of what the situation of the moment 
is (a$ well, of course, as his eval-
uations of the situation once he has 1decided' 
what it is) ••• preferences are exhibited 
only in a context of successful 
discriminations of the relevant out-
comes and of the circumstances on 
which these outcomes are contingent. Any 
statement of the general form ' prefers X 
over Y' rests necessarily upon other 
propositions about the capability of A to 
·discriminate the relevant contingencies and 
outcomes/ If these other propositions have 
'not been justified' or at least recognized 
explicitly as assumptions, then the preference-
claim has no point. 
(1967b, Pp. 219-220) 
· Thus far, the most succinct statement of the value problem. 
Clearly, for the authors this problem emerges when ·one seeks 
some sort of certainty regarding either the nature of facts 
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or of value: The assumption that some fact (that is, a 
discriminating state of affairs) must be assumed for the 
existence of ·a value judgment is clear¥ indicative of the 
author's belief in a relational epistemology whereby there 
are two components of an act of knowledge - the knower and 
the known. 
The problem as phrased by McClure P.nd Tyler (and, of course, 
by these value or~entations in general) can be seen to revolve 
around the search for common criteria in knowing. If such 
criteria could be established they would be definition, 
have to be value~free and independent to the values of the 
knowers. Yet this, so McClure and Tyler argue, cannot be 
so. How then do they escape from the dilemma? 
The solution offered is a simple one and involves the 
recognition of two assumptions. Firstly, they argue that 
"since science has been proceeding on its wa:y without severe 
difficulty (1967a, p.80)" therefore "the procedure ma:y be 
carried on indefinitely (p.81)"; 
... the only standard for "success" being 
the adequacy of the knowledge thus 
discovered to the purpose of the 
enterprise of the day - in other words, 
a pragmatic standard. 
(p. 81) 
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The second assumption concerns their own pragmatic suggestions; 
At some stage in research or therapy or 
counselling, a judgment, must be made as 
to which of several value alternatives 
would be the p~oper or best choice ••• or 
which of the client's values or society's 
values is the one that ought to be saved • 
••• one probes for the fact-claims that are 
presupposed by the values; and having 
discovered them, one attempts, as a first 
step, the critical scrutiny of these fact-
claims. 
( p .82) 
One can then point up to otheF facts and their accompanying 
values but this by no means "solves" the value problem, as 
the authors readily admit; 
The procedural assumption that remains as an 
anchor in the otherwise circular process we 
have described can perhaps be called 
·~'procedural contro1•;1 •• control in the 
-broadest experimental sense: i.e. 
knowledge of the limits, assumptions, 
characteristics, and defects of the 
particular procedure one is following 
at the moment, and of the general system 
within which one operates. 
I 
I 
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further this procedural control; 
••• implies ••• that one is aware of the 
variables involved in the logical 
construction of (one's) ••• experiment • 
••• Value criteria are, as we have argued, 
found among the assumptions of any 
experiment. Maintaining control means 
lmowing explicitly that these value 
criteria are· assumed in one's test. 
Procedural control is a refinement, 
then, of the ordinary idea of knowing 
what you are doing. 
(p.84) 
They do no present this'as a new thesis, but merely argue 
that it is this basic tenet that has always been tacitly 
assumed in science and has kept the value circle from turnj.ng 
on itself. In a sense what is proposed is a dialectic wLereby 
from within an explicit system, including the explicit awareness 
of the implied, there is always movement left such that the 
·system can be criticized. In the words of the authors; "There 
mu$t always be some appeal to a further - an outside, extra 
systemic-criterion. (1967a, p.81) 11 • 
Clearly what the authors have in mind is the growtli of 
lmowledge albeit a continuous, never-ending growth. This 
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growth is attained by relying on pragmatic considerations and 
by the explication of the values of respective investigations. 
What we have to ask is, "Is this a suitable answer to the 
value problem?" I think the answer is no, and for two 
reasons. Firstly, as has been argued, how is it possible to 
reconcile the duality of fact and value with the denial that 
is implied in an approach that demands the explication of 
values? Surely if such an explication occurs then these values 
assume the status of fact, that is, identifiable aspects of 
the experimental situation and thus no longer values. Equally, 
through constant explication, knowledge of experimental action 
would tend to be finite, that is, completely known. Again, 
1 
values would disappear. 
The second reason concerns the "extra-systemic-criteria" 
involved in their theory. This is obviously a kind· of scientific 
ethos which is an implied component of scientific activity and 
can be said to operate independently to this action. Thus if I 
explicate the values that I felt operated in a piece of research 
then, so McClure and Tyler argue, another researcher would be able 
to more realistically evaluate my research. What is involved 
here is the process of science which, it is assumed, tends to 
remove extraneous bias (values) and so preserve the core that is 106/ 
1 Interestingly enough the authors refrain from defining the term 
"values" preferring to note that when they use the term they mean 
. what everybody else means. In terms of the above criticism this 
is unacceptable since their final solution is vague and cleariy 
avoids specifying the nature of their explicated state. 
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reality. 
If such an ethos does operate the epistemological problem 
of how the resulting reality "core" is conveyed to individuals 
remains •.. How can psychologists be sure that any one 
individual's statement of what this core is is in fact so? 
Once again the value problem emerges as ~e are returned to 
the state of conflicting views of reality. This is concealed 
by McClure and Tyler's assumptions that explication of values 
and the process of science will solve the problem: examination 
of these assumptions leads straight back to our central problem. 
All of this is an example of what Wann and Walker (1961) 
call "conceptual uncertainty" whereby 
One can not speak of successive appro~imations 
to 'reality' unless one has prior knowledge of the 
position of the target ••• This is to say that 
not only does the relative nature of our concepts 
render us impotent, but that the tools of in-
vestigation, be they observation, experimentation, 
or instrumentation, also are confounding our indices 
of a real world ••• Recognition that no experi-
mental result can be interpreted as giving 
information about independent properties of · 
the objects of enquiry should lead us to see 
that methods and what methods contribute to 
results are as much objects of inquiry as the 
data they provide. 
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The common feature of naturalistic orientations 
lies in the attempts made to remove this "impotence" 
(Whittaker, 1949 , and to present, in fact "reality"; be 
it an ex:perimental or·therapeutic "reality": the value 
problem then resolves itself into a straightforward case 
of applying some acceptable criteria (such as scientific 
0 ' 
explication, reason, etc.) whereby the problem is removed 
from the network of the individual psychologists' responsibility, 
to a generalized ethic which is assumed to preserve the 
ll 
system from human error, or other failings. 
Little need be said in the case of the radical point of 
view since as has been clearly stated already, thJre is 
only one acceptable ethic~ And much the sam.e can be said of the 
less extreme formulations, technical eclecticism and cognitive 
therapy: as we have seen, these system values a.re grounded in 
such formulations as a generalized empiricism, or rationality. l 
At this stage, having looked at one set of orientations' attempt 
to cope with the value problem, we can see that the problem still 
remains intact. Reference is made continually by writers to 
the authority of some classification system which assumes 
almost total importance such that one would think that psychologists 
have never thought beyond their paradigms to appreciate the 
\ 
arbitrary nature of their authority. 
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The point I am making here is not that these orientations 
fail to describe "reality" adequately but that they claim 
\authority .for 
}unrealistic. 
so doing and condemn other systems as being 
There is, clearly a failure on the part of 
individual psychologists to question the limits set by 
orientations. In short; 
I 
... we have to get back to all aspects of the 
investiga,~ing act. But by doing this it 
does not necessarily follow that there exists 
an investigating reality that can be known: 
we must beware of resolving Cartesian-like 
problems ••• and repeating the same mistake. 
Obviously an act is not a discrete act, it is 
an act, in context both of other acts, and 
other thoughts, all of which are of fundamental 
importance to an awareness of the meaning of 
the act ••• But once we have all this information 
we have to perform another operation ••• we have 
to take note of the many assumptions that we, as 
investigators, have made in our own assessment 
of the situation and we have to appreciate that 
we are unable to remove the effect that we have 
on the subject matter. (Lambley, 1970a, Pp.232-233) 
It is this second, all important, step that is missing from 
the naturalistic orientations. 
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Whilst Lowe's description (1959) of the humanistic 
orientation contains a succinct statement of the views of 
some humanistic psychologists, it can by no means be 
said to correctly describe the various shades of opinion 
found in the general existential - humanistic framework. 
The term "humanistic" is too narrow for-the purposes of 
this treatise and our outline will concentrate not only 
on "Third Force" psychology (Bu.gental, 1967) but on the 
various existential schools that bear many resemblances to 
the general characteristics suggested by Lowe. 
The task becomes one of identifying the major 
rt~ of the existential - humanistic orientations as 
they have developed in the last decade or so. To begin 
with, let us first consider a number of articles that have 
attempted such an identification. A short article by 
Pervin (1962) identifies two broad trends in existential 
psychology. These he terms "Existential Analysis" and 
"logotherapy", the first derived from the writings of 
Binswanger and represented by May et al (1958), the second being 
Victor Frankl 1s work (1955, 1958). It must be noted that these 
are trends more closely tied to psychotherapy than was found 
in the naturalistic orientation but this has been the area 
in which the existential -humanistic framework has developed. 
Pervin points out that whilst existentialism is a 
"European creation" there nevertheless have been many American 
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writers who have participated in extending its inf'luence 
to psychology in general; "The theory of Carl Rogers, 
for exam.pl~, is phenomenological in character and stresses 
the individual and self-realization. Also, the psychology 
of George Kelly corresponds, in part, to the 'existential 
view' ( Pervin, p. 30 6)". 
Pervin points out that the first of the two trends -
existential analysis - involves "The belief ••• that the 
~ individual reveals himself tbrough his world-project or 
world-design. (p. 306) "and by analyzing phenomenologically 
l 
this design into tbree basic "modes of Being" - the Umwelt, the 
Mitwelt, and the Eigenwelt, the Being of the individual can be 
characterized. Related to this are various conceptions of 
normality that are derived from the nature of this Being; 
According to Tillich in the neurotic the self which 
is affirmed is a reduced one and some or many of 
its potentialities are not admitted to actualization. 
From Kierkegaard's view the neuroses and psychoses 
would be accompanied by a loss of self, an inner 
alienation. Jaspers views the p~y_9_E:otic as one 
'who has lost his own existence and so has lost the 
existence of reality. 
· (Pervin, p. 307) 
The second trend- logotherapy- is distinguished from the 
above in that whilst Frankl agrees that man lives in three 
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dimensions, the somatic, the psychic and the ~p_i~itual, 
---(similar to the tripartite spheres noted above) the goals 
of his therapy include individuals becoming "what they are 
capable of becoming," writes Pervin, "the therapist tries 
to bring out the ultimate possibilities of the patients, 
to enable them to find meaning in existence (p. 308)". 
Writers other than Pervin have made similar distinctions 
between opposing "schools". Schindler (1968) for example 
gives a fairly intensive treatment of two existentially-
orientated psychologies; the one he calls "Daseinsanalytic 
Procedure and Thought", the other "Logotherapy and the third 
Viennese School of Psychotherapy." Prem Nath (1963) in a 
paper entitled "Existential trends in American psychology" 
stresses the diffuse nature of existential psychology; 
Existential Psychology is not only a reaction against 
Behaviourism and Psychoanalysis but is simul-
taneously an indictment of the generality of 
American Culture which is allegedly tending to 
be ever more conformist and in which the 
individual is being crushed under the heavy 
weight of technology and huge--Ou~iness cor-
- -
porations. In a situation of such a cultural 
r-
crisis it aims at the rediscovery of man by 
rescuing him from the external forces, thus 
making him conscious of his lost freedom and of 
a large number of dormant potentialities. 
(p. 125) 
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For these reasons, he points out, it is difficult today 
to isolate the various determinants of the general existential-
humanistic orientation, a point echoed by Dufrenne (1965) 
who wrote " ••• to speak of Existentialism means something, 
but everyone of the so-called Existentialists treads now his 
own path in his own direction (p.51)". 
Whilst it is possible, to a certain extent, to talk 
of themes, the main feature of existential and humanistic 
psychology is its diversity, and trying to discuss one example 
as representative of the whole is cumbersome. .An example of 
such a treatment is Lyons (1961), who whilst presenting many 
telling points of criticism against "existential psychotherapy", 
considered only the works of a small sample - Binswanger (1957), 
May~ al (1958) together with the writings of people like 
Van Dusen (1957). 
Naturally, whilst one can accept that every writer 
takes a different approach regarding his particular brand 
of psychology, it is imperative that a treatment be given here 
that as far as possible captures the value structures of 
various poles that can be identified in the orientation. 
In Nath 1 s article one gets the intermingl~ng of ideas from 
people such as Allport, Maslow, Frankl and May whilst in 
Lyons reference is mainly kept to existentialistic philosophers 
such as Heiddegger and analysts such as Boss all of whom fit 
in to this orientation. In order to preserve the divergences 
then, three major poles will be discussed; "Third Force" 
psychology, logotherapy and existential analysis. 
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However, before this can be done a brief historical 
overview is required. This is doubly important, for each 
of the three orientations to be considered is closely 
related to phenomenology, and an understanding of the 
existential - humanistic orientation would be impossible 
1 
without attention being first given to phenomenology. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE PHENOJYJENOLOGICAL MOVEJYJENT 
ANTI EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY. 
Often cited as the first real existentialists.Yierkegaard 
and Nietszche hold a prominent position in the history of 
existential philosophy. There is so much to the writings 
of both these men that one can (as with Marx or Hegel) 
literally take any position and discover that the authors had 
expressed a view about it. But within the framework of 
existential psychology Kierkegaard is best known for his 
re-instatement of individualism as an important component 
of epistemology. Kierkegaard devoted his life to the refutation 
of Hegelian systematic philosophy. This system, amongst 
other things and according to Kierkegaard, placed man 
within a framework in which he, man, was only a part, a 
simple movement, in the direction of the totality; 115/ 
1 This section is of necessity longer and in more depth than that of 
the naturalistic orientation. The reason for this is because the 
theory that follows draws primarily on existential- humanistic 
insights. 
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The system, so it is said, begins with the 
immediate, ••• and hence without any pre-
suppositions and hence absolutely; the 
beginning of the System is an absolute 
beginning. 
(Kierkegaard, 1944, p.101) 
Kierkegaard attempted to refute absolutist tendencies 
foUl1d not only in Hegelian-like systems but also in Christian 
ethics in which the existence of the individual was relegated. 
to second place - the power of the Ethic predominating. 
To appreciate the nature of Kierkegaard's writings 
one has to appreciate his attack against the dogmatism 
embodied in the above quotation. For Kierkegaard the 
beginning is all important since with it the role of the 
individual person is established; 
How does the System begin with the immediate? 
That is to say does it begin with it immediately? 
The answer to this question must be an unconditional 
negative. If the Syst~m is presumed to come after 
existence, by which a confusion with an existential 
system may oe occasioned, then the System is of 
course ex post facto and so does not begin immediately 
with the immediacy with which existence began: 
although in another sense it may be said that 
existence did not begin with the imm 12dia te, 
since the immediate never is as such, but is 
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transcended as soon as it is. The beginning 
which begins with the immediate is thus itself 
reached by means of a process of reflection". 
(1944, Pp. 101-102) 
Kierkegaard suggests that rather than man proceeding through 
his allotted time span moving from one stage to the next 
automatically, man passes through life's stages (Kierkegaard, 
1941) by being involved in an act of reflection, that is, 
of choice. 
Turning the Hegelian dialectic around, Kierkegaard argues 
@:-7>tha:t_J!lan-begins-wHh-lillnself, with his own personal existence, 
I is feelings, his emotions, his problems - that is,his own being. 
It is through reflecting on this a priori Being that the 
individual is able to choose his own life path. In the words 
of Harper (1948) "Kierkegaard's aim (at least at the outset) 
was to tear individuals out of their empty, pretentious, 
co:rmnonplace lives and force them to become self-conscious (p.13)". 
Developing his own dialectic, Kierkegaard attempted to 
contrast two aspects of existence; 
Two ways, in general, are open for an existing 
individual: Either he can do his utmost to 
forget that he is an existing individual, by 
which he becomes a comic figure, since 
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existence has the remarkable trait of 
compelling an existing individual to 
exist whether he will it or not ••• 
Or he can concentrate his entire energy 
upon the fact that he is an existing 
individual. 
(1944, p.109) 
Writing of the former he distinguished two parts; the 
initial which he characterized as the Aesthetic stage marked 
by a cynical non-involvement in life. The Aesthete does not 
in any way corrnnit himself to life or to his own choice of 
life, but contents himself with experiencing in a romantic, 
non-synthetic way. The second stage is the Moral or Ethical stage 
whereby the individual sees himself as being subservient to a 
universal, general ethic. One can see here the beginnings of 
the identity problem which recurs so often in Sartre's writings, 
namely the problem of the person who seeks his identity as a 
thing in which his own unique identity is submerged: he is 
not thus a unique, independent individual but merely an agent 
of the System. 
Kierkegaard's own solution to this dilemma, is based not 
on a theoretical nor romantic solution, but on an existing, 
experiential act of choice whereby the individual makes a 
"Leap of faith" to a state in which he confronts the Absolute, 
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God; not as a subordinate being but as a fully aware 
individual in direct communication with the Absolute. 
This Christian existentialism does not deny the ordinary 
claims of Christianity, a position claimed by Ku:qn (1949), but 
places the individual squarely at the beginning of commitment. 
Kie+kegaard claimed that this final act invoked a degree 
of anxiety in that the choice was something requiring a great 
deal of resolve. To choose oneself presented both an attraction 
and a repellant (Kierkegaard, 1954). Anxiety emerged when 
!
' the individual became aware of the need for personal involvement 
and commitment; one had to have faith in the end to complete it. 
From the vantage of hindsight Rollo May notes (1958); 
Here is, in Kierkegaard ••• , the forerunner of 
relativity and the other viewpoints which 
affirm that the human being who is engaged 
in studying the natural phenomena is in a 
particular and significant relationship to the 
objects studied and he must make himself part 
of his equation. That is to say, the subject, 
man, cai" never be separated from the object 
which he observes. 
(p. 26). 
In terms of relevance for the existential psychological 
orientation, May has succinctly stated the essential core of 
Kierkegaard's argument, in that the ultimate step is a leap to 
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not only a subjective truth but also an objective truth · 
(the Absolute) : 
It (the Kierkegaardian argument) opens up the vast 
province of inner, subjective reality and indicates 
that such reality may be true even though it 
contradicts objective fact. 
(1958, p.26) 1 
One can hold that the epistemological burden is now thrown 
not on a System that is responsible for knowledge but on an 
individual's own committed Leap. The issue here is how does the 
individual know when his leap is accomplished? Is he alone 
the arbiter a;nd, more importantly, has he the right to dictate -
as Kierkegaard has, albeit somewhat mildly - that the Leap 
(a generalization perhaps?) is the better stage, that is, 
than the other two, even if this Leap is only defined in 
terms of a style of action. 
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1 A word is in order here, related to the above, regarding May's 
interpretation of the significance of Kierkegaard. It is common 
knowledge that May's book "Existence" has shaped many psychologist's 
beliefs about existential psychology, yet one feels that May uses 
Kierkegaard's words to attain his own ends. One feels for example 
thatKierkegaard would not have implied that "Truth becomes reality 
only as the individual produces it in action ••• (May, 1958, p.28)" 
in the sense that truth is awaiting discovery. One feels rather 
that Kierkegaard would place a more conservative interpretation 
on this. 
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By style, incidentally, is meant that an element of subjectivity 
or free variance is introduced. In short Kierkegaard is not 
instructing the individual where to jump, merely how to jump. 
However in terms of our problem of value, we can regard 
this last point as a value and see that the problem of how one 
knows when one has achieved this value is relevant to Kierkegaard. 
A second figure, Nietzsche, has often been regarded with 
Kierkegaard as one of the major figures in the development of 
existential philosophy (Jaspers, 1956). Nietzsche's contribution 
to this development lies in his emphasis on what one writer has 
termed the more negative aspects of existentialism (Kuhn, 1949): 
f Nietzsche dispensed with the notion of a God, something not even 
Kierkegaard felt he could do. Nietzsche directed his attacks 
against interpretations of reality as being a rational, organised, 
coherent process and he propounded the idea of an underlying 
"reality" which he felt was the opposite of such coherence. 
Nietzsche saw the need for the individual to be aware or 
self-conscious of his role in the process of life. Additionally, 
as Kaufmann (1956) points out, Nietzsche endeavoured to develop a 
form of actualization whereby the individual becomes an integrated 
unfragmented personal reality. The person in the world for 
Nietzsche has therefore, the task of orientating hims.elf to his 
world in terms of the position or perspective that he holds in 
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the world. Scbrnitt (1961) suggests that the famous 'Wi.11-to-power" 
is not a cosmological drive (Kauffman, 1950) but is in fact the 
willingness of the individual to establish his own perspective. 
At this point one can see that existentialistic ideas 
popularized by such American writers as May and Maslow, had been· 
laid down by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Indeed, it can be 
argued that existential ideas have long been current in philosophy, 
even before the nineteenth century. One finds for example 
Descartes writing in the Second Meditation; 
The first (rule) was never to accept anything 
as true that I did not know to be evidently 
so: that is to say, carefully to avoid 
precipitancy and prejudice, and to induce 
in my judgments nothing more than what presented 
itself so clearly and so distinctly to my 
mind that I might have no occasion to place 
it in doubt. 
(1968, p.41) 
It is not a new idea that the individual searcher is himself 
involved in that which is found. But what the existentialists 
l. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche felt strongly about was the loss of 
personal involvement in theories which may have begun with the 
individual but ended without him. However this is not the place 
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for an historic overview of the long history of this conception; 
we continue the discussion with the work of Husserl. For it 
was Husserl, who attempted to base the above philosophical 
ideas in a subjective empiricism. Husserl, who received training 
in mathematics that remained an influence in all of his work, 
was to a large extent influenced by Franz Brentano who in 1874 
published Psychologie von empirischen Standpunte. In this work 
Brentano attempted to distinguish between mental and physical 
phenomena; 
Every presentation of sensation or 
imagination offers an example of the 
mental phenomenon; and here I 
understand by presentation not 
that which is presented, but the 
act of presentation. Thus, hearing 
a sound, seeing a coloured object, 
sensing warm or cold, and the comparable 
states of imagination as well are 
examples of what I mean ••• Examples of 
physical phenomena, on the other hand, are 
a colour, a shape, a landscape, which I see. 
(Brentano, 1962, p.41) 
In other words "All physical phenomena manifest 
extension and definite spatial location ••• The opposite, 
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however, is true of mental phenomena; thinking, willing and 
so on, appear as unextended and without a situation in space (p.47)". 
In order to integrate these two classes of data he developed 
the notion of an "intentional inexistence "which is 
exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical 
phenomenon manifests anything similar (p.50) 11 • 
Briefly this distinction can be expressed as follows; 
''Whenever we think, we think about some object; whenever we believe, 
there is something we believe (Chisholm, 1962, p.4)". 
Following the thread of continuity from Kierkegaard we can 
see that Brentano attempts systematization of the basic relationship 
espoused by Kierkegaard, namely the interrelationship between 
subject and object. The difference being that Brentano was 
concerned with the more immediate aspects of phenomenal experience 
/ 
in accordance with the intellectual Zeitgeist of his time which 
was replete with attempts to ground large systems.in terms of 
experiential and experimental exigencies (Erikson, 1967; Spiege~berg, 
1960). 
Returning to Husserl it is necessary to point out that his 
thought underwent certain changes from time to time and, whilst 
many books dealing with Husserl's phenomenology stress the 
overall system (for example Lauer, 1S65, or Thevenaz, 1962), the 
most all-inclusive accounts are given by Spiegelberg(l960), 
Olafson (1967) and Kockelmans (1967). The following discussion 
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draws mainly on the latter. 
Husserl's earlier phases (pre-1894) are of little importance 
to us here. They were marked however by attempts to interrelate the 
consistent and unchangeable nature of logic with the vacillation 
of human action; 
For as soon as we make logical laws depend 
on psychological characteristics of human 
thinkers, we make them also relative to these 
thinkers and consequently make man in all his 
instability the measure of everything. And 
to Husserl relativism is a self-defeating 
position ••• 
(Spiegelberg, 1960, p.94) 
At this time Husserl fits into the rationalistic G.cadi ti.on 
in that he emphasized the neutrality of logical formulr:i:Liom; and 
their independence to human action. 
However between the years 1894 and 1900 his thought appeared 
to shift towards a more tolerant position in which some interrelation 
between the human observer and logic was entertained. As 
Spiegelberg remarks; 
What Husserl wanted was a descriptive study of 
the process in which the entities studied in 
pure logic are presented ••• Husserl's intent 
was a description of the ideal types of logical 
experience corresponding to the ideal laws. 
(Spiegelberg, 1960, p.102) 
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Husserl sought a means of relating an ideal logical 
system to the perceiving mind of the human observer. As 
Kocklemans puts it; 
Although an ideal being acquires form and unity 
in consciousness, it, nevertheless, retains an 
independent being or a being-in'.""'i t,self. 
Psychological considerations can never totally 
account radically for these ideal beings. 
( 1967' p. 90) 
What Husserl seems to have been offering at this stage 
was a form of parallelism between the act of confrontation 
\
with t~e ideal logical 
content of such an act 
system (the noetic aspect) and the 
(the noematic aspect). The similarity 
here between this form of phenomenology and phenomenalism is 
apparent; both involve some basic action which establishes the 
relationship between the knower and the known (the universal 
quasi-independent system). As Olafson (1967) has pointed out, 
Husserl's was an early form of correspondence theory. 
The aspect of Husserl's work that is of interest to us here 
\ is his expansion of the above idea into a full phenomenological 
; system. In the initial phases Husserl began by talking about the 
different ways one could create meaning about the same referent, 
that is "Multiple acts of meaning and the one ideal meaning 
to which they all point: this identical meaning is to Husserl 
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an ideal entity, not only a psychological datlun (Spiegelberg, 
1960, p.105)". This concept led onto the notion of universals 
which dealt with the problem of the essences of conscious reality. 
Briefly, Husserl, following Bergson and Stumpf (Boring, 1957), 
posite~ as it were, a stream of consciousness which served to 
furnish raw data. Acts such as thinking, loving, etc. were 
essentially the structuring actions of the subject. It i.s th:Ls 
intentionality that provided the means "by which the various a::3pects, 
perspectives, and stages of an object are all focussed upon, and 
integrated into, identical cores (Spiegelberg, p.109) 11 • 
Clearly, as Olafson (1967) points out, there enters here 
a value element since a distinction is assumed between "adequate 
and inadequate apprehension of these essences (p.64)" or.cores. 
Husserl had to provide a method whereby such an adequate, 
\apprehension of essences could be obtained and this method goes 
under the general term "reduction". 
His reduction process was in opposition to that of the 
phenomenalistic sciences; Husserl preferred the method of 
scientific phenomenology (Husserl, 1962) to the naturalistic 
attitude which, he argued, was concerned not with the essences of 
reality but with the collection of facts. The phenomenological 
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reduction allowed a knowledge of the meaningful relations that 
existed between various facts; 
Can the world, can human existence have 
any meaning if the sciences hold for true 
only things which can be stated in objective 
terms, ••• can we be satisfied with this, can 
we live in such a world where historical events 
are nothing but an unending concentration of 
imaginary upswings and bitter disappointment?" 
(Husserl, 1954, Pp. 411) 
Following Fluckinger and Sullivan1 s summary (1965, Pp.267-268), 
.X. we can see that thj-~ reduction process has~two -phases. The first 
occurs at the level of day-to-day living in that one gets 
away from the ·particularity of daily, mundane, experience and 
arrives at the "· •• systematic and radical e?ro'l'-u of every 
objectifying "position" in an experience, practised both upon the 
regard of particular objects and upon the entire attitude of 
mind. (Husserl, 1962, p.121) ". This he termed the eidetic 
reduction and it occurred at the psychological level. 
According to Spiegelberg, the second phase is the 
,f: I phenomenological reductiori proper. Here an attempt is made to 
\ 
suspend belief or commitment to any "trans-phenomenal exi::.> tence". 
;:-:-s the famous bracketing process involving " ••• expert 
' recognition, comprehension and description of the manifold 
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'appearance' of what are no longer 1 objects 1 but 'unities' of 
sense" (Husserl, 1962, p.121)". This is the description of the 
noe:rnatic. The assumptions of everyday living and mundane points 
of view (for example the view of an external "factual' reality 
!'
, independent to sensual experience) are cast aside and ~nl~ t~t 
which is pure consciousness is attended to. -"- _____ , -
Whilst this process may seem confusing it must be 
remembered, as Spiegelberg and Fink (1934) point out, that 
Husserl himself indicated that a final account of the nature of 
his reduction and the exact nature of what was found under reduced 
conditions (outside of such statements as "pure subjectivity") 
had still to be stated. Nevertheless, Husserl's later work gives 
fairly clear indications of what he had in mind. Spiegelberg 
characterizes this direction as "transcendental subjectivity". 
I 
Simmilarly Husserl (1962) makes a distinction between Phenomenol-
gical psychology and tr~scendental phenomenology: 
To this transcendental subjectivity, 
transcendental experience gives us.direct 
approach. As the psychical experience was 
purified, so is the transcendental, by 
a reduction. The transcendental reduction 
may be regarded as a certain further 
purification of the psychological interest. 
The universal is carried to a further stage. 
(p.124) 
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In the Cartesian Meditations (1960) and The crisis of the 
European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (1954), 
Husserl continued to elaborate and substantiate his idealism. 
Here he also attempted to deal with what has more recently been 
termed the problem of "other minds" (Wisdom, 1952). How, for 
example, the question is raised, in the state of transcendental 
subjectivity does one apprehend the life-view of another? 
Spiegelberg writes; 
••• we perceive a body other than our own 
as 1 there 1 rather than as 1 here 1 , we apperceive 
it at once as the body of the alter ego,. an 
analogy which, however is by no means an 
illference by analogy. In this process the 
analogizing ego and the analogized alter ego 
are 1 paired 1 in a characteristic 1 coupling 1 
Thus the other ego, while not accessible as 
directly as its body, can be understood as a 
modification of our own pure ego by which we 
put ourselves into his body - as if we were in 
his place. 
(1960, p.159) 
Closely related to this is Husserl's concept of the 
Lebenswelt, the extension of the above idea as applied to the 
total experiences life-world of each person; "a life-
world is to be conceived as an orientated world with an 
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experiencing self at its center" writes Spiegelberg 
"Arormd this pole the world is structured by such peculiar 
patterns as 'near' and 1far 1 , and 1foregrormd 1 ". 
The centrality of this concept to modern phenomenological 
analyses is seen in Kuenzli (1959), Natanson (1952, 1966), 
~chlitz (1967a, 1967b), Straus (1964, 1966) and Wild (1958). 
,Natanson, for example points out that "phenomenology, finally, 
seeks the reconstruction of the Lebenswelt, the life-world 
within which each one of us is born, exists and dies (1966, p.8)". 
~Wild also pointed to a s_~ilarity that existed bet~een~his concept 
and British analytical philosophy, bot1l_ being concerned with 
L_ - . 
fundamental aspects of the Lebenswelt. 1 
Penultimately Husserl stands at the beginning of modern 
I existential and phenomenological psychology. He was concerned with 
131/ 
1 That Husserl's final writings bear close resemblance to 
linguistic analysis is suggested by Margaret Chatterjee 1 s analysis 
(1969). She suggests that "the phenomenologist is in a favourable 
position for appreciating that the relation of language to Being is 
... 
not at all a question of the adequacy of language to Being. He shares 
a common insight with a philosopher like Wittgenstein who does not 
speak in terms of Being at all but who nonetheless has grasped the 
internality of language to the whole enterprise of life (p.121, 
my emphasis). Charles Taylor (1959) made a similar point. 
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x- the fundamental essences of life and focussed attent:Lon on the 
epistemological difficulties involved in gaining knowledge of 
these essences. 
Secondly, Husserl drew attention to the experiencing 
----
in,dividual and, in particular to perspectivity which governs 
-the knowledge an individual has of the world. Through his 
own unique perspectives the individual, for Husserl, can experience 
the essential reality. By bringing into focus these problems he 
advanced the philosophical ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to 
the level where they could be more readily applied to the study 
of man. 
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER FJDSSERL 
Strasser (1957) gives some idea of just how diverse and 
significant was the irifluence of Husserl's writings, and the 
study of European personality theories edited by David and 
Von Bracken (1957) gives added support to the notion that 
Husserl was indeed a central figure in European philosophy and 
psychology. In so far as we are concerned with the influence of 
this movement on current value-orientations, some indication 
of the developments in general must be given as well as the 
developments that occurred in existential psychology. 
Ellenberger (1958) lists five areas in which phenomenological 
ideas have developed with particular reference to psychotherapy. 
132/ 0 .. 
" I ) 
" 
-132-
Fundamentally these ideas have all taken as axiomatic Husserl's 
conception of the Lebenswelt resulting in theories dealing with the 
totality of the experiencing person's project in the world. By 
paying attention to acts the phenomenologically-orientated 
psychologist aims to intuit the particular Lebenswelt of 
the patient (Jessor, 1961)0 
If one examines for example, at one level in general psychopathology, 
the work of Karl Jaspers (1963) in which, according to Ellenberger, 
"a careful and accurate description of the subjective experience 
of mentally sick patients 'was taken' with an effort to 
empathize (einflihlen) as closely as possible with this · 
experience (p.97)". Ellenberger cites also the work of 
Mayer-Gross (1924) and Wyrsch {1940) as illustrating this 
-;;:, particular application, termed descriptive phenomenology. 
~-- - ....... 
( Whilst recognizing the importance of mere description, 
.~~1 
/ ND '\ further thought had also to be given to the basic structure 
~-, 
l of experience. The main contribution coming from Mfki1!towski 
.I\ 
(1927) who saw his task as defining "the basic disturbance 
from which one could deduce the whole content of consciousness 
and the symptoms of the patients (Ellenberger, p.100)". 
Von Gebsattel (1954) is also cited by Ellenberger as contributing 
to a genetico-structural phenomenology. 
The third area in the application of phenomenology, 
categorical phenomenology, can be seen as an extension of the 
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research of the previously mentioned authors in that important 
dimensions, such as the temporal, the spatial, the causal and 
the substantial, were isolated as variables with which to study 
the Lebenswelt. The question of time as experienced by patients, 
was one such example; 
According to Martin Gschwind, there are 
two periods in life when the 
speed of time seems to accelerate 
rapidly, the first one from the end 
of puberty up to twenty-two or twenty-
four years and the other at a variable 
point of the second half of life. The 
\.__j ~ feeling of the speed of time is modified 
.j in many conditions ••• One of the main 
.. 
"-, 
< 
symptoms of depression, from the 
phenomenological point of view, is the 
subjective experience of time flowing 
desperately slowly, stagnating, or even 
being annexed. 
(Ellenberger, p.104) 
' -,, 
Related work by Plethner (1964), Merleau-Ponty (1945) 
\ \ ./ Ti-(j \' and Binswanger (1933, 1963) reveal the con~E__O~ phenomenology 
w~t~ experienced living and with reconstructing the inner 
world of the patient or subject. In America, work by Kelly (1955), 
Snygg and Combs (1949) and by Rogers (1964), for example, all show 
this influence. 
These developments however are of secondary importance to the 
mod~fications made by the existentialists of Husserl 1 ::o concept::o 
and we can turn now to an enumeration of these modifications. 
134/ ••• 
-134-
Of the main existential philosophers like Heidegger, Sartre, 
Buber and Marcel, two - Sartre and Heidegger - are of particular 
relevance. Heidegger because of the direct relationship between 
his writings and two of the major schools of existential psychology -
existential analysis and logotherapy - and Sartre because of the 
impetus his writings have had on humanistic psychology in general. 
Our discussion therefore will be limited to the general theme 
developed by these two in particular. Where necessary, however 
reference will be made to others. 
Whilst Husserl was concerned with the crisis of science, the 
clash between the naturalistic world view and the phenomenological-
existentialistic thinkers have expanded this concept away from 
a purely scientific concern about reality to a concern with the 
whole of ontology. In Heidegger's words; 
As my familiarity with phenomenology grew, 
no longer merely through literature but 
by actual practice, the question about 
Being, aroused by Brentano 1 s work, 
nevertheless remained always in view. 
So it was that doubt arose whether the 'thing itself' 
was to be characterized as intentional consciousness, 
or even as the transcendental ego o•• Accordingly, 
the prefatory note to the seventh unrevised edition 
of Being and Time (1957) contains the remark: 
(This) 'way still remains even today a necessary 
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one, if the question about Being is to stir 
our There-being' • 
(1967, Pp. 12-18) 
~ Existentialism as such can be reduced to one main concern, 
, \ the differentiation between that which is merely peripheral and 
particular and that which is enduring. Yet it is not to be· 
confused with the search for reality often found in scientific 
laboratories. Dufrenne (1965) suggests that existentialism {r 
( 
I: 
involve~ .. existence, and m_~e-~pecifically,_ h~~-!_e_:i_c::_· 
Rather than being concerned with aspects of that existence, 
\existe:-t~al~_~t~ turn to th".__total natur:~; Being. The capHal 
~etter gives the same status to Being as is given to the Absolute 
Jin other systems. 
Whilst other philosophies may favour study of specific aspects 
of Being, such as language, or behaviour, the existentialistic 
thinker prefers, as Husserl, to strive after the very nature of 
\ Being. We have found this striving in Kierkegaard who was not 
content to remain as one person within a system of many, not 
contacting reality, but taking instead as substitute the words 
of other philosophers or high priests (for example Comte or Hegel). 
In many ways this feeling originating in Kierkegaard is more than 
an intellectual piece but is, a personal revolt against the 
dictates of orgapizations .. or representatives of Mass Society. 
136/ 
-136-
Traditionally the term "Being", as Barrett (1964) points 
out was used to refer to naturally-occurring categories existing 
"out there 11 • Existentialists conceive Being rather differently 
and posit two interrelated aspects, "the in-itself, the opaque 
and inert being whose essence implies existence, and the for-
itself, the transparent being of consciousness, whose existence 
posits the essence (Dufrenne, 1965, p.52) 11 • 
Heidegger serves as example here by rejecting the naturalistic 
not;Lon of "things" independent to the observer. Gendlin (1967) 
puts it this way; 
We come today upon a science in which 'things' 
are held to be objects around us, separable 
and movable in space. But (Heidegger) ••• 
sets up three sorts of things: (1) The 
objects around us, (2) 
and procedures, and (3) 
our human attitudes 
the totality of these 
two in interdependence together. And, as he 
says, later, the third is really first ••• He 
wants to make clear to us that the things we 
run into are not simply given, as they 
seem, but have always involved a certain 
'approach' which could be different. Once 
we note these very different ways in which 
we render things, we can no longer 
consider the things ••• as simply 
given independent of us. 
(p. 257) 
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He is referring here to Heidegger's more recent works 
(Heidegger, 1954, 1966, 1967) but this influence can also be 
seen in Heidegger's definitive work (1962). For Heidegger and 
\
for Sartre (1943) this approach takes as base the involvement 
"as thrown" into-the-world of the individual: he can only view 
Being from a point of view and as that view changes he must be 
able to retain the authentic core that is common to all points 
of view (Richardson, 1967). 
In existentialism there is maintained a fine balance between 
Ith: phenomenology of Husserl and the personalism of Kierkegaard and the aim of these thinkers is the retention of the latter 
in the pursuit of the fruits of the former. Certain existentialists 
are careful to stress the total and personalistic nature of the 
endeavour even to the extent of steering clear of describing 
Being. Marcel for example writes; 
I who ask these questions about being, how can 
I be sure that I exist? Yet surely I, who 
formulate this problem, should be able to 
remain outside it - before or beyond it? 
Clearly this is not so ••• so I am 
inevitably forced to ask: who am I I who 
question being? How am I qualified to begin 
this investigation? If I do not exist, how can I 
succeed in it? And if I do exist, how can I be sure 
of this fact? 
(1956, p.16) 
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This paradox is central, involving, as it does, 
the value problem (Gerber, 1966; Marcel, 1935). Yet even with 
these appreciations of the problem, existentialists in general, 
{ do see a way out. This takes the form of an authentic search. 
As Sanborn (1967) puts it; 
Marcel implies that the experiences of awareness 
and dissatisfaction are based on the fact that 
every person has a sense, obscure though it 
may be, of what, he !really! is. Accompanying 
this sense is an urge to move beyond what he 
now is. 
(p. 137) 
and, in the case of others - for example Buber - some similar 
solution is offered; 
It is only man ••• whose constitution is 
suited to the lifetime of the individual 
organism by a unity which can be imagined 
or thought by him as existing for itself. 
With soaring power he reaches out beyond what 
is given him, flies beyond the horizon and 
the familiar stars, and grasps a totality. 
But only from the meeting of natural being 
with man does the near and enduring arise, 
·that which comprehends and finitely transcends 
the real •o• Man is like this because he is 
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the creative (Wesen) through whose being (Sein) 
'what is 1 (das Seiende) becomes detached 
from him and recognised for itself. 
(Buber, 1965, p.62) 
The important point is that the existentialists argue that 
man knows Being through his own awareness of Being. It is, 
therefore, up to the individual to open himself to the dialogue 
with Being (Farber, 1956; Friedman, 1960; Friedman, 1965). 
In essence then existentialistic philosophy created the 
<~ conditions for a psychology of existence and personal experien(;e 
~~' (Gendlin, 1962) in which the individual's contact with Being 
~\::\ ~~ is seen as an empirical situation: this in contrast to the 
~,r:f phenomenalistic definition of empiricism in which only a 
particular segment of the total world action of an individual 
is attended to. 
This then is the background from which modern day 
existential - humanistic approaches to psychotherapy have 
developed. The main assumptions are that tne individual 
creates his own contact with "reality " or Being and that he 
has to develop his own contact existentially and against 
the interpretations of this reality presented by mundane systems 
such as naturalistic science. 
140/ ••• 
( 
-140-
EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS 
Under this heading the orientation represented by 
writers such as May et al (1958), Boss (1963) and Straus (1966) 
is discussed. The main feature of this orientation is that 
the authors involved derive their ideas in the main from 
Heidegger. 
Heidegger's philosophy was an attempt to uncover 
"hidden and forgotten being (Thevenaz, 1962, p.58)" which 
was "to be reawakened through an analysis of Dasein 
(Borgman, 1967, p.163)". The term "Dasein" provides the 
link between the philosopher and the existential analytic 
movement and it is this term which has been retained in the 
existential psychological literature to describe, as May (1958) 
puts it, "the existence of this particular being sitting opposite 
the psychotherapist (p.37)". 
What relation the two terms "being" and Dasein" have to 
each other in Heidegger's philosophy remains somewhat uncertain. 
Bartky (1970) gives the clearest idea when he remarks that 
"Dasein is a structure while Being is an event " he continues, 
"Being conceals itself in disclosing a world, first, because 
as the future, it is always more than what it discloses and 
second, as Dasein it normally remains hidden from inauthentic 
humanity (p. 374)". The relationship that emerges is th!,3.t Dasein 
is the particular manifestation of Being. 
l j( 
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Naturally enough Dasein, for Heidegger is a human reality 
and not at all independent to the human thinker. Now Being 
can be known, as we have seen, through a consideration 
of the experiential world of the individual. 
In Heidegger's later writings Dasein analysis gives 
way to an analysis of Being through different modes. 
For example Heidegger (1962) writes; 
The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world-
an intelligibility which always goes with 
a definite situation expresses itself as speech. 
(p. 203) 
It should be noted that hermeneutic analysis is 
prevalent in Heidegger's more recent writings (Bartky, 1970) 
and represents a narrowing of his interest away from pure 
Dasein analysis. 
Main tenets 
Existential analysis takes as its main concern the analysis 
of Dasein and as such the term has become somewhat reified. 
Dasein, the analysis of Being in its human form, takes on a 
significance in the hands of Boss, Binswanger and May that is 
not necessarily found in Heidegger (Lyons, 1961). Here, the 
term assumes a paradigmatic significance which defines the focus 
that adherer;_ts to the school are obliged to adopt. This usage 
is analogous to that of many religious schools of thought 
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which take certain basic values as essences which determine the 
action of man (Smith, 1958). 
To begin with, how is Dasein defined by the analysts? 
To answer this we shall consider two definitions, the first 
from May (1958) and the second from Boss (1963). May writes; 
"1{: ; Composed of sein (being) plus da (there), 
Dasein indicates that man is the being 
t who is there and implies also that he has 
a 'there' in the sense that he can know 
he is there and can take a stand with 
reference to that fact. The 'there' 
is moreover not just any place, but the 
particular 1 there 1 that is mine, the 
particular point in time as well as 
space of my existence at this moment. 
(p. 41) 
and Boss; 
\ Dasein means 1 being 1 (sein) 'there' (da). 
;Analysis of Dasein takes this meaning 
\1iterally: man's Dasein is the being of 
the 'there', the 'there' designates the 
realm of illumination which human existence 
is, the realm into which all particular 
beings may come forth, where they show 
themselves, may appear and thus be ••• 
( p. 38) 
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The emphasis remains Heideggerian; man becomes aware in-
" ,situation and that awareness (consciousness) is the sole 
giver of meaning to human Being. There is no other extant, 
platonic force which causes the human to see the "really real". 
In Binswanger's words; 
Existential analysis does not propose an 
ontological thesis about an essential condition 
determining existence, but makes ontic statements . 
- that is, statements of factual findings about 
actually appearing forms and configurations of 
existence. In this sense existential 
r i analysis is an empirical science, wj. th its own 
methods and particular ideas of _e~a~s, 
namely with the method and the ideal of 
exactness of the phenomenological empirical 
sciences. 
(1958, p.192) 
To enable ~elineation, the existential analysts 
ident~fy three closely inter-connected dimensions ~~ Dasein, 
"••• three simultaneous aspects of world which characterize the 
existence of each one of us as being..,-in-the-world (May, 1958, p.61)". 
~ The first of these dimensions is termed Umwelt (the world 
around us in its biological meaning) and is drawn mainly from the 
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writings of Von Uexkull (1921, 1928) who developed a complex 
.lliteractional picture of the biological environment. Von Uexkull 
argued that the perceptual world and the action world of 
the animal determined the environment. Blliswanger (1958) 
adopted this to his own needs; 
When we speak of the environment (Umwelt) 
. i 
the parame~um, the earthworm, the cephalopod, 
the horse, and even man has 'Has' 
signifies the establishment of a 'blueprint' , 
especially of the perception-and-action-
~~ation, limited by nature to ·quite deflliite 
possibilities of stimulation and reaction. 
(p. 198) 
The second dimension, the Mitwelt is the aspect of Dasein 
which deals with the lliterrelation of the human with others. As 
May (1958) puts it, "the meaning of the group for me depends in 
part upon how I put myself llito it (p. 62)". 
The fllial dimension, that of the Eigenwelt, "presupposes 
self-awareness, self-relatedness, and is uniquely present in 
human beings (May, 1958, p.63)". It is this dimension that 
allows the fullest movement of the human beyond any pure statement 
of his limits (Bucklew, 1958). It is the Eigenwelt which distinguishes 
man from other creatures and which is required for the development 
of the awareness of Being. 
The picture that emerges of Daselli can thus be seen as 
( 
an integral 
that of the 
one. Each aspect is involved at the same time with 
other, each determining the "world" as experienced 
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by the individual; 
Things can come forth into its (Dasein 1s) 
openness only in consonance with Dasein 1 s actual 
attunement or 'pitch'. Just as the colouring and 
the brightness of a physical light determine what 
can be seen by it, so things are always 
disclosed in accordance with man's pitch. 
An individual's pitch at a certain moment 
determines in advance the choice, brightness, 
and colouring of his relationship to the world. 
{Boss, 1963, p.41) 
This expresses clearly the movement and relatedness of Dasein 
action. 
Whilst Dasein analysis is the primary interest of the 
analytic orientation, equal importance is attached to the 
distinction that exists between the Dasein of the mentally we~l 
and that of the unwell. Binswanger writes; 
This insight - that the world-designs as such 
distinguish the mentally ill from the healthy 
and hamper communication with the former - also 
throws new light on the problem of the 
projection of psychopathological symptoms onto 
specific brain processes. Now it cannot be 
so important to localize single psychic 
symptoms in the brain but rather primarily, 
to ask where and how to localize the fundamental 
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) 
psyc.hic disturbance which is recognizable by 
the change of being-in-the-world' as such. 
For indeed, the ~:om') ••• proves to be 
the expression of a spreading chan~e of the 
----~--
soul, a change of the total form of existence 
and the total style of life 1 
(1958, p.213) 
It is argued by analysts such as Hoy (1967), Maddi (1964), 
Schindler (1968) and Straus (1966) that the requirements of 
----~- ---
/mental normality - or authentic existence demand that the 
' ~ - . -
I individual question his biological and sociological limitations , As Straus puts it "In questioning, man has passed the threshold 
between mere animal existence and human life (Pp. 166-167)", 
and in going beyond these "givens","he (man) only demonstrates 
and fulfills a basic mode of human existence (p. 166". 
In this desire to achieve and conceptualize mental health, 
the analysts are extending the ideas of Husserl and the 
existential philosophers. One can see clearly the influence 
in the direction taken-of the latter in that a reality (health) 
has to be attended to against mundane dictates (the biological 
and sociological aspects). 
For the analysts, this state of authentic existence is 
attained by the individual experiencing Angst (analogous to 
1 See also Farau (1964). 
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Husserl's reduction process); 
The first step in self-discovery is 
Angst, a nameless dread which leads the 
Dasein to ask, Who am I?. and 'What am I 
doing here? 1 Angst arises from a psychological 
shock or from disgust produced by a:q utterly 
inauthentic existence, which leads to a 
realization of the Dasein 1 s Unheimlichkeit 
(Un-home-li-ness) in the world. The Angst 
produced by this leads to self-questioning 
" 
and the discovery of the whole structure of 
one's own existence. 
(Fish, 1961, p.979) 
( Awareness pf Angst follows on from an awareness of a 
sense of insecurity. This insecurity is caused primarily because 
the individual realizes tb.8.t the dictates of the 11 naturalistic 1' 
or ''social 1' attitudes to which he has become accustomed to 
living, do not present individual salvation~ they provide only 
a general viewpoint in which the individual is treated as one 
amongst many. The reality of .!ill:'.:. death, _!gY_ living, is not 
~~ important to a nomothetic ethic and it is this realization 
....... 
tb.8.t creates the climate for the development of Angst. 
At base,inauthentic modes of living remove Angst by off~ring 
soothing explanations of "reality". The whole aim, and this is 
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stated openly by May, of the analytic framework is to break 
this pathology and replace it by fear - the fear or dread of 
loneliness, anxiety, insecurity. In this system the individual 
is conceptualized as not one of many, but alone, isolated. 
In this isolated state, the individual's full potentiality 
. )
si able to be used and his Dasein can become as he, in the 
Eigenwelt aspect, wishes to make it, free of crippling 
inauthenticities. Should an individual fail to develop his 
individual potential as a result of the pervading Angst, he 
may fall into a state of ontological guilt which is described 
by May (1958) as follows; 
First, everyone participates in it. No one of 
us fails to some extent to distort the reality 
of his fellow men, and no one fully fulfills all 
own potentialities Second, ontological guilt 
does not come from cultural prohibitions, or 
from introjection of cultural mores; it is 
rooted in the fact of self-awareness. 
Ontological guilt does not consist of I-am 
guilty-because-I-violate-parental~prohibitions, 
but arises from the fact that I can see 
myself as the one who can choose or· fail 
to choose. Every developed human being would 
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have this ontological guilt, though its content 
would vary from culture to culture ••• 
Third, ontological guilt is not to be confused 
with morbid or neurotic guilt. If it is 
unaccepted and repressed, it may turn into 
neurotic guilt ••• Fourth, ontological guilt 
does not lead to symptom formation, but has 
constructive effects in the personality. 
Specifically, it can and should lead to 
humility, • • • sharpened sensi ti vi ty in 
relationships with fellow men, and increased 
activity in the use of one 1 s own potentialities. 
(May, 1958, p.55) 
It is important to see Angst and guilt as co-existing with the 
p_otion of Dasein. The existential analyst stresses the 
"expeJ;'ience of being guilty of a definite concrete act which 
expresses the general estrangement of our existence, an act for 
which responsibility cannot be denied, in spite of the element 
of destiny in it (Tillfoh, 1961, p.14) 11 • Should one repress 
or deny the felt guilt, then one runs the risk of entering a 
neurotic state of denial of the ontological. 1 
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Psychotherapeutic value implications. 
Existential---humanistic orientations in general make much 
of the value problem as we have defined it here. Explicitly 
embedded in the writings of many adherents to this orientation 
JI lare ideas which point out that the therapist is himself an 
1
acting and· re-acting individual and that he imparts in 
t.- : 
1)/ I 
,,_ !a multitude of ways effects into the situation that he is not 
~- [1 
1~- ! always aware of. 
! 
Existential analysts place value on preserving this 
~ : 
'-..'.. · "openness" and stress the dangers involved in approaching the 
' I, 
individual in therapy in terms of pre-conceived models. 
Galdston (1960) for example writes; 
Existential psychiatry is both protago- and 
antagonistic. Its impulsion is to break 
down conceptual barriers, to complement and 
enlarge, and thereby to deepen understanding 
of the dynamics of becoming and of being. 
(p. 210) 
The essential value here is that no person can be 
\subsumed under any one epistemological framework since, as 
•
1 Neufeld (1964) remarks: "Existence is considered not a static 
structure or giveness but a process of becoming (p.11)". 
Hora (1959) adds; 11 0 •• it seems desirable that we liberate our 
·-- patients from the chains of our own epistemological attitudes (pol'72)" 
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an idea also to be found in Arbuckle (1965), Johnson (1967) and 
Cantril and Bumstead (1960). 
What is demanded of the therapist in the existential 
situation is a basic openness which allows him to be receptive 
to what have often been termed the "irrational" aspects of man 
(Galdston, 1953). He has to avoid any action which will prejudice 
the nature or existence of the other (Van Dusen, 1957, 1960). 
Closely related to this therapeutic value is the concept 
used by certain analysts (Galdston, 1960) for example of "thrust", 
whereby the individual has the potentiality or freedom to move 
beyond any description imposed upon his actions by others • 
. From this, ,the notions of totality and openness assume special 
significance. No longer is man to be seen as one "thing" 
whether "thingness" is defined in terms of units of physical 
mass or units of behavior (Sattler, 1966); man is seen as more 
than any framework or classification can establish: he is, in other 
words, a whole that cannot be reduced or classified. For Sartre 
(1943) if one says "Man is X" then man has the power "not to be X". 
And this is a fundamental value of the analysts, since the whole 
concern of existential analysis is to maintain a non-reductive 
position. 
" '•, 
Now, in terms of actual practice what does the term "totality"\ 
imply? This has been the concern not only of May (1958) but also 
of those ~sychiatrists connected with the development of existential 
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analysis such as Benda (1960a, 1960b), Braaten (1961), 
Hora (1959), ·Straus (1969) and Sutherland (1966). 
~/ ·,,' 
The\::_~=-~ybasic task of the therapist is to be aware of 
/ 
the way that the patient communicates with him and with the 
world. The therapist has to go beyond the limits set by 
normal "explanations" or labels and has to open himself to 
total involvement. As Hora (1959) puts it; 
The task of the physician is to help the 
patient understand the language of existence 
whether it speaks from his body, his mind, 
or his destiny. 
(p. 168) 
Similfµ'ily May (1967) writes; 
It would seem also to me that tone of voice, 
inflection and infinitely variegated subliminal 
language with which we communicate without 
knowing it would be significant. 
(p.21) 
!In short, man expresses his Dasein in a multiplicj_ty of ways 
' and the existential posj_ tion emphasizes this mul tj_plici ty. 
':{ 
The second goal or task of therapy is to ensure firstly 
that the patient is aware of Being as Hora suggests and that 
the therapj_st is similarly aware. Since the latter j_z an 
assumption that is seldom questioned amongst analysts, the 
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former requires a relatively clear demarcation of value position 
which allows the therapist and patient to discriminate authentic 
Being from inauthentic Being. 
In a sense all that is inauthentic has been discussed 
above in that viewing a man as a thing, as nothing but drives, 
etc. or viewing man in such a way as to de-emphasize his uniqueness 
and wholeness, is evidence of a failure to appreciate the nature 
of Dasein. The concept of inauthenticity has been extended in 
'·,, many ways. Maddi ( 1967), for example, talks of the need for the 
) individual to function on three levels (the psychological, 
I, -
'~ 
the social, the biological) and regards any lesser functioning 
as inauthentic. Braaten (1961) lists ten 1 do 1 s 1 for existential-
orientated thinkers and argues that "the essence of therapy 
is the client's movement from feeling unfree and controlled 
by others ••• (p.11)". 
In general, however, authenticity has two features; 
."b~coming" an~ the importance of commitment. These will be 
discussed separately. Man is by virtue of the existential 
ethic, free to become whatever he will. ~~ _can transcend the 
limits imposed on him by any theory, he can ma~e choices 
which he alone takes responsibility for. Thus, man cannot be 
seen merely as a thing, but as a movement towards something 
that is exclusively unique. 
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) Closely related to this is the idea of the realization 
I 
\ of potentialities. In May 1.s terms ( 1958) : 
The aim of therapy is that the patient experiences 
his existence as real. The purpose is that he 
become aware of his existence fully, which 
includes becoming aware of his potentialities 
and becoming able to act on the basis of them ... 
the task of therapy is to illuminate the 
existence • 
(p. 85) 
In order to "discover his being? his Dasein," writes May, 
"the individual must get at the totality that he is - not jus-fi 
fragments, not just feeling but intellect, feeling, everything 
that ·he is (p.87)". 
In contrast, the inauthentic is regarded as being abnormal 
because it is fragmented: "The neurotic is overconcerned about 
the Umwelt, and underconcerned about Eigenwelt (May, p.83)" 
'\ 
r the individual, in the inauthentic mode of existence lives as he is 
~Jf~"-.,( 
told to live by the societal milieu; 
Most existential concepts of an ontological 
authenticity of human Dasein actually 
represent, as it were, a declaration of 
spiritual independence of the individual 
from (contemporary) society. 
(Neufeld, 1964, p.12) 
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Whilst philosophers such as Sartre or Heidegger may have 
resisted, on occasion, attempts to specify particular directions 
of authenticity (Closterman, 1963), the members of the analytic 
school have been more open in their explication of the directions 
to be taken for "becoming" to occur. 
r 
Closely related to the notion of "becoming" is that of 
c~nt (Arendt, 1959; Bollnow, 1955); when one chooses to be 
then as May expresses it; ''We use the term decision as 
meaning decisive attitude toward existence, an attitude of 
commitment (1958, p.88)". By being encouragingly open to 
the patient in therapy, the therapist maintains commitment 
to the direction chosen by the patient. At the same time he 
(the therapist) must be committed to his own Eigenwelt, so that 
therapy as such becomes an encounter and from within this 
develops authenticity. 
'---:)~Commitment then is a pre-requisite for authenticity. 
Sattler (1966) for example writes; 
••• the interaction between two people 
should be open~ Whatever is said and 
done does not seal the interpersonal 
engagement. The relationship should be 
allowed to have some sort of mutual 
fulfillment, and should be characterized 
by the unexpected. Omnipotence and 
omniscience have no place in the science of 
psychology. 
(p.291) 
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Whilse these sentiments suggest a somewhat permissive 
nature of psychotherapy, it is inevitable that more concrete 
goals would have to be set up in order, at least, to convey the 
meaning of the analytic point of view. This is very evident in 
later developments of thiG orientation, as Hora (1959) points 
out; mental health requires an authentic epistemology and to 
present existential analysis as a therapeutic approach demands 
an epistemic rationale. 
One can find many examples of directives in what has gone 
before and other examples add to the picture of an exi::;;tential 
science (May, 1960). Benda for example writes (1960a); 
The contact with the therapist is thus (contact with 
a person) whose more mature and stabilized 
views enable the patient to evolve from his 
predicament and enter a new phase of life. 
(p. 39, my empha::;;is) 
And May (1967); 
••• the goal of therapy is not to free the 
patient from anxiety. It is, rather, to 
help free him from neurotic anxiety in order 
that he may meet normal anxiety constructively 
the self becomes more integrated and stronger 
as experiences of normal anxiety are 
successfully confronted. 
(Pp. 81-82) 
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·and further; 
... mature values are those which transcend 
the immediate situation in time and encompass 
past and future. Mature values transcend 
also the immediate in-group, and extend 
outward toward the good of the community, 
ideally and ultimately embracing humanity 
as a whole. 
(p. 82) 
By way of evaluation it is possible to make a crucial 
. point against the analytic orientation. Considering the value 
problem, we have to ask how it is that proponents of this 
orientation know the penultimate value of authentic~ty as 
expressed, for example, in the quotation by May above. The 
answer is not readily forthcoming for, lost in the web of 
existential terminology and debate, there is little attention 
given to this point (as noted by, amongst other, Clive, 1963; 
Olafson, 1967 and Tymieniecka, 1962). One has, in effect, to 
either accept or reject existential values. If one expects, as 
proof, some form of experimental or logical validity, it will 
not be found: the individual person in action uncovers '1 truth 11 
and his only tool seems to be some modification of the 
phenomenological reduction espoused by Husserl (Ayer, 1959; 
Taylor, 1959). 
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The second point that is of :importance follows on from 
the first. Value is given by a particular kind of action; 
authenticity. Authenticity is, variousl~ defined as what the 
existential analysts say it is or as the individual makes it. 
Either way, the problem of value emerges. 
If we take the former case, then the value criterion rests 
in the intersubjective agreement that existential analysts 
have arrived at; that is, the convergence of their separate 
opinionso Naturally, we then ask why intersubjective 
convergences of other orientations should not be of equal 
validity? To which the analyst may reply - "But we do not 
systematize man as others do", which in turn can be seen to be 
contradictory for to speak of intersubjective agreement is to 
speak of common features which jn a very real sense destroys the 
conception of freedom of action that the individual is supposed to 
have. Alternatively, if the existential intersubjective consensus 
is supposed to be more "real" than others there must be some 
criterion which will establish this. However, as above, such a 
criterion is against the conception of a free-acting individual. 
Taking, on the other hand, the idea that value is created by 
the individual, one then has to ask how he comes to recognize it 
once he has attained it. Clearly whilst the individual may be 
authentic, the therapist, because he is an individual, too, may 
not have the same understanding of authenticity and may, therefore, 
consider the individual's value to be false when it may, for the 
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patient, not be. 
These points a.re mentioned here and will be dealt with in 
more detail later. What has to be noted at this stage is that, 
as was the case in naturalistic approaches to the value problem, 
there is an evasion of the critical re-evaluation necessary to 
be aware of the infinite regress that occurs when discussing value. 
Whilst existential analysts tend to be more open in terms 0£ 
recognizing the role of value classifications in dealing with 
conceptions of mental health etc., they "solve" the problem by 
appealing either to the authority of personal experience or to that 
of the existential orientation. 
LOGO THERAPY 
This second of the three major trends is, like the first, 
rooted in the writings of Heidegger, yet in contrast to the 
above approach, the logotherapist postulates a major motivational 
/
force that serv.es to direct human movement - that_c:Jf~the_will~ 
to find meaning in life (Ungersma, 1961): The neurotic 
--~- -~ 
personality is one in which this will has been frustrated in 
some way. 
Main tenets 
Viktor Frankl, the founder of the "third Viennese school" 
of psychology, differentiates his own brand of existentialism 
from that of the existential analysts and humanists such as 
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Maslow (Frankl, 1955, 1965, 1966a, 1966c). He is concerned 
with the existential experiential world in which each person 
finds himself and with the nature of man's actions in living 
his own particular life. Frankl writes (1966b); 
There are two specifically human phenomena 
by which human existence is characterized. 
The first is constituted by man's capacity for 
self-detachment ••• Another capacity of man is that 
for self-transcendence ••• In fact, it is a 
constitutive characteristic of being human that 
it always points, and is directed, to something 
other than itself. It is, therefore, a severe 
and grave misinterpretation of man to deal 
with him as if he were a closed system. 
Actually, being human profoundly means to 
be open to the world, a world, that is, which 
is replete with other beings to encounter and 
with meanings to fulfill. 
(p. 97) 
Frankl builds his system around these twin aspects. He 
believes that the individual is here and now, but is capable of 
thinking beyond the present and it is this tension created by 
this contrast that defines the human situation. 
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Psychotherapeutivevalue implications 
Using the above idea, Frankl distinguishes between healthy 
neurotic living. Frankl maintains that the neurotic individual 
is one who is hiding from what he terms "existential facts" 
(1966a, 1967). For Frankl, these "facts" are the tragic senses 
of life - death, pain, suffering, guilt and so on. The 
neurotic attempts to deny the presence of these realities and 
follows other pursuits, such as pleasure, in order to escape from 
the tragic. He sees attempts to gain these "things" as in-
authentic since they evade the responsibility the individual 
has for creating his own meaning. 
Now) in the heal thy mind the person is encouraged to develop 
a basic tension between the "I am" and the "I ought". What 
logotherapy tries to do is not to dictate to the individual what 
-he must do, but rather shows him that he is responsible for 
his own being and therapy is directed to making him aware of 
the existential facts, and of the will-to-meaning; 
By declaring that man is a responsible creature 
and must actualise the potential meaning of 
his life, I wish to stress that the true meaning 
of life is to be found in the wor~d rather 
than within man or his own psyche, as 
though it were a closed system. 
(Frankl, 1966a, p. 175) 
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This is important. In contrast to existential analysts, he 
~ 
stresses the nature of the "beyond self • Frankl believes 
that the existing experience of self has to be seen as one 
pole, the other being meaning itself. Will to m~ing_~s the 
necessary tension that exists between the self as it is and 
that which it has potential to become. 
As Frankl is at pains to point out, whilst his point of 
view is an existential one, it is also idealistic since man 
should, so he argues, be encouraged to hcwe faith in some-
thing beyond himself (Brammer and Shostrom, 1969). It is 
from this point of view that he criticizes other existential 
humanistic formulations; 
Self-actualization is not man's ultimate 
destination, not even his primary intention. 
Self-actualization is, and must remain, an 
effect, namely, the effect of mercy fulfillment. 
Only to the extent to which man fulfills a 
meaning out there in the world does he 
fulfil himself. 
(1966b, p.99) 
He argues that meaning (the intended, self-transcendent 
aspect) cannot be identified with Being since when man is 
his Being, he can go no further (Frankl, 1955, 1965a, 1966c) 
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Logotherapy, in respect of our value problem, would 
/set values as those beyond the present _Being of the individual 
1to which he, the individual, must aim or have faith in. The 
problem here lies in the role of the logotherapist in this 
process. As is clear from Frankl 1 s general approach the therapist 1 r:: 
task is to show the individual the essential potentiality contained 
within himself. Responsibility is thus lodged with the therapist -
he, one assumes, knows the required epistemological value. 
The essence of the logotherapists approach to the problem 
of value in psychotherapy is that the therapist somehow is 
gifted with knowing that the individual must believe in something 
beyond himself. If he does not, then the individual is not 
being authentic. This assumption does not account in any 
satisfactory way for the role of the therapist in creating these 
values; we can be sure of only one thing, that authority is again 
vested in a particular insight which, while no doubt being of 
inestimable value, is only that. There are other orientations 
who claim equal authority for their insights and offer proof in 
just as convincing style. 
It is necessary to point out that logotherapy whilst 
, moving away from the analytic conception of a "realizable" 
authenticity toward a tension-creating authenticity, less 
awareness and appreciation is shown of the role of the 
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therapist. It is clear from most of Frankl 1 s writings 
that the logotherapist has to deal with the patient as 
he, the logotherapist conceives of that person's full 
potentiality. 
This conceptualization involves an epistemology based 
on the logotherapeutic goal of self-transcendence as 
one pole of the existential situation. Clearly, there 
is some doubt that the logotherapist has total knowledge 
of this transcendence since this would require the 
therapist setting up a criterion for the beyond-self. 
If such a criteria has to be uniquely determined 
by tne patient, the issue becomes one of inquiring how 
the logotherapist recognizes a unique beyond-self and 
how is this to be differentiated from inauthentic or, 
as Frankl has it, self-actualized being? Again the 
orientation falls back on the authoritative dictates of its 
followers. Clearly there is little consideration made of the 
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therapist as a value giver he is seen mainly as an agent of 
the orientation. 
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 
This last orientation represents the values of an 
interaction of three interrelated orientations. On the one 
hand, as Sutich (1962) points out, humanistic psychology 
(has grown out of behavioural psychology and psychoanalysis, 
and on the other, its proponents have been influenced by 
Continental existential philosophy and psychology. 
Hwnanistic psychology attempts to go beyond the mere 
existential presence of the individual and emphasizes mar~ 
specifically the importance of studying the results of a 
Dasein 1 s effect on the world. As Buhler puts it, humanistic 
psychology is " ••• a science which tries to establish by 
means of empirical research what the actual motives, goals and 
values of human beings are (1966, p.l)". 
From the sections on Existential Analysis and Logotherapy, 
we have seen that whilst there is a theoretical distinction 
made between authentic and inauthentic modes of being-in-the-
world, the direction of authenticity remains to a certain extent 
determined by individual, idiographic factors (Beck, 1953). 
The humanistic orientation takes the systematization already 
evident in existential analysis further to a " ••• search for the 
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conditions under which the human organism can function 
optimally (Solomon, 1962, p.89)". He adds; 
Values, beliefs, religiosity, and most of 
the subject..,..matter traditionally treated 
under the rubric 'psychology of religion• 
------- --
can now comfortably be fitted into the 
emerging framework of an existential -
humanistic psychology which tries ••• 
to come directly to grips with the inner 
core of human nature, its instinctoid 
characteristic, and that Essence' which 
we now have good reason to believe, 
does precede existence. 
(p. 89, my emphasis) 
Other writers, for example Bugental (1965) have 
contributed to the general development of this point of view and 
conducted research designed to establish the nature of the "core" 
that Solomon discusses above. 
Main tenets 
There are two points that need concern us here. In the 
humanist's' 1 _attempt to establish general rules for living he draws 
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on a particular framework for his analysis which is-best 
termed a wholistic ~ne. Secondly, he hypothesizes a basic 
personality core or self-concept which he uses to describe 
the idealized value contained in his wholistic epistemology. 
With regard to this wholistic epistemology, humanists take_ 
-- -- ----
their stand from the existentialistic_ ide_a _of __ a fr_e_e_indiv:idual 
able to create his ?wn part~cul~o_rl9--viE2yv. Bugental expresses 
this as the belief that "no a.mount of additional findings about 
parts will ever yield an appreciation or understanding of man 
in the world (1964b, p.20)". 
Humanistic psychologists such as Bugental (1964a, 1965), 
Cantril (1955), Cantril and Bumstead (1960), Maslow (1956) and 
Rogers (1963) seek a more comprehensive picture of man than 
the reductive model used by behavioural psychologists and 
psychoanalysts. In short, as Maslow (1960) suggests, 
~1human~stic_psychology_avoi~.rubricizing-the-indi~idual 
and atte~pts rather_to understand man in his ~otali~y. 
---
Bugental 
puts it as follows; 
There is no way in which I, purely as a 
psychologist, can grasp the totality of 
the person whom I am encounterying; nor is 
there any way in which I can, as psychologist, 
respond with the wholeness of me ••• It is only 
with my awareness of the process of myself-and-of-
the-other-person-in-the-situation-of-encountering-
each-other-that I can apprehend this event. 
(1963, p. 242) 
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f:)i1 The principle of wholeness assumes valuative proportions 
?'!JI since the emphasis on the whole man is considered, too, to 
be the symptom of the healthy, humanized personality; 
••• neurosis may be defined as (the) irreal 
fragmentation of one's self and the psycho-
therapist's inadequate glossary is apt to 
augment such neurotic fragmentation rather 
than resolve it. 
(Bugental, 1963, p.245) 
he adds that" ••• it becomes our responsibility to try to 
present an alternative glossary which avoids the fallacy of 
fragmentation (p.245)". Under these conditions we can see that 
humanistic psychology aims at describing and outlining what 
they consider to be a more fundamental mode of living (Cohen, 
1962; Severin, 1965). 
In order to appreciate this value, we turn to the humanistic 
notion of "self". This "self" is correlative with the wholi'stic 
epistemology since the latter involves the studying of man as 
a unique individual; the former is a prerequisite for this 
study and also the desired end-product. 
When the humanist talks of "self" he is using 
/restricted al though related formulation of Dase in. I , 
a more 
This usage 
shows clearly the interrelation between American psychology and 
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Continental existential psychology since the term "self-
concept" has long been in use in the former as Allport (1943) 
and Meissner (1966) have shown. Others such as Lowe (1961), 
Raimy (1943) and Raskin (1949, 1952) point out that the 
term has often been closely associated with "ego" and that 
it, in fact, may have originated in the desire of some 
psychologists to escape the web of psychoanalytic theory. 
Since the early fifties, the term has, however come 
to be associated with the work of humanists such as Rogers 
and Snygg and Combs (Rogers, 1951; Rogers and Dymond 1954; 
Snygg and Combs, 1949; Snygg, 1955) • 
. Bugental (1962a) defines "self-concept" as follows; 
Our chief concern here is with this pre-
existing conception or definition of 1who-
I-am-and-what-my-world-is1 ••• In general terms, 
this self-and-world concept is learned; it 
is abstracted from experiences; and it provides 
one with a road map for seeking satisfactions 
and avoiding harms in life ••• it is important 
that it be as accurate as possible, in the 
sense of according with external reality, so that 
the person actually may find satisfactions and 
generally avoid harms ••• to the extent that 
one distorts or rejects incoming information, 
he reduces his accuracy of perception and thus 
the efficiency of his ability to cope with reality ••• 
(Pp. 527-528) 
170/ 
-170-
This self-concept is the raw data as it were, that the 
humanistic psychologist works on. His method involves the 
apprehension of an individual's self-concept through experiencing 
with the person his own particular world. This is done, 
naturally, in a wholistic sense involving the total-being of 
both individual and investigator. 
Psychotherapeutic value implications 
Using the above assumptions it is possible to arrive at 
relatively clear-cut goals for the orientation. Thus 
Bugental (1962a), for example, writes; 
Neurosis ••• becomes a name given to the 
situation of a person who has such conflicts 
between his self-and-wo~ld concept and reality 
that he is distorting or rejecting much 
incoming information ••• and so experiences 
anxiety, as his feelings of being a stable 
1 
self in a stable world is threatened. 
(p. 528) 
Similarly, Rogers (1961) writes; 
Therapy seems to mean a getting back to 
basic sensory and visceral experience. 
1 Similarity between Bugental 1 s conception of self-and-world 
and the work of Bruner (1951), Bruner et al (1966), Breger 
(1968), Miller, Pribram and Galanter (1960) and Pribram (1962, 
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1968) is fairly close. All stress the importance of the correct 
coding of incoming information allowing the individual to successfully 
operate in the environment. This is an indication of the intricate 
synthesis found in humanistic psychology. 
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Prior to therapy the person is prone to ask 
himself, often unwittingly 'what do others 
thin~ I should do in this situation?' 
'What would my parents or my culture want 
me to do?' ••• During the process of 
therapy the individual comes to ask 
.himself, in regard to ever-widening 
areas.of his life-span, 1How do.!. experience 
this?' ••• He comes to act on a basis of 
·what may be termed realism - a realistic 
balancing of the satisfactions and dis-
satisfactions which any action will 
bring to himself. 
(Pp. 103-104) 
The value here lies in this awakening of the self to the 
real demands of the situation (Pentouy, 1959). In Bugental 1 s 
terms; 
Since full awareness necessarily means the 
conf~ontation of uncertainty, of conflicting 
impulses, of threat and of one's own 
individual responsibility for choice, there 
is a constant invitation to reduce one's 
awareness of the actual ••• Conversely, one is 
non-self-actualizing and neurotic to the 
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degree that one treats himself as other 
than a unified totality, rejects awareness 
of his own experience, assigns causal 
power over his own feelings, thoughts and 
actions to ot~er agencies, or denies the 
contingencies of existence by ascribing 
certainty to some agency. 
(1963, p. 248) 
The point here is that some definition is required of 
. the terms "real" and "unified". And for these, "penultimate", 
valu~s we turn to the work of Maslow who is perhaps the most 
well-known of all humanistic psychologists. 
Maslow, as other humanists, seeks to develop a discipline 
which is directed "toward comprehensiveness, allness, and the 
acceptance of all concrete experiences, all suchness,all 
esthetic savouring of the full richness of everything without 
need to abstract (1966a, p.75) 11 • Yet he recognizes that in 
cannot be identified with the reality it refers to. 
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He contends; 
The solution of this dilemma that I have 
worked out for myself ••• is to know when 
I am abstracting and when I am concreting, to 
be able to do both, to enjoy them both, and to 
know ·the values and shortcomings of both. 
(1966a, p.75) 
To this end, Maslow distinguishes between two types of 
experience, the normal everyday one and the "peak experience". 
He devotes much of his writing to enumumerating and defining 
the latter. Maslow believes that certain types of people 
exhibit the latter and can be studied. These are "highly 
heal thy people. They have higher ceilings. They can see 
further. And they can see in a more inclusive and integrating 
way (1966a, p. 144)". Thus, to begin with, Maslow studies those 
people who best cope with life, who "by definition", he argues, 
"are gratified in all their basic needs ••• (and) are now 
motivated in other higher ways, to be called 'metamotivation' 
(1964, p.la)". These higher metamotives; 
Are not only wanted and desired by all human 
beings, but also needed as well in the 
sense that they are necessary to avoid 
illness and psychopathology ••• in order 
to get these intrinsic goods, animals and men 
are willing to learn practically anything that will 
achieve for them these ultimate goods. 
(1970, p.5) 
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There is thus, a very definite value complex that is 
intrinsic to self-actualizers. Why is it then that these 
people have such contact? The answer is given in a number of 
papers, notably those dealing with the contact that actualizers 
have with "Being"; 
It (Being Psychology) has been used to 
refer to the whole cosmos, to everything 
that exists, to.all of reality. In peak 
experiences, in states of fascination, or 
focal attention; attention can narrow down 
to a single object or person which is then 
reacted to 1 as if 1 it were the whole of 
Being, that .is, the whole of reality. 
(1962, p.51) 
In a later paper, he extends this; 
Contemplation of ultimate values becomes the 
same as contemplation of the nature of the 
world. Seeking the truth ••• may be 
the same as seeking beauty, order, oneness, (etc.) 
(1967' p.34) 
The information provided by this contact with "Being" can 
be used to generate basic principles for the creation of the 
"Good society". This thesis is developed in a number of articles 
(1963, 1964, 1966b, 1968, 1969) whereby "somehow two (or more) 
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people have arranged their relationship in such a fashion 
that one person's advantage is the other person's advantage 
rather than one person's advantage being the other's 
disadvantage (Maslow, 1964, p.12)" 1 
Clearly Maslow synthesizes a number of methodologies in 
structuring his theory. The existential experience of healthy, 
actualized people is studied wholistically and then subjected 
to the checking and replicating that is the "follow-up work, 
subsequent to the great intuitions (1968, p.694)" provided by 
. 2 
a humanistic analysis. 
The penultimate value that emerges from Maslow1 s system, 
published shortly before his death last year is contained in 176/ 
1 In similar vein, Charlotte BUhler presents arguments derived f+om 
a neo-Freudian orientation. BUhler posits four basic tendencies; 
need-satisfaction, self-limiting adaptation, creative expansion and 
upholding of the internal order. She argues that "the best -
adjusted persons I have studied seem to strike a happy balance 
among these tendencies, while neurotics and psychotics show 
extreme predominance of single trends or irreconcilable conflicts 
(1962, p.446)". Again there is the idea of value placed on whole-
ness, non-fragmentation and a kind of stable "Becoming" in which 
"Becoming" is achieved through progression not of aspects of the 
personality, but of the totality (:SU.hler, 1959, 1969; 
BUhler and Massarik, 1968) 
2 Maslow has been criticized by Murphy (1967) and Stark (1968) for 
failing to distinguish between the act of creation and. the act 
of validation but, as can be seen above, this is not so. 
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the following quotation from his last work; 
Self-actualizing does not occur in young 
people. In our culture at least, youngsters 
have not yet achieved identity, or autonomy, 
nor have they had time enough to experience 
an enduring, loyal, post-romantic love 
relationship, nor have they generally found 
their calling, the altar upon which to 
offer themselves. Nor have they worked 
out their~ system of values; nor have 
they had experience enough (responsibility 
for others, tragedy, failure, achievement, 
success) to shed perfectionistic illusions 
and become realistic; nor have they generally 
made their peace with death; nor have they 
learned how to be patient; nor have they 
learned enough about evil in themselves and 
others to be compassionate; nor have they . 
had time to become post-ambivalent about 
patients and elders, power and authority; 
nor have they generally become knowledgeable 
and educated enough to lay open the possibility 
of be coming wise, nor have they generally 
acquired enough courage to be unpopular, to 
be unashamed about being openly virtuous, etc. 
( 1970, p.11) 
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The person who can achieve all these things is regarded 
by Maslow as something of an Olympian knower and this concept-
ualization fits well into the therapeutic setting. 
In this last quotation, humanistic psy.chology reaches its 
zenith in terms of an explicating of its values. It involves 
a paradigmatic language no less than other orientations and 
despite its links with existential notions of "Being", there 
is a far more definite statement of an essential value. This 
follows of course from the humanist's desire to define the 
totality of human existence. In order to do so, some value 
emerges which whilst stated here explicitly by Maslow and 
others is implied also by people like Rogers and Von Rintelen 
(1961). 
CONCLUDING EVALUATION 
Whilst the existential~humanistic orientation has been 
concerned, in part, with the complexity of subject-object 
relationships and with personal involvements of the psychologist 
with the value direction taken in therapy, it has, one concludes, 
been more concerned with systematizing its own posit~on and has, 
become embroiled in an unfortunate contradiction of its own avowed 
involvement in the value problem. 
It began with a statement of extreme relativity: the 
dogma of naturalism and its concomrnitant positivism was to 
be condemned for equating its own dictates with states of 
reality. Individuals were encouraged to transcend the limits 
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of such theories about reality and to create their own beliefs, 
or commitments to reality. 
Yet this personalism and emphasis on the unique had to 
give way to describing the ways in which an individual could 
live. A distinction was made between the authentic and 
inauthentic value choices that an individual could make, and, 
as it developed, the orientation polarized into a definite 
value position which was no longer personal in the original 
relative use of the term. Definite authentic values were 
"discovered" and served as in the naturalistic orientations -
to guide followers of the orientation to the "right" or "actualized" 
epistemology so essential for good mental health (Mullan and 
Sangiuliano, 1960, Tennessen, 1967). 
This is where existential - humanistic orientations have 
failed to consider the value problem. Whilst one can find 
isolated statements of interest in the problem, the orientation 
as a whole has side-stepped it. There is little, in recent 
statements by members of this orientation (for example, Maslow, 1970; 
Winthrop, 1966a, 1966b) to indicate that the problem will be 
treated as it was perhaps by Sartre or Heidegger. 
In conclusion therefore it is necessary to say that the 
existential- humanistic orientation maintains a value that 
·----.... 
is relattye_ly __ aJ.!_thor.i,1ati·:e. One learns, if one seeks 
membership of 9ne of these orientations, to use a particular 
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language in order that one can be termed "existential", "humanistic" 
and so on; in precisely the same way as one learns to be a 
behaviourist of a technical eclectic. 
As one learns such a language one is then able to 
identify "an authentic person". Clearly to be able to do 
this implies that authenticity is something that can be :known 
and transmitted. In other words, as Maslow (1970) has it, 
it is a "higher value" which is independent to the valuer, 
1 the :knower and thus the psychotherapist. This is tantamount 
to a denial of the value problem and is the main reason why 
existential - humanistic orientations do not offer a meaningful 
solution to the problem. 
SECTION C: A THEORY OF EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
-181-
The problem of the role of value in psychotherapy has 
been examined in terms of two value orientations and both 
have been found lacking in certain respects. What I have 
tried to show is that each orientation claims that its 
/\ ti values and methods are more reliable, more real and epistem-
ologically sounder than any other. In this section a theory 
is proposed which does not make this claim but which maintains 
its commitment to the value problem rather than to a solution 
of the problem. 
DEFINING THE AUTHORITATIVE 
After the examination of the preceding value orientations, 
certain general conclusions can be drawn. The most important 
of these is that each value orientation offers some solution 
to the problem of value in psychotherapy and does so 
authoritatively in that some value is advocated which transcends 
the value problem. The naturalistic orientations either ignore 
the problem or invoke the process of science as corrective of 
value-bias. Equally, existential -humanistic orientations, 
whilst paying lip service to the interaction between therapist 
and patient, evade the problem by the use of concepts of 
authenticity which, clearly, represent a movement away from the 
complexity of therapist-patient functioning. 
) 
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Since a great deal rests on my use of the term 
"authoritative" it is important that this usage be clearly 
defined. It should be made clear from the outset Umt my use 
of the term is very similar to other writers' use of the 
term "scientism". This latter term is used to describe an 
epistemology in which the method and spirit of science is 
applied somewhat over-exuberantly (Hayek, 1952; Schoeck and 
Wiggins, 1960; Willtbrop, 1959, 1960). 
Winthrop describes a number of assumptions of scientism 
and discusses at some length one such assumption which he 
calls the "Pythagorean complex". This, so he argues, involves, 
"the systematic emphasis on the notion that number lies 
at the heart of the universe (1960, p.301)". He adds; 
Like the faith in the methods of science, the 
PC 1 also has its social determinants in that, 
having discovered the extent to which the laws 
of harmonics were expressible in mathematical 
terms, the Pythagoreans then extrapolated 
• from these discoveries and took as an article 
of faith that similar mathematical regularities 
would be found to underlie all phenomena. With 
the rise of modern science, following Newton's 
amazingly successful theories, this faith 
has been strongly reinforced. As a result 
1 "Pythagorean Complex" 
\ 
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various brands of uncritical positivism 
have arisen in our time which take as 
an article of faith for intellec'tuar 
inquiry, that the methods of the natural 
{ sciences assisted by the function of 
' thinking of mathematics and various types 
of logical analysis, will suffice to reveal 
truth in all her glory. 
( p. 301) 
Other assumptions are listed by Merloo (1956), Sorokin 
(1956) and Winthrop (1959). Examples are 11modelling after the 
physical sciences" and "factophilia" - the belief in the 
absolute nature of facts. 
Winthrop (1959) goes on to criticize scientism for its 
narrow emphasis on the above assumptions and raises the following 
points against scientistic doctrines; 
••• neglect of the causative role of value 
meaning, and the effect of the individual 
to maintain himself as a system ••• relative 
neglect of the role played by the inner 
mental life ••• the promotion of a dangerous, 
ethical relativism through a superficial, 
philosophic approach to individual and group 
ethics ••• (and) an uncritical insistence 
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that there are no other ways of relating 
to experience, apart from ••• the 
scientific attitude. 
(1959, p.112, my emphasis) 
Others such as Bertalanffy (1960), Couch (1960) and 
Schoeck (1960) demand that scientists should be aware of 
the dangers of over-emphasizing the value of a scientific 
epistemology. Battig (1962) and Bugental (1962b), for example, 
suggest that the.attention of psychologists, in particular, 
be directed to creating the conditions for encouraging 
appreciation of the complexity of scientific activity as a 
human activity and one in which personal values play a major 
role. 
~ 
.cf' My use of the term authoritative is, however, applied 
_) f0 (- to ~ approach which claims that its own way of investigation, 
. 
of knowing, of valuing human reality is the only one (Lambley, 
1970b, 1970c). In particular, as developed in this thesis, the 
term is applied to the two psychotherapeutic value orientations. 
The distinction is a subtle one. Whilst authors like 
Winthrop criticize scientistic thinking they suggest that 
another approach (in Winthrop's case an existential - humanistic 
one) is more appropriate. Clearly, from what has gone before, 
neither orientation in general offers an adequate solution to 
- ~ ~ ~ ~--- . ..,_ -· - - - - ~ -
the value problem and both can be termed authoritative. 
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Now, it should be clear by this stage that the evaluation 
presented so far has been an evaluation from a particular point 
of view. This point of view is of course, the value problem 
ffifined in Section A. This approach was chosen to avoid 
subscribing to either value orientation's value theory. If 
one takes the naturalistic value system, one's theory generally 
has to take the form of an experiment in which unusual or new 
combinations of accepted variables are tested. Alternatively, 
if one commences with an existential~humanistic perspective 
one is often bound to explore the experiential aspect of a 
particular existential reality in order to ascertain the 
essential features of general Being (Van Kaam, 1961). 
By being concerned with the value problem a particular 
theoretical viewpoint is implied. Quite obviously, the 
value problem, as I present it, is only a problem from the 
point of view that has been taken: if any other orientation 
had been taken, as I have shown, the problem would have 
disappeared. 
Now that these preliminary points have been made, the 
theory itself can be outlined. This theory is in essence a 
non-authoritative approach to the value problem. 
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AN EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
There have been several authors who have been aware of 
and have attempted to resolve the dilemma created by the value 
problem in non-authoritative ways. We turn now to an 
examination of these approaches. 
Many of these writers have been mentioned already in the 
preliminary discussion on existential philosophy and phenomenology 
blt to begin with I shall go back to a problem faced by Husserl. 
Husserl's main concern was to interrelate two seemingly 
unrelated concepts. That of an essential absolute reality and 
that of existential, subjective apprehension of this reality. 
Whilst Husserl developed numerous hypotheses his formulation 
of the concept of subjectivity has dominated the work of many 
phenomenologists and existentialists (Patterson, 1965). 
In essence, Husserl's notion of subjectivity involved 
the postulation of a perceiving consciousness which created 
contact with the transcendent essence. This essence is only 
realized in consciousness of the right type (Fulton, 1966). 
There are different definitions of the term "subjective" and 
some of these have been discussed by Spiegelberg (1966). 
He identified three meanings of the term; 
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(i) Subjective in the sense of merely 
personal, hence varying from person to 
person and from case to case, according 
to purely empirical circumstances ••• 
"Objective" is what is not subject to 
personal variation. 
(ii) Subjective in the sense of dependent 
upon a subject regardless of his personal, his 
typical or atypical constitution 
objective is here anything that has no 
possible connection with a subject, and 
is therefore independent of it. 
(iii) Subjective in the sense of subject-
related ••• This is, in short, the general 
relational implication contained in (ii) 
above. The subject-related category 
involves, as it where, a continuum or 
degree of subject-related. 
(p. 137) 
Clearly Husserl's definition is of type (iii). It does 
however raise an interesting problem, that of the epistemological 
considerations surrounding the meaning of non-subjective. 
This can be expressed in Husserl's case as a questioning 
of the "transcendental". Whilst we can appreciate the subjective 
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involvement of the sort described in (ii) above, we have to 
ask what is the nature of that which is not-subjective yet 
at the same time subjective? For Husserl one has to ask 
how it is possible to know the essential "core" which, by 
his own admission is transcendental, that is both subject 
and non-subject related? To attempt, as Husserl did, to 
answer the problem by recourse to transcendentalism begs 
the question of how· one is to know when one has attained this 
state. Is it the same for all who experience it? Does this 
I 
ess~ence have the same meaning for separate persons undergoing 
epocM? 
These are examples of the sort of problem involved 
when the term "subjective" is used. Husserl 1 s solution, as 
has been shown, was to differentiate between different types 
of perception. Within each seperate perceiving subject there 
is the potentiality for achieving aw~eness of the non-subject 
related. 
In short, he advocated a theory of perspectivity. That is, 
the difference between "correct" perception and purely "personal" 
(in the sense of (i) above) perception was merely a change of 
attitude or perspective. However, if we assume, with Husserl, 
that some form of perspectivism is essential to his theory then 
it is clear that what he is suggesting is that there is some new 
perspective which is the sum total and something more of all 
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separate perspectives. By definition, this can no longer be 
a perspective, equally it is no longer subject-related. 
Husserl does not explain in any satisfactory way how the 
act which creates this total perspective can in fact subsume 
all others; we rely on his word and on the dictates of the 
phenomenological paradigm for this. 
One is drawn therefore to the conclusion that whilst 
Husserl did not wish to use the terms "objective" or 
"independent to", this was the direction that he moved towards. 
Transcendentalism is subject-related but it is not personal: 
man, in process of the phenomenological reduction, contributes 
nothing personal to the transcendent essence, he is merely 
a voyeur of that which is beyond himself. His look~ng does 
not change the essentialistic nature of the essence. 
For my own purposes I make the following point here; 
\·"subjective" does not ne. cessarily imply personal factors 
I often assumed. As ~usserl uses the term it clearly does 
as is 
not 
I 
I 
' involve, at least epistemologically, the unique personal 
l t variability of the human: this is, in fact, regarded as 
unimportant. 
In other orientations the term is defined in relation to a 
specified object of interest and assumed to occur either 
simultaneously with the object or as a result of object action. 
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Examples of such a usage can be found in Champion (1967), 
Day (1969), Richardson (1965), and Winthrop (1963). Others such 
as Burt (1962) have developed similar subject-related theories 
to Husserl whilst certain writers (Bertalanffy, 1964, 1965, 1968; 
Feigl, 1958; Place, 1956; Smart, 1963) have preferred to 
identify subjective-experiential states with the occurrence 
of physical phenomena. 
At root these usages do not differ overmuch from Husserl's 
since in each case the subjective aspect of hum.an functioning 
is defined in terms of some objective pre-existant (Lyons, 
1963). Clearly these various objective concepts are presumed 
to exist a priori to perception or to knowing. In Husserl 1 3 
case transcendental "reality" appears before or prior to the 
particular individual's subjective awareness of it. 
The point that I am making is that the personal should be 
brought more into focus since, so I shall argue, this is a 
basic requirement of a non-authoritative theory. 
This conviction is echoed by Sartre's criticism of Husserl 
and his own approadl to the problem is of considerable interest. 
Sartre (1940) argues that to think about an object requires some 
image of that object and this image cannot, logically, be that 
object since this is a denial of the ability of a subject to 
reflect on or think about anything else. 1 Thus we get the 
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the reason of the series of apparitions which unveil it" 
(Sartre, 1943, p.15). 
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beginnings of an epistemology which reaches its full fruition 
in L'Etre et le neant (1943). 
Sartre's theory of consciousness, closely related to the 
above, is also very relevant. 
modes of ___ '!B_eing,", that which is identifiable and that which 
~--·· -- •' ,it-1 co 
is not. The first mode of being is pr_g;::r-e£~1eet~v-e=e:xoi-s4,.er.rce. 
~<:_,..;'.:- - -
The individual lives according to a particular identity; he 
is something and this something is usually given in terms of 
a theory about his identity which he accepts un-reflectively. 
{;:;\ Q; fl, 
\_)/The second mode of "being" occurs when the individual becomes 
aware consciously of the theoretical and provisional nature 
of his living, or, more relevantly, of his value choices. 
Sartre believes that man has to fight to retain this 
" -'{~ If essential "consciousness", since there are certain forces 
that seek constantly to remove this personal freedom created 
' ' f: 
: by a reflective-consciousness. These forces seek, in effeQ~, ; I: 
" .-?~o·~-~- - .··· - - • -~-==--- .. ,:: l f ~?0 identify the person and thus make him something definite. j't 
I ,. 
Now this is directly related to the distinction he made 
between the act.of thinking and the "reality" intended by this 
thinking. Epistemologically, one cannot identify a person 
because this implies that everything is known about that person 
and to achieve this the person making the identification will 
have to predict every possible movement. However as Olafson (1967) 
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points out; 
If I am informed of ••• (a) prediction of my 
behavior, this knowledge will open up 
alternative possibilities of action in 
the situation in which it is predicted 
that I will act in a certain way. In 
existentialistic parlance, the prediction 
as well as the theory from which it 
derives and the sequence of events 
which that theory projects, become 
elements in my situation to which I 
can react in a number of different 
wa;ys that are not determined by the 
theory itself. But, if coming to know 
a prediction theory of some kind by itself 
modifies the situation in question in a 
way_ that is relevant to the_possi.pili ties 
~cc::~==-~····~ 
of action in i \, then the deterministic 
< . 
case can be saved only by expanding the 
original theory to take account of these 
modifications. There would, therefore, 
have to be a second law-based prediction in 
which my reaction to the circumstances specified 
in the first law, as well as to the prediction 
itself, would be taken into account. But 
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the same issue arises with respect to 
this second law: does it predict what 
I will do in these circumstances if I 
also know of this new prediction? 
It appears that as long as I know 
what it is predicted I will do, a 
series of possibilities opens up that 
cannot be foreclosed by that prediction. 
(Pp. 149-150) 
Sartre (1948a, 1948b) takes this further and argues that 
the individual who accepts an identity, that is, who lives in 
terms of a definite norm, such as living in terms of conventional 
morality or in terms of any clearly defined general law, is 
living a determined lif,e. His every action can be predicted 
and is the responsibility not of the individual but of the 
particular thesis that he accepts as identity-giving. 
The authentic, 1 conscious individual on the other hand, 
is free to choose his own identity and thus his own r~sponsibility. 
With this choice however, the individual experiences angoisse 
owing to the uncertain nature of authenticity an.d the taking of 
responsibility on to himself (Smith, 1964). As Sartre puts it; 
I am condemned to exist forever beyond my 
1 Where this term is used in what follows, it is used in the 
Sartrian sense. 
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beyond the causes and motives of 
I am condemned to be free. 
(1956, p.515) 
Sartre clearly alters the Husserlian notion of subjectivity 
1 towards a more personal model in which the individual him::;;elf 
I 
constructs his own meaning_ or identity -- it_is_not-given.to 
him l?Y~C_:n~act_Y.:'.i tl} an_essen:t;tal_reali ty. 
The reason why I have begun with Husserl and Sartre and 
not, say, with Skinner, or any behaviourist is because Sartre, 
in developing Husserl's phenomenology, achieves a deep appreciation 
of the value problem not generally found. Additionally, my 
own treatment of the value problem is derived in part from Sartre. 
~n the introduction I presented the value problem as arising 
out of an infinite regress and cited the work of people like 
Bridgm1;l.Yl. as suggesting the problem. The preceding outline of 
Sartre's theory can be seen to bear very closely on the value 
problem: Husserl conceived of that which has value (transcendental 
reality) as being "found" through a subjective-related epis ternology 
whereas Sartre tried to show that such an epistemology involved 
establishing a value-identity which because of its certain 
identity could no longer be subject to the variations of a 
valuing (and thus personal) individual. 
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If we apply this point to the problem of value in 
psychotherapy, the following situation arises: from Husserl's 
point of view the therapist attends to the "real" structure of 
.the situation by discarding all pre-existing, mundane 
assumptions about the patient and noting only those features 
that are of an essential nature. This point of view is not 
solely Husserlian but is a characteristic of all the existential~ 
humanistic orientations discussed in Section B. 
In short, this position involves the therapist removing 
personal valuations (or at least suspending them) from 
consideration. Implied here is the concept of a definite 
non-personal but nevertheless subjective value - the essential 
structure of psychotherapeutic reality. In terms of general 
therapeutic interest this is, of course, the matrix of the 
patient's personality and his "problem". 
Sartre's argument is that such a formulation is not tenable 
since there is, epistemologically, no such reality structure. 
I The therapist can only create his own personal valuation of the situation: he errs when he considers his valuation to be identical with a "real" problem. 
Sartre, as Olafson (1967) has shown, subscribes to the 
value problem as I have outlined it; the therapist attempts to 
describe a reality and in doing so involves his own values. 
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Consideration of his interpretation by some outside agency 
in turn involves a value a priori and so on. 
It would appear then that the search for "mental health", 
for the "good life" or for a penultimate value is doomed to 
fail because of the intrinsic limitations contained in the 
value problem. Further, the value problem would appear to 
curb "authoritativism" in that, for Sartre, authoritative 
dictates would presuppose the identifiability of such a 
penultive value. 
In this I agree as too, do I accept Sartre's formulation 
of the value problem. However, contained in Sartre's theory 
is a certain implied value that I believe is authoritative and 
in need of examination. 
.. 
This issue centres around Sartre's development of the 
authentic theme. It appears that Sartre uses the value 
problem to present a new value, that of authenticity. Sartre 
points out that the individual can choose between living in 
a state of unawareness of non-consciousness, whereby he does nqt 
take advantage of the value problem or of his essential 
indeterminacy, and a state of such an awareness (Sartre, 1960). 
By suggesting this it is clear that Sartre is advocating 
that a definite value choice exists which, if only individuals 
would choose it, would ensure that they live in "good faith". 
This is clear from the following quotation; 
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••• whenever a man chooses his purpose and his 
commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity 
whatever that purpose may be it is impossible 
to prefer another for him One may object 
1But why should he not choose to deceive 
himself? 1 I reply that it is not for me 
to judge him morally, but I define his self-
deception as an erroro Here one cannot 
avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. 
The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, 
because it is a dissimulation of man's 
complete liberty of commitment. 
(1948a, Pp. 50-51. My emphasis) 
Man 1 s "complete liberty of commitment" is an essential-
istic value and is something which contradicts Sartre's own 
belief in the value problem (McGill, 1948; Natanson 1952). 
In short, if one says that the value problem prevents a value 
ever being identified since this involves the loss of the 
pers?nal valuator then to make appreciation of this into a fact 
or into a basic "liberty" is, in turn, creating an identifiable 
value. The value problem in turn becomes a universal value 
(Naville, 1948). 
My objection to Sartre's thesis is clear; the personal 
gives way to a generalized value, in much the same fashion 
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as Husserl's theory gives way to a general subjectivity. 
The objection is even more clearly seen when applied to the 
psychotherapeutic situation. To advocate a basic "liberty" 
in therapy means that the therapist can recognize the "right 
choice" when an individual makes it. Clearly, from the value 
problem this is not possible in the sense that there exists 
a panacea-li:ke "right choice". To discover an authentic value 
involves identifying it in therapy and as soon as one 
identifies it the individual patient l~ses, in Sartre's 
'terms, the freedom to act differently to any valuation of 
him. 
Further, if -· according to Sartre - the individual is 
unique and can choose his own determination, no other person 
can recognize this uniqueness simply because, in the absolute 
sense, recognition demands knowing on a one-to-one basis • 
. If one should argue that only the ~ of uniqueness is 
recognized as Sartre, I feel, impl;Les when he says "he, the 
l individual, cannot be anything ••• unless others recognize him as such (1948a, p.44)", then one is obliged, as was the case 
with other approaches to the value problem, to ask for the 
1 
values on which such a typology is based. Clearly Sartre 
1 See also Chambliss (1963) and Mead (1938). 
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would not recognize any consensus as determining a unique 
authenticity since this would be against his whole philosophy 
(as Naess, 1968 points out). Under the circumstances 
Sartre appears caught in his own dialectic. 
Merleau-Ponty has argued that Sartre begins with the 
personal "act of freedom" almost as if this freedom appears 
out of nowhere. Consequently, attempts to describe this 
freedom must fail in the final analysis because "freedom" can 
only be described from a point of view which must not be the 
one described (Tillich, 1961). 
( Merleau-Ponty (1942, 1945, 1955) accepts, as does 
\) 
Sartre, the basic indeterminacy of man. He believes that i 
Man's consciousness allows him to make of himself what he 
\ will, yet he feels that Sartre neglected to consider the full implications of his notions of consciousness and subjectivity. 
f0 In _5'..~n!r_a~t, !'lerl_eau-Ponty argues that "free consciousness" 
{V I is_ not an isolated, suddenly ere a ted process. whj, cp __Qf!C' e 
awakened is free to transcend_all_limitations_previ~ly 
existing but it is, rath~r, tied t~_something t~~.i ~s_n~i 
itself. Using Sartre's own arguments, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
tl;lat consciousness cannot be aware of itself if it is alone -
it requires some non-conscious (in Heidegger's terms, some 
"non-thing") contrast in order to be known. 
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Merleau-Ponty's own theory rests on the distinction he 
makes between three levels of "Being" the physical, the 
vital, and the human, each of which is related to the other 
by a dialectical process whereby each higher process is a 
new synthe~~i' of a lower. Each manifestation of "Being" 
cannot , therefore, be said to determine the other yet all 
are necessary aspects in the development of human "Being" 
(Waelhens, 1951).' 
In La phenomenologie de la perception (1945) Merleau-
Ponty stressed the inter-relationship between these levels 
of "being" and the consciousness of the individual. Any 
development of consciousness has, so he believed, ~o be a 
dialectical movement from some pre-existent thesis. 
Consciousness, as a form of "Being" must be related to non-
conscious forms of "Being". 
In short, man's physical or bodily presence serves as 
the grounding which l;inks the two manifestations of "Being". 
l The body is the point of contact between consciousness and the world and, as Kwant (1963) points out, consciousness takes 
l up an--~~~eady_9n-going dialogue which by definition lies deeper than consciousness. It is consciousness that provides L meaning at the human level of "Being". 
It is not necessary to accept Merleau-Ponty 1 s metaphysic 
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to appreciate the point he is making here: Sartre's 
penultimate value of "freedom" can never be explicated 
entirely because man cannot transcend all his limits which 
would be required by such an explication. As Kwant puts it 
"Man would be absolute freedom if only he did not find himself 
in a siiuation which has already a meaning (1963, p.217)" 
referring, of course, to the dialogue of "Being". 
So far what I have done is to contrast two ways of 
conceptualizing the "subjective" nature of the psycho-
therapeutic situation. In each, subjectivity begins with 
the personal involvement of the observer-therapist and each 
ends with some authoritative value-choice being demanded which 
involves a penultimate value. 
1VIerleau-Ponty 1 s criticiBms of Sartre's position emphasize 
i 
that a pure "personalism" (an unique authenticity) is not ! 
consistent with the value problem since, as we have seen this 
omits consideration of the non-authentic - or the non-conscious. 
I prefer to re-interpret this as evidence that the position 
which invests the value of the individual with sole validity 
(as is Sartre's) is an authoritative position. 
Clearly, one seeks now, a tbeory which allows for this 
important "clash" between objective (non-personal) value bias 
and personal (uniquely individual) value bias to be understood. 
One such approach is provided by a group of people whose 
writings show 1VIerleau-Ponty 1 s influence. I refer here to 
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Grene (1966, 1969), Koestenbaum (1961, 1966) and Polanyi 
(1958, 19629 1965, 1966, 1968, 1969). These authors have 
proposed a philosophy of consciousness in which the inter-
relationship between the personal values of the individual 
and the conditions which have to be assumed as a priori to 
that knowledge assumes significant status (Bannan, 1954). 
In this system; 
••• consciousness cannot be described as a 
reality whose essence consists of clear 
self-knowledge. My self-presence is 
·1 conditioned by my existential field, 
which is never wholly a field of light. 
(Kwant, 1963, p.218, my emphasis) 
Polanyi has termed this "existential field" the tacit 
dimension which, he argues, consists of the "kind of indefinable 
insights which the current view of science regards as mere 
psychological phenomena, incapable of producing rational 
inferences (1968, p. 27) ". 
The conceptualization of the situation by the authors is 
best seen in Polanyi 1 s description of the "tacit triad". In 
essence in any situation there are three components. The 
------- ____ _...._ -- -·--- ---· -- - - . - -
- f~, subsidi~_particulars ("fringe facts" for Koestenbaum) 
which are tacit bac~ound factors, allow the individual to 
- ' 
focus on a particular attribute of the situation; 
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The relation of a subsidiary to a focus 
is formed by the act of a person who 
integrates one to the other. And so 
the from-to relation lasts only so 
long as a person, the knower, sustains 
this integration ••• This is not merely 
to say that if we no longer look at a 
thing, we shall cease to see it. The 
knower can dissolve the triad by merely 
looking differently at the subsidiaries. 
The triad will disappear if the knower 
shifts his focal attention away from 
the focus of the triad and fixes it on 
the subsidiaries. 
(Polanyi, 1968, Pp. 30-31) 
~It is the "knower" which forms the third part of this triad. 
Polanyi adds; 
, - - ~ 
t It is intuition ihat senses the presence of 
'-... 
1 hidden resources for solving a problem and 
:which launches the imagination in its pursuit. 
And it is intuition that forms there our 
surmises and which eventually selects from 
the material mobilized by the imagination 
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the relevant pieces of evidence and integrates 
them into the solution of the problem ••• 
All explicit thought ••• can be developed 
and understood only by a tacit operation 
and it is thus based throughout on tacit 
knowing. All knowledge is either tacit or 
rooted in tacit knowing. 
(1968, p.42) 
This is relevant to this theory since it provides a way 
of describing the value problem and allowing for the infinite 
regress embedded in describing value to a situation: knowledge 
of values is personally created by the individual and can only 
be so created by excepting certain "subsidiary" values. 
However, Polanyi does not stop at this. He writes; 
••• I have argued that personal knowledge 
is fully determined, provided that it is 
pursued with unwavering universal intent. 
I have expounded the belief that the capacity 
of our minds to make contact with reality and 
the intellectual passion which impels us towards 
this contact will always suffice so to guide 
our personal judgment that it will achieve 
the full measure of truth that lies 
within the scope of our particular calling. 
( 1958,- p. 27, my emphasis) 
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There is here the hint of a synthetic "truth" emerging and 
this is confirmed when later in the same book he suggests 
that his aim is that "unifying perspective of the different 
aspects of man (p.34)". This truth, Polanyi argues, can 
only be known 11 by dwelling within the unspecifiable particulars 
of its external manifestation (p.33)". 
Now clearly this 11 truth 11 , even if known by a development 
of the tacit triad and by "indwelling", is nevertheless an 
essential truth. Again the impression is given that only by 
following this method will "truth" manifest itself. 
These points are important but should not blind us 
to the relevance of the work of Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty and Polanyi et al for our problem. We at least are now 
in the position of being aware of the pitfalls involved in 
attempting to solve the value problem. Perhaps the most prominent 
of such pitfalls is one that I mentioned earlier - that of the 
dangers of being authoritative, of refusing to accept that one's 
own solution is not sufficient, that there is, in a sense, 
a.need to accept the provisionality of one's every act. 
Further, it seems to me that the "solutions" proposed above 
fail to appreciate the nature of the therapist's (or any 
observer's) value dilemma: he is faced with the need to choose 
between value orientations and he is, frequently, held responsible 
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for this choice. Each suggestion above helps the therapist 
overcome this dilemma by subscribing to some "authentic" 
value. choice. Clearly, for a Sartre or a Polanyi, it would 
be quite unacceptable for our therapist to choose to be 
inauthentic or to dismiss "tacit" assumptions. 
/ 
These considerations now enable us to define an 
existential perspective. It is this; the therapist, as he 
considers various alternative claims to solution of the value 
problem is faced with numerous authoritative claims. He alone 
can choose - in the existential therapeutic situation - to 
accept or reject now this and now that orientation. Quite which he 
accepts or rejects, be it an existential or behavioural orien-
tation is unimportant, all are (relatively-speaking) equally 
authoritative in that any choice as such is a movement away 
from the value dilemma. 
I 
The author:h_j;§'.j;:j.ve.act is, then, one which identifies a 
! particular value as being superior or better or in some way 
i I more realistic than another - in any given situation. Now, 
[ I want to argue that the existential situation defined above 
contains the possibility for two sorts of action, authoritative 
and non-authorj_tative and that both are essential features of 
any therapeutic action. 
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But first, consciousness and non-consciousness have 
been important issues in the preceding discussion and 
remain so here. I assume that the therapist has some awareness 
of at least the following; his patient and a number of 
possible ways of understanding him and his needs. These 
"ways of understanding" are not only formal value orientations 
of the type treated here, but involve too, numerous background 
valuations provided by what is normally understood by 
physiological, cultural, social and personality factors in the 
therapist (Natanson, 1969, Winthrop, 1961). 
Now I do not imply that this awareness or consciousness 
is of such a type that certain factors are focussed upon 
while some remain hidden, nor is it of the type that some 
reside in an unconscious part of the mind. These are types 
of consciousness and, as such, are theories about mental 
functioning. When I use the term I do not imply any particular 
theory of consciousness but rather that in the existential situation 
1 
the therapist is aware of certain factors: 
be aware of the value problem or cannot be aware. 
he can for example 
I do not 
' mean that the value problem, if he is unaware of it, awaits ~ 
\discovery or is, in some Heideggerian sense, hidden (Wyschogrod, 
1961). 
The only limiting condition is that our problem is a 
specified one and consciousness is tied to a particular situation 
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(psychotherapy) in which a therapist is in therapeutic 
relationship with a patient. The problem is an existential, 
I conscious one: the patient in 
1 patient. 
the therapist seeks to understand or value 
some way so that he can do some thing for the 
I should add that this definition of consciousness is an 
assumption which itself can be questioned but which is used 
here heuristically. Like McClure and Tyler (1967a, 1967b) 
( 
I assume this as minimum: 
of a particular situation. 
consciousness is consciousness 
From within this situation the therapist constructs his 
/
own awareness of particular value orientations. These, 
of course, need not be those outlined here but could be any 
orientations that the therapist is famiJ,.iar with. However it 
is important to note that in const~cting his awareness, the 
therapist does so eclectically. By this I mean that his 
knowledge of a particular value orientation is a function of 
how he understands and synthesizes the reading or other 
communication that he has with members of the orientation. 
The importance of this point is established when we 
remember that the distinction that is to be made is between 
authoritative and non-authoritative actions, not whether or not 
the therapist acts in accordance with the essential features of 
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1 one orientation or another. It follows from this that the 
therapist cannot identify absolutely value orientations as 
existing independent to himself and to his own act of knowing: 
what he can do however is to familiarize himself with the 
writings etc., o.f particular people and for this reason, the 
therapist is an eclectic because what he knows is not identical 
to value orientation but is his own interpretation of these 
\writings etc. 
This becomes clearer if we consider the status of a theory 
or value orientation if it were identifiable completely. It would, 
for one thing, never change, never be subject to interpretative 
variation or to arguments over precise meaning of its postulates 
and axioms. In short such a position is not in keeping with 
the arguments developed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Equall~' 
\
to e~tablish the existence of a definite value orientation 
requires that the essential features of that orientation be 
1::s:~~~d~::::~:::~e, tha~is, without the bias provided 
My use of the term "eclectic" refers to the personal and 
unique way in which the therapist conceives of the therapeutic 
-- -- _____.,,,,_,. 
situation. In so far as he knows that there is more than one 
-- ----------~ - -· - "-•• - T"" - - -~ - -
way of looking at the therapeutic situation he is aware of _the 
v~~ problem, perhaps not in quite the same fashion as outlined 
here but at least in so far as alternative frameworks are 
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recognized as such. Judging from the number of articles 
devoted to attacking "non-acceptable" orientations, it seems 
fair to say that most if not all psychologists are aware 
to some degree of the dilemma. 
Clearly in so ~ar as w~ ar~ concerne~with val~e 
orientations the th~r~pist_~il~ direct his attention to aspects 
of the situation according to a numb~r of factor~ one of 
which will be the particular value orientation that he has, 
.. --------·- -- - - ...,._. - ~ 
in the past, chosen or in which_h~ was trained. Thus if 
he has subscribed to the naturalistic orientation he would 
be most likely to consider those aspects of the therapeutic 
situation which he is familiar with, and which can be easily 
identified with labels that he has learnt to regard as 
significant. An example would be particular symptoms or 
symptom patterns which the therapist presumes he has the 
techniques to remove. 
Alternatively, if existentially or humanistically 
orientated, the therapist would go through more or less the 
same process of identification}"absence or presence, 
for instance, of "neurotic guilt", general "apatby" or 
fragmentation and so on (Maddi, 1967). In both cases the 
therapist tries to search for some value which he can 
identify and so give him a lead as to what to do, how to 
behave, what to aim for, and so on. 
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Now, returning to the distinction referred to earlier, it 
\ 
\becomes apparent that authoritative action is that action which 
r 
/' involves the ~~:V-~d~al 1 s commitment to a value orientation. 
\Such an act is a decision that is of the type "I choose to be a 
\rehaviourist, an existentialist, or whatever". Now this 
choice defines the extreme authoritative position and applies in 
particular to the value orientations discussed in Section B. 
These orientations, as I have shown, reject almost completely 
the value problem. One is, as it were, an existentialist 
or a behaviourist, for life or at least for a greater part 
of one's life. Notice that, from the definition of eclectic, 
this commitment is a personal one and is based on the choice 
of the individual, as he perceives and has structured the 
situation. 
~ At the other extreme, the non-authoritative position advocates 
) complete adherence to the value problem. In the existential 
!' situation there exists numerous alterriative value orientations 
1' 
cl, which can be used to interpret the situation and to direct action. 
None of these values can be applied in such a way as to constitute 
a "correct" solution to the dilemma since there cannot be a 
"correct" solution in the absolute sense. Any solution has 
itself to be the subject of further evaluation and the evaluation 
evaluated and so on. 
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Naturally enough,. however, the therapist has to decide to 
\ 
act and must at some 
value orientations. 
stage make use of the ideas of respective 
The therapist cannot not-act in order not 
to be wrong, or not to create conditions in which he has only 
a certain amount of control. He has to choose to do something 
and choosing to do nothing can be as authori~ative as choosing to 
use behavioural techniques. Besides, what is doing nothing? 
Surely it is only nothing from some value position itself and 
involves the absence of that position rather than a zero act. 
Non-authoritative therapeutic action is provisional 
action and means that the therapist acts (and can do so by 
using any means he chooses) but he does so while yet maintaining 
commitment to the value problem. 
Provisionality arises in the following way; we accept that 
-----
the therapist cannot hope to define the reality of the situation 
since such a definition involves total identification of the 
reality with no possibility for evaluation of the evaluator. 
Such an identification is authoritative and equates reality with 
what the therapist thinks is the case. Provisiopality follows 
on from the contrast provided by the value problem and involves 
the notion that whatever the therapist does in the situation his 
act cannot be evaluated finally; provisionality being dependent on 
evaluation which in terms of the actual situation may take the 
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direction of being judged correct according to some value 
orientation known to me, or being judged ·as correct by the 
effect I see it has on the patient. Neither of which can be 
said to be final. 
Maintenance of this provisional and non-authoritative 
state of mind requires the balancing provided by contrasting value-
orientations as created by the conscious awareness of the therapist. 
) There can be no appeal to any.one authority as being above or 
jbeyond the individual or vested in the individual. Such an act 
of authority-seeking results in the removal of the balance, 
and the creation of certainty and~identity·: ·the patient's 
"problem" becomes established and the appropriate "cure" is 
prefer.red (Szasz, 1961). 
• Now, whilst others have intimated that the value problem, 
as such, is of central importance, they have not developed notions 
of provisionality in quite the same way as is done here. 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre appear to come close: Sartre in 
his notion of the authentic consciousness keeping "bad faith" 
at bay which seems related to provisionality (Naess, 1968) and 
Merleau-Ponty 1 s "ambiguity" which involves the individual having 
to tolerate a certain amount of ambiguity in his understanding 
of the humari level of "Being". However, the term provisionality 
used here, as the term "consciousness", does not contrast 
"good" wa:ys·of evaluation with "bad" but compares the value 
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problem with numerous ways of evaluation and it is this 
distinction that allows in the long-run a non-authoritative 
position to develop. 
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As we have defined the existential situation here, it 
applies to a very particular time and space network. There is, 
for example, implied in the definition, the social institutional 
. 
determination of concurrent therapist-patient exigencies (Hotopf, 
1958, 1959). We accept that the therapist has a special 
(trained) position and that, by virtue of his training, he is 
placed in a position to convey directives as to how people 
should best live and so on. Clearly this need not be the 
penultimate definition of therapeutic action and indeed we err 
to consider it so. 
However, ·in this thesis it has been assumed that the 
existential situation is one that most therapists are familiar 
with. Equally it has peen assumed that the orientations discussed 
are relevant to modern psychotherapists. 
The orientations treated pertain to this particular situation 
but, as mentioned before, any value orientations can be used. In 
so far as we are dealing with naturalistic a.~d existential -
humanistic orientations, comments will be restricted to them. 
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Now it seems fair to say tbat most therapists believe 
tbat the patient bas, in some sense, a problem or problems 
in living. Now I want to suggest tbat the most important 
implication of the provisional position concerns this·view of the 
patient. 
From the authoritative position, the patient's problem has 
to be identified and this can be done in a variety of ways 
even to the extent of employing an approach which treats the 
patient's complaint multi-dimensionally. Provisional\ry-, 
however, suggests tbat the patient does not bave a complaint 
"out there" but tbat his "complaint" is only such according to 
the value orientation selected; if one shifts value orientations, 
the complaint need not necessarily remain as such although 
clearly it may do so. 
This becomes apparent if we take, by way of example, the 
behavioural definition of a problem as a socially-deviant attitude 
and contrast it with an existentialist orientation's view which 
regards this "same" complaint as evidence of authentic action 
(Sartre for example on numerous occasions demands tbat a man 
be judged by his actions alone, not by his thoughts - surely a 
unique twist to delight any behaviourist). To be aware 
of the value problem both these interpretations are essential 
since they allow the clash of value interests to be appreciated. 
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To paraphrase Polanyi, the therapist's being aware of these 
two orientations constitutes a "provisional triad" in which 
the two alternate orientations are secondary background 
characteristics which intend the focus, the value problem. 
I should add that unlike Polanyi, this triad is a conscious 
one, not necessarily based on a tacit "truth". 1 
Clearly involved in this "triad" is a certain basic 
requirement. This is that the therapist has to be aware 
of the two orientations treated here. He should, at least 
initially, know what the "other" has to say. However one 
cannot say precisely what this requirement has to be since 
the therapist constructs his awareness eclectically. As the' 
various orientations have been presented here they have been 
presented eclectically as I see them. Any awareness should 
be sufficient to at least appreciate the value problem. 
Now, it seems to me, that two important points follow from 
I this conceptualization of the patient's problem. concerns the status of mental illness and the second therapeutic The first 
action. 
In Section A, the problem of value was related to the 
f problem of mental health• 
conceptualizes the person and his problems is intimately related 
in a sense how each value orientation 
to that orientation's picture of mental good and bad health. 
1 The third part of the triad is, of course, the therapist. 
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Now, it is apparent that the provisional position is in 
agreement with those theorists who have argued that mental 
illness is not an illness "out-there" (Smith, 1961). 
Mental health is, in terms of provisionality, not a 
unitary concept, indeed it cannot be j_dentified as a 
goal whether applied in terms of the health of the individual 
or the health of a societal corrrrnunity, but has to be seen as 
\ 
.a complex concept made up of how different people view 
mental health. 
The problem of mental health is the problem of value 
applied psychotherapeutically. In order to be non-authoritative 
the problem has to be seen as such, it has to be seen as the 
existence of conflicting directives for health provided by the 
vru:-iou~ v~lue orientations. In this sense we can agree with 
Szasz that mental health involves "problems in living" but 
we add that mental health is, equally, a problem. Can we, for 
example, i~entify the mentally healthy personality? I think not. 
Not, certainly, in the sense of creating an essential mode of 
living: we cannot, and indeed must not, if we are to remain 
'" 
'i 
aware of the value problem, believe that the healthy person is 
non-fragmented, or whole, or has a congruity between affect and 
cognition, ·or is well-adjusted. 
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These are authoritative dictates and are part of the way 
in which therapists refer to mental health but should not 
be regarded as, therefore, the equivalent of mental health. 
Equally, we cannot dispose of them, they are functional to 
our provisionality and this i~ why the provisionality advocated 
here does not in itself present a new way of looking at 
human action and human problems - it merely provides the 
means for therapists being made aware of the value problem. 
As Jourard (1967) puts it; 
Might it not be better to teach acceptance 
of the parad~xical than to require as a 
'mark of maturity' that the individual 
hang his identity on a limited set of 
his capacities for being? 
(p. 25) 
In terms of the naturalistic and existential - humap.istic 
orientations, the therapist, to be aware of the value problem, 
should be able to appreciate that both behavioural and existential 
perspectives for example, define mental he~lth yet without 
believing, as Hitt (1967) for example, does, that a third "new" 
perspective will emerge from such an appreciation. 
The next point concerns the action that follows from the 
above. In choosing to act provisionally, the therapist does 
not necessarily act in a new way - he may, for example, choose to 
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act existentially or behaviouris~ically. What he does do, 
however, is appreciate that his action is not an action in 
full accordance with behavioural values or humanistic values, 
but is a unique act in which he, as a part of the existential 
situation acts as he has understood these values. That is, 
in his action as well as in his construction of the situation 
he is eclectic and cannot identify completely what he has done 
(La.mbley, 1970a). 
The best example of this point is perhaps La~arus 1 
admission that he was always able to understand his actions 
in terms of S-R psychology until he appreciated the personal 
influence that he himself imparted to the situation. Now he 
interprets all he does in terms of technical eclecticism. The 
point here is that wby should the re-interpretation end here? 
Clearly, the structure of his action is a provisional one and 
it is not a question of wbat the therapist did do or did not 
do, but of his ability - as part of the existential situation -
to identify what had taken place. 
It follows from this that the uniqueness of the therapist's 
actions are his own responsibility in so far as it is he alone 
that makes them. He may feel that he acted in accordance with 
the dictates of a value orientation but this is an authoritative 
shifting of responsibility away from himself and away from the 
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value problem. By being provisional, t~e _ therapi_s-t; __ ~_'.'.l not 
bound by the requ~eme!-1-ys _of_ J>elc:mging _to particular __ value 
orientations and he is free to comb~~- ~s_he deems necessary 
the various orientation's values into unique syntheses. Equally 
he can choose to use behavioural techniques with one patient 
and existential "techniques" with another, without feeling 
that he has to be consistently "behavioural" or "existential". 
His is the responsibility alone if he chooses to be provisional. 
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